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Abstract
Maximising expected utility has long been accepted as a valid model of
rational behaviour, however, it has limited descriptive accuracy sim-
ply because, in practice, people do not always behave in the prescribed
way. This is considered evidence that either people are not rational,
expected utility is not an appropriate characterisation of rationality,
or combination of these. This thesis proposes that a modified form of
expected utility hypothesis is normative, suggesting how people ought
to behave and descriptive of how they actually do behave, provided
that: a) most utility has no meaning unless it is in the presence of
potential competitors; b) there is uncertainty in the nature of com-
petitors; c) statements of probability are associated with uncertainty;
d) utility is marginalised over uncertainty, with framing effects pro-
viding constraints; and that e) utility is sensitive to risk, which, taken
with reward and uncertainty suggests a three dimensional representa-
tion. The first part of the thesis investigates the nature of reward in
four experiments and proposes that a three dimensional reward struc-
ture (reward, risk, and uncertainty) provides a better description of
utility than reward alone. It also proposes that the semantic differ-
ential, a well researched psychological instrument, is a representation
or description of the reward structure. The second part of the thesis
provides a mathematical model of a value function and a probabil-
ity weighting function, testing them together against extant problem
cases for decision making. It is concluded that utility, perhaps more
accurately described as advantage in the present case, when construed
as three dimensions and the result of a competition, provides a good
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It is uncontroversial that some form of preferences must have existed prior to the
evolution of intelligence or rationality and that an evolutionary process cannot
produce the cognitive machinery to input, reason with or generally use infor-
mation in a format that was not available from the environment (Cosmides &
Tooby, 1996; Robson, 2001). It is reasonable to suppose that one of the simplest
forms of information available is and would have been in our evolutionary past,
the frequency of good and bad things that occur. Simply put, things that are
perceived to make your world better are good and things that are perceived to
make your world worse are bad. In order to make choices about what may or
may not make our worlds better or worse, a forecast or prediction about what
will happen is needed.
It may be thought that reducing prior experience to the apparent use of two
outcomes is too limited, however, it is argued that this is not the case. This
thesis proceeds on the basis that peoples choices are determined by their beliefs
and desires; that is, the things that are likely to be desired and thereby gain them
1
advantage are ‘good’, otherwise things are ‘neutral’ or ‘bad’. This is not meant to
suggest that choices are dominated by something like hedonism, but rather that
people try to achieve things that they want (perhaps in our evolutionary past
their own or others survival through the benefit of food or escape from danger)
and that choices are made in a way that they believe is likely to realise them,
in other words, choices are a means to an end, or instrumental. It should also
be noted that, in the sense currently used, good and bad should not be taken in
a moral or ethical way but rather to indicate that a person feels attraction and
aversion or perhaps exhibits assimilation or contrast.
To be able to make accurate predictions and therefore effective choices, implies
that certain characteristics are represented for every object, situation and action
that we can make choices for, for example, to choose between “do I go for a
walk or grab a coffee”, I must be able to compare them and to do so requires a
‘common currency’. While most of the aspects of things that we know about, for
example, a particular concept, situation or object, are specific (“has wings” is an
appropriate feature for describing birds, but not situations), arguably only one
characteristic of a concept has to be represented in order to make a choice. The
quantity used to compare possible options is known in economics as utility and
in psychology as predicted reward.
This is taken as the point of departure for the present thesis. It is proposed
that a modified form of the expected utility theory is both normative, suggesting
how people ought to behave, and is also descriptive of how they do, in fact,
behave. Maximising expected utility has long been accepted as a valid model of
rational behaviour, however, it has limited predictive and descriptive accuracy
simply because, in practice, people do not always behave in the prescribed way.
2
Accordingly, this is interpreted as evidence that either humans are not rational,
expected utility is not an appropriate characterisation of rationality, or some
combination of these. The present thesis argues that this observed behaviour
can be considered rational and expected utility an appropriate characterisation of
rational choice, provided it is accepted that a) most utility/reward has no meaning
unless it is in the presence of potential competitors; b) there is uncertainty in the
nature of the competitors; c) all statements of probability are also associated
with uncertainty; d) utility is marginalised over uncertainty, with framing effects
providing constraints; and that e) utility is also sensitive to risk, which when taken
together with reward and uncertainty suggests a three dimensional representation
of utility.
Chapter 2 motivates this view based on a survey of the literature that ranges
from Damasio’s Somatic Marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994), which argues that
rational choices are based on emotions and feelings, through to the expected util-
ity hypothesis and how it has been shown not to be representitive of peoples
behaviour, together with how it was modified by Rank Dependent Utility the-
ories and, in particular, Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory. It
seems intuitively right, though, that rational behaviour is to do with choices that
are made in a social environment (or social economy as it is sometimes called),
which was noted by Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), and must take account
of uncertainty and prior experiences, which give rise to beliefs. Our beliefs about
things are important because, although they are subjective, we use a process of
induction to apply them to novel situations. Indeed, the greater our experience
of particular things and situations is, the more sure we are about making choices
involving those things and situations.
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While choices based on induction can not be easily justified on a rational
(philosophical) basis, updating the beliefs that they are based on can be rational,
using Bayes’ rule. Taken together, the uncertainties and risks that must be inher-
ent in the process of making a choice mean that, consistent with Rushworth and
Behrens (2008), choices can not be made based on expected reward alone, but
must instead involve two further dimensions, taking the risks and uncertainties
of achieving a reward into consideration. It is highlighted that there is a psycho-
logical instrument called the semantic differential (Osgood & Suci, 1955; Osgood,
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) that has been in use since the 1950’s and offers a
three dimensional description of concepts in terms of their connotative or emo-
tional content: In particular its reliability and universality are emphasised. The
plausibility of thee dimensions of reward is also considered from the perspective
of neurophysiology and the neurotransmitters, dopamine, serotonin, acetylcholine
and norepinephrine.
Based on these ideas and adopting a very broad question at the outset consid-
ering what rules or processes govern people’s choices in a social economy, Chapter
3 proposes that there are three dimensions of reward that can be plausibly de-
scribed using the semantic differential. Implicit in this proposal is that these
dimensions of reward must be maintained for all of the concepts that we know.
The difficulties of collecting data that are concerned with good and bad experi-
ences covering such a large range of concepts is addressed using internet blogs
and an experiment carried out to investigate whether the inferred good and bad
experiences are predictive of the dimensions of the semantic differential. It is
found that the semantic differential dimensions are predictable and the Evalua-
tion, Potency and Activity dimensions are tentatively relabelled as Reward, Risk,
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and Uncertainty.
However, the relationship between the Internet data and the semantic differen-
tial is correlational and, of course, a causal link can not be inferred from it; what
is required is to be able to demonstrate manipulation of the semantic differential,
that is, what has been proposed as a description of a three dimensional reward
structure, through experiences alone. This is the subject of Chapter 4 which,
on the basis of experiences from betting on arbitrary shapes (representing an
economic decision), finds that the semantic differential can be manipulated and
concludes that, to a first approximation, the semantic differential appears to be
a summary of the reward history. Despite the analysis of internet blog data and
the AlphaBet shapes experiment the Activity dimension, perhaps unsurprisingly,
was not well addressed.
Based on the idea that this latent factor is perhaps more accurately described
as control or certainty. Chapter 5, the triangles experiment, successfully focuses
on certainty by keeping other variables, such as the shape, static. In addition,
because, no explicit rewards are given to participants, unlike the AlphaBet shapes
experiment, only the subjective feeling that a good choice has been made is avail-
able, this experiment is perhaps more like many everyday choices. A fourth
experimental chapter investigates the hypothesised relationship between the se-
mantic differential and reward structure based on the premise that the somatic
marker hypothesis, and hence our reward structure, is created through physio-
logical states and learned associations.
Chapter 6 concludes the first part of the thesis with an investigation of the
idea that our reward structure will be evident from ‘lower level’ perceptual infor-
mation. Since it is known that the mere perception of colour triggers evaluative
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processes (Elliot & Maier, 2007), perceptual information, in the form of colour, is
assumed to be included when viewing a scene briefly, that is to say based on the
gist of a scene, and used in its evaluation. It is found that a semantic differen-
tial can be produced from ratings of scenes that are viewed briefly and that this
relates to the colour composition of those scenes. In addition, during the course
of the data analysis, it is shown that a good representation of the basic colours,
proposed by Berlin and Kay (1969), can be produced from first principles.
The second part of the thesis is concerned with constructing two functions
with broadly the same characteristics as those described by prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), a value function
and a probability weighting function. The chapters covering modelling these two
functions are preceded by a short chapter that reiterates the importance of un-
certainty, introduces Bayesian modelling and discusses a feature of the decision
making literature that has received attention recently; decisions from descrip-
tion versus decisions from experience. The modelling then proceeds in Chapter 8
which addresses a function called the value function.
Based around Bayesian techniques, the approach used for the value (or util-
ity) function introduces the novel ideas of utility of advantage and fair judges.
Retaining the idea of a personal reference point introduced by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), it is proposed that utility, which can not be measured directly
and since Kahneman and Tversky has been considered to be based on changes
in wealth, is more correctly concerned with the probability (or how certain) that
we are to gain an advantage over real or hypothetical competitors. Furthermore,
harking back to the very origins of expected utility, that the winning or gaining
advantage over those competitors is based on the idea that the result would be as
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if it were decided by a fair judge. The resulting value or utility function has all
of the key features of the empirically derived value function of prospect theory.
Another function, the probability weighting function, modifies the result of the
utility function and is generally considered to represent the way that people have
been found to overestimate small probability events, but underestimate medium
and large probabilities.
Chapter 9 focuses on the probability weighting function, which, evident from
the literature, has received much research effort. Since being proposed in prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), the weighting
function has been considered to be as described above, underweighting medium
and high probabilities and overweighting lower probabilities, however, this has
been questioned recently under the heading of decisions from experience. The
probability weighting function that is constructed in Chapter 9 tries to account for
new and novel experiences using a novel, but straight forward Bayesian approach
with a mixture of priors. As with the utility function, the probability function
that is constructed has all of the features of the weighting function found in
prospect theory. Armed with a model consisting of both of these functions,
Chapter 10 carries out tests against the documented problem cases that are found
in the decision making literature, based on the data and results from previous
studies. The model is found to account well for all of these problem cases.
Chapter 11 draws the thesis to a conclusion, summarising the findings, iden-





Two friends are camping and they are attacked by a bear.
One puts on his running shoes.
“What are you doing? You can’t outrun the bear.”
“I don’t need to out run the bear. I only need to outrun you.”
Anon.
2.1 Introduction
This thesis is, to a large extent, concerned with rational choices. “Rationality” in
this context is not the same as its common or everyday use, meaning something
like “in a clear and considered way”, its philosophical uses, or just “sane”. Ac-
cording to Herbert Simon (1979, p500), the classical model of rationality requires
knowledge of all the relevant alternatives, their consequences and probabilities,
and a predictable world without surprises. These conditions, however, are rarely
met for the problems that individuals and organizations face, despite being implic-
itly (and sometimes explicitly) assumed in research. In this thesis, the meaning
of “rational” is taken to be something more instrumental, such as, “weighing the
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presently perceived benefits in order to reach a choice that maximises some sort
of personal advantage”. This is not too far from the idea of rationality that is
now used in some areas of Economics (Blume & Easley, 2008), but, contrary to
many philosophers views, it tries to embody the personal and deeply subjective
nature of many of our choices, yet retain the notion of reasoning.
The classical model assumes that decision making involves maximization of
expected utility, almost as if there were unlimited knowledge, time, and processing
power (Bechara & Damasio, 2005), and commonly that rational decisions must
be strictly objective, logical and free from emotion (Goldie & Spicer, 2002). Emo-
tions are always partial, arbitrary and just happen to people, whereas rational
choices should be impartial, justified and made freely; indeed, a standard instruc-
tion given by judges, to members of a jury in a court of law, is that they should
not be swayed by emotions, or let emotions influence their judgements (Pizarro,
2000). However, emotions have long been recognised as powerful influences on
human behaviour and their function or purpose in our lives has been debated
historically. Plato considered emotions and affective reactions in general, to be
‘foolish counsellors’ and two thousand years later philosophers such as Descartes
and Kant continued to view emotions as aﬄictions that biased and obscured
thought and decisions. Psychology and neuroscience, on the other hand, suggest
that this view is unrealistic because everything we do is inextricably linked with
our emotional and affective systems (Damasio, 1994, 1996, 2000). Unlike the
classical model, this thesis considers that our choices are unavoidably coloured
by affect and, indeed, that affect is a vital part of making effective choices.
The literature that is concerned with choices is very deep and richly textured,
beginning arguably with J. Bernoulli (1713) who was interested in probability, due
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mainly to gambling, and continuing through to the axiomatisation of Expected
Utility theory (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and Prospect Theory (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Much of the literature, especially
in recent years, seems to be characterised by research that concentrates on axiom
violation. The intention here, however, is to focus on those parts of the litera-
ture that are concerned with affect, context and uncertainty, which are surely very
important, especially when making intuitive, everyday, choices and form the foun-
dation for the present thesis; indeed, Davidson and Irwin (1999) conclude that
“every region in the brain that has been identified with some aspect of emotion
has also been identified with aspects of cognition... The circuitry that supports
affect and the circuitry that supports cognition are completely intertwined”, a
point that is central to Antonio Damasio’s Somatic Marker hypothesis.
2.2 The Somatic Marker Hypothesis
The somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994) offers a neuroanatomical and
cognitive framework for decision making and how emotion influences it; building
on an idea that was proposed by William James and Carl Lange (James, 1894;
Lange, 1885), the somatic marker hypothesis proposes that emotions arise from
physiological states of the body, for example, the emotion of fear arises from the
physiological state of increased heart rate, sweating, etc. that is associated with
some event. Significantly and central to the hypothesis is that marker signals aris-
ing in these bioregulatory processes, particularly those that express themselves in
emotions and feelings, influence decision making. This influence can be at differ-
ent levels, some of which occur consciously and others that occur non-consciously
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(Bechara, 2000).
The Somatic Marker hypothesis draws a distinction between primary and
secondary emotions. Primary emotions, happiness, fear etc. appear to be hard
coded and generated by evolutionarily older parts of the brain, particularly in
the limbic system (Damasio, 1998). These areas of the brain are responsible for
predictable body responses such as increased heart rate and sweating. Secondary
emotions or the experience of emotional states (more correctly ’feelings’ according
to Damasio), on the other hand, are learned and depend on the experiences
of an individual; they affect ongoing thinking and accordingly can alter future
thinking. Secondary emotions are dependent on the prefrontal cortex, but operate
through the older primary network (Damasio, 1994, pp173-183). Indeed, Damasio
identifies the prefrontal cortices as one of the very few areas that receive signals
about any activity that takes place in the mind and body (Damasio, 1994, p181).
As individuals go about their lives, frontal networks create associations be-
tween activity in primary sensory cortices and physiological states of the body;
experiences are marked by body states, hence the Somatic Marker hypothesis
and it is these that are then used in future thinking. It is uncontroversial that
categorisation is one of the most basic and important things that we do in terms
of cognition, indeed, there is much evidence, especially from memory research,
that memories of experiences and concepts are stored with associated affect (e.g.
Squire, 1992; LeDoux, 1993, 1996).
Although there is no agreement on how it might be achieved, despite much
research, categorisation of a novel stimulus involves what has been experienced
previously, that is, categorisation depends on generalising from particular learned
instances to novel situations (Kruschke, 2005). Memory researchers believe that
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episodic memories (memories for specific experiences) are refined into semantic
memories (memory of meaning, understanding, and other concept based knowl-
edge unrelated to specific experiences) over time, along with the attendant emo-
tion (e.g. Squire, 1992). In this process, much of the episodic information about
a particular event is generalised and the context of the specific events is lost.
Given this understanding of the way that semantic memories are formed and
considering the way that we learn, it can be inferred that the affective component
is available from both episodic and semantic forms of memory. Introspectively
this seems to be right; we can all remember how it felt to be in a particularly
embarrassing situation or the sadness at the loss of someone very close, even if it
is a less potent emotion; in fact Damasio et al. (2000) has used just this approach
to confirm the hypothesis that there is a close relationship between emotion and
homeostasis.
Research from outside of Damasio’s lab investigating ‘interoception’ (our aware-
ness our homestatic state or ‘the material me’ as Craig (2002) puts it) using
imaging techniques (Craig, 2002, 2003; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, &
Dolan, 2004), also provides strong support for the somatic marker hypothesis.
The feelings associated with concepts and experiences through somatic markers
may be consciously or unconsciously perceived and replayed, through Damasio’s
(1994) body-loop or as-if-body-loop, with the result that alternative actions with
negative markers are rapidly rejected and those with positive markers receive
more attention.
The idea that the evolutionary process has created neocortical systems of
regulation on top of more ancient ones is important because, on this basis, judging
and decision making serves the same purpose as the more ancient limbic system
13
2.2 The Somatic Marker Hypothesis
i.e. survival, reproduction etc.. In Damasio’s view, making a good choice is
choosing to act so as to be ultimately advantageous to the individual in terms of
survival and the quality of that survival (Damasio, 1994, p169). Key here is that
there must be correctly operating emotional circuitry and correctly operating
cognitive circuitry (including memory) that interacts.
When operating correctly, this interaction serves, amongst other things, to
draw attention to salient events (Damasio, 2000), which would seem to be a sig-
nificant adaptive advantage if those salient events concern things such as danger
or reward for example, as is often the case when making choices. People with
damage to their prefrontal cortex seem to lose the ability to integrate affect with
their choices (Damasio, 1994). They can still carry out reasoning tasks, partic-
ularly those that are norm or rule based, but interestingly, having been released
from the influence of feelings, these people do not become hyper rational, Mr
Spock1 like, fiercely objective and logical. Rather, they lose the ability to know,
quickly and intuitively, that questionable choices should not be made; these in-
dividuals do not have intuitive feelings of rightness or wrongness. As Damasio
illustrates with the famous case of Phineas Gage, people with frontal cortex dam-
age can not decide which choice to make, often ending up making poor choices
or no choices at all (Damasio, 1994). Damasio (1994, pp193-194) also provides
an anecdotal illustration of a patient with ventromedial prefrontal damage who,
when asked to choose a next appointment date from two alternatives that were
provided, took more than half an hour, going through many reasons against each
of the dates, and still being unable to come to a conclusion.
1Mr Spock is a fictional character in the Star Trek television series. He is one of the three
central characters; offering his colleagues a classically rational, emotionally detached and logical
perspective.
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Somatic markers then, are feelings that have been connected, through expe-
rience and learning, to episodes and concepts, which are then used to predict
potential outcomes using what Damasio calls body-loops or as-if-body-loops to
play out scenarios and experience feelings (Damasio, 1994; Bechara & Damasio,
2005). If a negative marker is associated with a potential outcome it will serve
as a warning or danger signal and may be automatically discarded, whereas if a
positive marker is associated with a potential outcome attention will be drawn
to it.
Importantly, for decision making, the somatic marker hypothesis provides a
mechanism that reduces the number of options to be considered for a non trivial
decision from indefinitely many for any given alternative to very few, which can
and frequently does, occur beyond conscious awareness. Arguably, relying on
a reasoning process alone is at best prohibitively time consuming and at worst
would not reach a conclusion (as Damasio attempts to show in his anecdote), it
is also potentially error prone (Damasio, 1994, p172). This has been a common
argument in consideration of the calculations potentially required for Utilitarian-
ism and Consequestialism (e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong, 2011). Damasio (1994, p173)
does, however, allow that somatic markers may not be sufficient for all normal
decision making and leaves room for a process of reasoning that ultimately selects
an alternative in some instances. However, the number of potential alternatives
will be narrowed considerably and attention directed to alternatives with the
potential for greater advantage.
Support for the somatic marker hypothesis also comes from a different source,
moral psychology. Much recent research into moral psychology has resulted in a
growing consensus that moral judgement is affectively based and several theories
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have been proposed to explain the part played by emotion (e.g. Greene, 2002,
2007; Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007; Hauser, 2006; Nichols, 2004; Prinz,
2006). The move towards emotion and affectively laden intuition as the basis of
moral choice gathered momentum with the publication of research by Greene,
Sommerville, Nystrom, and Darley (2001) and Haidt (2001). Both essentially
contend that moral judgements are based on intuition, central to which is affect,
arguing that reasoning in moral judgements is for post hoc justification of the
intuition that gave rise to the judgement. Characteristic of this is an inability
to accurately describe how the moral judgement is arrived at, often resulting in
an invented story that Haidt and Bjorklund (2007) refers to as ‘moral confab-
ulation’. If moral judgements were the result of a reasoning process then the
moral principles that were used to reach the judgement would be evident in the
justifications that were given for those judgements.
Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, and Cohen (2004), like Damasio, also leaves
room for a reasoned cost benefit analysis when there is no overriding emotion, for
example in a moral dilemma. It is interesting to note though, that even after the
reasoning process produces a choice, many people would still consider that the
result did not feel right. In a moral dilemma1, the least worst choice (whatever
that might be) is still morally wrong, and in the case of ordinary choices we even
have an idiom, “letting the heart rule the head” or vice versa, that acknowledges
1For example, The crying baby dilemma, Greene et al. (2004): Enemy soldiers have taken
over your village. They have orders to kill all remaining civilians. You and some of your friends
have sought refuge in the cellar of a large house. Outside, you hear the voices of soldiers who
have come to search the house for valuables. Your baby begins to cry loudly. You cover his
mouth to block the sound. If you remove your hand from his mouth, his crying will summon
the attention of the soldiers who will kill you, your child, and the others hiding in the cellar.
To save yourself and the others, you must smother your child to death. Is it appropriate for
you to smother your child in order to save yourself and the others?
16
2.2 The Somatic Marker Hypothesis
the difficulty.
Nonetheless and somewhat ironically, Greene (2007) argues that the post-hoc
justifications and confabulations seen in research are deontological in character
and can be plausibly considered to be the basis of philosophical deontology (that
is, concerned with obligations, duties and right action). Greene justifies this on
the basis that we have strong feelings about what can and cannot be done, but
we have no clear idea how to make sense of those feelings. He goes on to suggest
that philosophers, in order to explain these feelings, have made up a rational story
about rights and duties, concluding that deontology is the cognitive expression
of our deepest moral emotions.
Recent research using imaging techniques (Shenhav & Greene, 2010), pub-
lished during the present project, pulls the findings on moral psychology and
decision making together by reporting that both moral and ordinary decisions
are based on the same neural mechanisms. Shenhav and Greene (2010) suggest
that the prefrontal areas represent both the subjective value of material gains and
losses, together with more abstract and hypothetical gains and losses that may
have no material effect on the decision maker. It is interesting to note that many
of the imaging studies investigating decision making in one form or another and
from one standpoint or another, all find activation of the same areas of the brain.
Journal article after journal article implicates areas of the prefrontal cortex, more
specifically the orbitofrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, as well
as the anterior cingulate cortex in decision making and emotion (e.g. in addition
to those cited above O’Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001;
Walton, Devlin, & Rushworth, 2004; Rolls, 2006; Naqvi, Shiv, & Bechara, 2006).
In summary, emotions or feelings are central to good decision making and
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many of the predictions of the somatic marker hypothesis have been found to be
correct (e.g. Bechara & Damasio, 2005). The hypothesis also attracts support
from other areas (e.g. Craig, 2002; Critchley et al., 2004; Shenhav & Greene,
2010); indeed, it is easy to see that there are also striking parallels with psy-
chological research more generally, particularly in the areas of affective primacy,
(Zajonc, 1980); cognitive impenetrability and confabulation, (Nisbett & Wilson,
1977); and dual process (or system) operation, where an intuitive or automatic af-
fective process can be overridden by (or operate in conjunction with) a conscious
deliberative process (Stanovich & West, 2001).
In much of the research already discussed it could be considered that choices
are made on the basis of maximisation of simple reward (the maximum good
or happiness for example); but this seems to be unsatisfactory as it ignores the
risk and uncertainty that is, or might be, associated with obtaining the reward.
Rushworth and Behrens (2008) also suggests that models of decision making can
be improved by considering a richer conception of reward consisting of reward,
risk (or cost) and uncertainty. This is an important part of the present thesis
that can also be motivated by considering the decision making environment, in
fact, this was considered by Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) under the heading
of rational behaviour in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior ; their classic
treatment of expected utility.
2.3 Rational Behaviour
Far from anything to do with neurophysiology, psychology or reinforcement learn-
ing, the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Neumann & Morgenstern,
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1944), provided a starting point for the interdisciplinary research field of game
theory. Importantly for the present thesis, though, this book also provides a
necessary and sufficient set of axioms from which the expected utility hypothesis
can be derived (see Appendix A), though it should be noted, as Mongin (1997)
does, that the axiomatisation that has become familiar had to wait until the work
of economist Marschak (1950) and mathematicians Herstein and Milnor (1953).
The expected utility hypothesis is originally attributed to D. Bernoulli (1738)
based on his solution to a gambling problem known as the St. Petersburg para-
dox or prospect (see Appendix B), where rational behaviour can be described as
maximizing the expectation of a utility function.
Utility is an abstract concept rather than an observable quantity, which need
not be based on money and as such it can account for risk aversion. Because
people clearly did not consider the St. Petersburg prospect in terms of expected
monetary value, which in this case is infinite, D. Bernoulli argued in effect that
people estimate value instead in terms of the utility of money. D. Bernoulli pro-
posed the log function as a description of expected utility because of its property
of being able to model decreasing marginal utilities (Mongin, 1997). Moving for-
ward to the twentieth century, the expected utility hypothesis set out in Theory
of Games and Economic Behavior (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) essentially
argues that people are rational to the extent that they satisfy the axioms that
they set out and accordingly that rationality can be modelled as maximising an
expected utility or reward. This has been taken to be what people ought to do
and remains the normative theory of choice in economics.
However, although it was hailed as a book of outstanding importance (Hurwicz,
1945), very soon after the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior was pub-
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lished, research became available that showed that human behaviour violated the
normative principles that it set out (e.g. Mosteller & Nogee, 1951). As has been
shown with many experiments that result in violation of the axioms (see below),
the expected utility hypothesis has limited predictive and descriptive accuracy
simply because, in practice, people do not always behave in the appropriate way,
rationally trying to maximise wealth or some fixed non-linear function of it. Nev-
ertheless there are considerations identified by Neumann and Morgenstern that
are important to the present thesis.
Early in the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Neumann and Mor-
genstern (1944, §2.1, p8) discuss the problem of rational behaviour; beginning
with the sorts of choices that might face the only member of a very simple econ-
omy, Robinson Crusoe. Whereas Robinson Crusoe’s problem amounts to simple
maximisation, in the sense that external conditions are given and he has to make
choices in order that his position is as good as it can be, a member of a social
economy, while having preferences, also has to enter into competitive relation-
ships with others. Importantly, in a social economy, a choice will depend not
simply on an individuals own actions but also on those of others, with each at-
tempting to maximise a function where they do not control all the variables. In
this situation people are forced to deal with risk and uncertainty. In much of
the decision making literature it is often difficult to know whether a discussion
is based on risk or uncertainty, but the difference seems to be quite intuitive and
was captured by Knight (1921). According to Knight, risk is about an event or
situation where the probability of an outcome can be determined, while uncer-
tainty, in contrast, refers to an event where probability cannot be determined.
Neumann and Morgenstern conclude that the problem in the social economy,
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unlike Robinson Crusoe’s problem, is a “disconcerting mixture of several conflict-
ing maximum problems”; accordingly, it can be seen that rational behaviour is
considered to be a complex maximising process in a social economy and that,
due to the complexities identified, the members of that economy must deal with
uncertainty. Research with the Ulimatum game potentially supports this view
(e.g. Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006; Henrich et al., 2005).
The Ultimatum game has variations that can be played by two or more par-
ticipants. In its simplest form, a proposer offers a responder part of a fixed
amount given by the experimenter. If the responder accepts the offer, he/she
gets the amount, the proposer keeping the remainder, but if the offer is rejected
neither proposer nor responder get anything. The expected utility hypothesis
suggests that participants ought to be utility maximisers with the proposer offer-
ing a minimal amount and the responder accepting it. However, in anonymous
one-off experiments, conducted in different cultures, proposers commonly offer
considerably more than a minimal amount, and in some cultures responders re-
ject relatively generous offers (Henrich et al., 2005).
However, despite steps taken to ensure that participants remain anonymous
and will not meet again, players tend not to be given explicit details of the
game context, or framing, beyond instructions on how the game works (Hagen &
Hammerstein, 2006). In view of this, participants are likely to take cues, which
can be subtle and occur automatically, from the environment in which they find
themselves, constructing their own frame of reference (Haley & Fessler, 2005). For
example, Bateson, Nettle, and Roberts (2006) have shown that in a naturalistic
setting people will contribute significantly more to an honesty box for drinks
when a picture of eyes is placed above the honesty box and drinks equipment,
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rather than a picture of flowers. It is thought that the eyes motivate cooperative
behaviour, because they create a perception of being watched. The authors argue
that the results confirm the hypothesis that concern for reputation is a powerful
force motivates cooperation. A similar result was found by Haley and Fessler
(2005) in a game played anonymously with either a bland background on the
computer screen they used or one showing a drawing of eyes. These examples
are compelling evidence that humans are attuned to cues that may affect the
judgements they make and actions they perform.
This may also explain variations in the levels of generosity or cooperation
that is observed when the Ultimatum game is played in different cultures, for
example, a series of studies undertaken across fifteen small scale cultures based
on the Ultimatum game (Henrich et al., 2004). In western cultures offers tend to
be around 45%. In other cultures, people offer more, and in some they offer less.
Among the Machiguenga of Peru, the average sum offered was 26% and the most
frequent was 15%, an offer that most western players would consider unfair and
likely reject. The New Guinean Au and Gnau consider accepting a gift creates
a strong obligation to reciprocate, which the receiver often finds difficult. If the
receiver does not reciprocate there are serious social consequences. This may be
the reason that these people tend to reject offers exceeding 50% in the Ultimatum
game (Tracer, 2003). These examples show that players draw upon information
that is not apparent in the formal structure of the game or the experimenters
instructions and is presumably based on prior experience of social factors.
Nonetheless and despite their own comments, Neumann and Morgenstern
state that they will ignore social considerations on the basis that they do not
consider that they change the formal process of maximising (1944, §2.2.1, p10),
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indeed, Marschak (1950, p113) also explicitly excludes basing rational behaviour
on incomplete information, opting instead for a theory based on complete in-
formation. However, while social considerations may have little effect on the
maximisation process itself, the same may not be true of processes surrounding
value and independence. Uncertainty and incomplete information must necessar-
ily be considered. While this point is revisited later in this thesis it is clear that
many of the unknown and uncertain variables that people have to handle must be
inferred from prior knowledge and experience. In order to do this, people must
reason inductively, that is, to derive general principles from particular facts or
instances, and while it is an obvious point for some, it is one that is important,
forming part of the background to this thesis and motivating the use of Bayes’
rule.
2.4 New knowledge
The problem of induction is a philosophical question about whether inferences
based on a series of observations lead to new knowledge. It is a problem that has
exercised philosophers since at least the time of Sextus Empiricus (c. 160-210
CE) and in its current form since Hume (Hume, 1739). Although the arguments
surrounding the problem of induction are not covered in detail here, a description
is provided of how people are thought to gain knowledge that is sufficient to make
choices.
We can know some things with certainty even though they have not been,
and in many cases never will be, observed, for example, a common knowledge
statement that ‘I have not observed every triangle that there could be, but I
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know in advance and with certainty that they will all have three sides’ is, while
elementary, a valid deductive argument. A valid deductive argument is one that
is true by definition, where the conclusion follows from the premises and true
premises guarantee a true conclusion; indeed, to try to deny that a triangle has
three sides is clearly incoherent. However, while this type of argument may
reorder or rearrange what is known, it does not add anything to it and it is not
the sort of knowledge that is of interest here, rather, what is of interest are what
Hume (1748, §IV, Part I) calls matters of fact.
Matters of fact claim to report the nature of things in the world and a propo-
sition that is a matter of fact has the distinctive feature that both the fact and its
contradiction are conceivable. There is no doubt that we have opinions and be-
liefs that involve unobserved matters of fact; indeed it is probably fair to say that
practical life would be impossible without them; it has already been mentioned
in §2.2 that inference is used in categorisation, albeit unconsciously. Knowledge
of unobserved matters of fact can not be derived a priori (prior to experience).
Rather, knowledge of matters of fact must in some way result a posteriori (from
experience).
To paraphrase Hume (1748, §IV, Part I); someone would have to be very smart
to discover, just by thinking, that ice is the effect of cold, without previously
having experienced water turning to ice in the cold. Having experienced English
winters, for example, we would obviously predict that water will turn to ice given
sufficiently low temperatures, and clearly be right. However, the water could stay
liquid or turn to ice; neither conjecture involves any kind of contradiction and
as long as no investigation is allowed, neither proposition can be ruled out. So a
priori there are no grounds for an opinion or belief one way or the other. The
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difference between us and our potentially smart friend, is simply a difference in
experience; which seems to be completely general. While it may not be obvious
how our experience is relevant to our prediction, the fact that it is relevant, is
obvious.
How then is our prediction derived from our experience? Hume (1748, §VI &
VII) asserts that all reasoning concerning matters of fact seems to be based on
the idea of cause and effect since it is the only way that we can go beyond our ex-
perience. However, there is no necessary connection and any attempt to logically
prove a connection results in an unwarranted assertion or assuming induction
(the conclusion) in the argument, which is begging the question; the belief that
two events are causally related must therefore be a habit that is acquired through
experience because of the constant conjunction of those events. In other words,
because every time a particular event is seen it is always preceded by the same
thing it is inferred that the preceding event caused the succeeding event. This
simple form of argument is known as enumerative induction and goes from a
number of particular observations to a general principle (or law); historically in-
duction was understood as this sort of enumerative induction, however, thinking
about induction has become more sophisticated since Hume. A weaker form of
enumerative induction, singular predictive inference, leads not to a generalisation
but to a singular prediction:
1 a1, a2, ... , an are all Fs that are also G
2 an+1 is also F
∴ an+1 is also G
Singular predictive inference also has a more general probabilistic form:
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1 The proportion p of observed F’s have also been G’s
2 a, not yet observed, is an F
∴ It is probable that a is a G
Hume (1748) asserts that all beliefs and opinions about unobserved matters of fact
are derived from experience by induction or equivalently, our beliefs in matters
of fact arise from a sentiment or feeling rather than from reason or the rational
application of the formal rules of logic or probability (Morris, 2011); note here the
similarity with the Somatic Marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994). Interestingly, re-
search has highlighted that people are generally poor at applying the formal rules
of logic and probability theory to everyday problems and choices (e.g. Tversky &
Kahneman, 1983, and for a review of research in this area ; Oaksford, Chater, and
Stewart (2009)). The problem is though, that because induction is contingent it
brings with it the risk of error and of not rationally knowing which belief to hold;
if that is the case, then surely there is a serious problem with induction?
At this point it is perhaps sufficient to note that the descriptive problem
of how we can know about unobserved matters of fact is resolved if they are
derived from experience by induction, as Ramsey (1926) states, echoing Hume,
“We are all convinced by inductive arguments and our conviction is reasonable
because the world is so constituted that inductive arguments lead on the whole
to true opinions. We are not, therefore, able to help trusting induction, nor, if
we could help it, do we see any reason why we should”. Nonetheless, there is not
a sufficient justification of induction from a reasoned logical point of view: This
is the normative problem of induction, but, further consideration of the problem




We can accept, as Ramsey (1926) does in the quotation above, that Hume is
correct and that any opinion can be formed with varying degrees of belief from
an inductive argument, however, whether those opinions are rational or not is
not the question of interest. The question of interest is really whether beliefs and
opinions can be modified rationally based on additional experience or evidence.
Induction is the reasoning we do every day while operating in the real world,
that is, what we do when making choices about the world. We can think of it as
learning from experience and applying our prior experiences to new, but similar,
situations. There is a uniquely reasonable way to learn from experience, using
Bayes’ rule (Hacking, 2001). Using Bayes’ rule avoids the normative problem of
induction by accepting the descriptive explanation, whether it is reasonable or
not, and identifying a model of reasonable change in belief that is sufficient for
being rational in a changing world.
Assuming the somatic marker hypothesis and maintenance of markers on (or
at least that can be modelled on) a Bayesian basis, implies that there is a marker
for every concept that we know, and consistent with Rushworth and Behrens
(2008), it is reasonable to consider that it will be based on reward, cost (or risk)
and uncertainty. It is worthy of note that there is a (social) psychological instru-
ment, that has been around since the 1950’s, has been extensively tested, and
which purports to measure the connotative (or emotional) meaning of concepts,
in three dimensions: The Semantic Differential.
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2.5 The Semantic Differential
The literal or primary meaning of a concept is its denotation, in the case of a
word, its dictionary definition; however, in addition to this meaning, there is
another way to understand a concept, its connotation. Connotation is the idea
or feelings that a concept invokes. Consider, as an example, that the dictionary
definition of ‘pub’ is (noun): A place of business where alcoholic beverages are
sold and drunk [Short for public house], whereas, ‘pub’ evokes connotations such
as merriment, pleasure, cheerfulness, perhaps some sadness, etc. Similarly, words
such as summer, love, and melody tend to carry positive connotative associations
for most people, while words like cancer, fight and homeless have negative conno-
tations. The Semantic Differential (Osgood, 1952; Osgood et al., 1957) is thought
to measure the connotative meaning of concepts; indeed, it is probably the most
successful empirical method that has been devised for studying the nature of
connotative meaning.
Establishing a semantic differential is procedurally straight forward: com-
monly, a large number of concepts (e.g. objects, actions and settings) are pre-
sented to participants who are asked to rate them on perhaps as many as 40-50
scales, although this can be varied with potentially as few as one concept be-
ing rated on just three scales. Each scale is typically a seven point Likert type
scale based on contrasting adjectives (e.g. clean vs dirty; fast vs slow etc). Data
from Semantic Differential scales are coded numerically on the basis that the
scales are polar opposites and that they are equal interval scales passing through
zero. While the use of Semantic Differential scales on this basis involves some
assumptions that may not be perfectly accurate, violation of these assumptions
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is not considered serious enough to interfere with its application (Heise, 1969).
Generalisations are supported by many research studies on the use of Seman-
tic Differential rating scales for measuring affective meanings (Snider & Osgood,
1969), the scales are a straight forward and economical method for collecting data
on reactions to stimuli, and they are easy to use for adults and for children from
any culture (Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975; DiVesta, 1966). Once the scale data
have been collected, factor analysis is then used to analyse the ratings, resulting
in three robust observations.
First, approximately 50% of the variance in the rating data can be captured by
just three dimensions (Evaluation, Potency and Activity). Second, the most im-
portant of these dimensions, known as Evaluation, almost always corresponds to
whether the concept is ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Third, the two other dimensions, Potency
and Activity, each account for about the same amount of variance, with Potency
capturing the extent the concept is ‘strong’ or ‘weak’, and Activity whether the
concept is ‘calm’ or ‘chaotic’. Cross cultural research has shown that these Eval-
uation, Potency and Activity dimensions are clearly common across cultures and
languages (Osgood et al., 1975).
Although both this technique and these results are over fifty years old, it has
stood the test of time and has been found to be robust across domains (Dalton,
Maute, Oshida, Hikichi, & Izumi, 2008; Kim & Kang, 2009), languages and cul-
tures (Osgood et al., 1975; Heise, 2001). A review of the literature that has been
published during the last fifty years suggests that there are few psychological
principles that have received such cross group and cross cultural verification, and
there are few approaches that are associated with such applicability and breadth
of findings as those that are found in Semantic Differential applications. Indeed,
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substantial numbers of papers are published each year using or referring to the Se-
mantic Differential in an enormous range of journals (Google scholar in December
2011 returned > 4, 440 hits since 2010 for the term “semantic differential”).
The Semantic Differential is clearly significant as a multivariate approach to
affective meaning, especially when compared with, for example, attitude mea-
surement or expected utility which deal with the single dimension of Evaluation
(Heise, 2001). However, Osgood et al. (1975) was hard pressed to explain the
universal patterns of affective meaning, but points to the centrality of emotion
in human affairs: We can imagine the situation for our ancestors when coming
across a bear, for example. Three things had to be dealt with rapidly: a) Is it
good or bad for me? (evaluation); b) Is it stronger or weaker than me? (po-
tency); and c) Is it faster or slower than me? (activity). Regardless of their
origin, these emotional reactions seem to be universally held and the semantic
differential has shown itself to be a useful tool in their investigation. Theoreti-
cally though, the construct is less satisfactory and has been sharply criticised as
a measure of meaning (Weinreich, 1958).
Besides the rather vague idea that the semantic differential measures conno-
tative or affective meaning, perhaps better referred to as sentiment, it is still far
from clear what is actually being measured and why such a robust, reproducible
finding is found over so many domains and cultures (Miron, 1969; Osgood, 1969).
It is proposed as part of the present thesis that theoretical insight can be gained
from one defining feature of the semantic differential, its generality and that the
semantic differential actually represents or describes a three dimensional reward
structure.
Considering the semantic differential as a representation of our reward struc-
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ture implies that we use it to make choices, as in the example above, to evaluate
and then choose a course of action. Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) provides a descriptive theory of how people make
choices for certain types of problem.
2.6 Axiom Violation and Prospect Theory
The expected utility hypothesis tells us that given an option consisting of either a
reward or a penalty that occurs with a known probability that the rational thing
to do is to choose the prospect that maximises the expected utility associated
with it (Davis, Hands, & Maki, 1998). Although the expected utility hypothesis
is simple to understand and, on an abstract level, seems to be a good characteri-
sation of what people should do, it provides a poor description of the choices that
people actually make (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). As already discussed
in §2.3 the expected utility hypothesis is due to D. Bernoulli (1738) and was
axiomatised two centuries later by Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), however,
very soon afterwards, research began to be published that showed that human
behaviour did not seem to conform with the hypothesis.
A great deal of research work has been carried out on axiom violation since
the publication of The theory of Games and Economic Behavior, much of which
has led to alternative theories, including prospect theory. The small industry
of axiom violation experiments can be summed up by the following quotation:
“Give me an axiom and I’ll design the experiment that refutes it” (attributed to
Amos Tversky in Gilboa, 2010). Details of much of this research work can be
found in a meta analysis of axiom violation research by Yaqub, Saz, and Hussain
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(2009, although it concentrates on the Behavioural Economics era from 1990).
Prospect theory greatly improved the match between theory and human per-
formance by making two modifications to the expected utility hypothesis for
which Kahneman received the Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences in 2002. The
first modification is to replace the absolute utility function with a nonlinear value
function that is expressed relative to a persons current position, convex (risk
averse) for gains, concave (risk seeking) for losses and the curve for losses is
steeper than that for gains; in other words, things that make your world better
are good, and things that make your world worse are bad. The second modi-
fication is that when people are presented with probabilities, they behave as if
they are not using the given probability, but a version of it transformed by a
probability weighting function. This function has four robust characteristics; it
increases the effective probability of improbable events; decreases the probability
of probable events; crosses the line of equality at a probability less than 0.5; and
is systematically different for the assessment of positive and negative prospects.
Kahneman (2011, Part IV, Chapter 25 & 26) cites inclusion of a reference
point, utility (value) being based on changes in wealth, and losses being treated
different from gains as the significant contributions that prospect theory made. In
fact, Kahneman (2011) expresses considerable surprise that what, on reflection,
appear to be rather obvious anomalies in expected utility theory, had not been
spotted for the two hundred years of its existence, despite the powerful intellects of
the people involved, putting it down to ‘being in the grip’ of a theory, essentially
accepting that the theory is correct despite empirical data that could indicate
otherwise.
To illustrate the importance of the changes to the utility function in how a
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choice might be perceived consider two people, p1 and p2, whose current wealth
is 1 million and 4 million respectively. Both are offered the following gamble:
1. equal probability to end up owning 1 million or 4 million; or
2. own 2 million for certain
It is easy to imagine yourself in each position, making it clear that each person
is likely to make a different choice; for p1, the certain option is very attractive,
doubling wealth, while the other option contains no risk as wealth will either
remain the same or quadruple. This, however, is very different for p2, choosing
the certain option reduces wealth by half, while the best outcome from the risky
option is to lose nothing but potentially lose three quarters of wealth. From
the point of view of expected utility theory, though, both people face the same
choice, expected wealth will be 2.5 million and 2 million respectively and the
predicted choice would be the same for both people. However, this prediction is
wrong because their current wealth or reference point is important and must be
considered (a fuller description of these points can be found in Kahneman, 2011,
Part IV, Chapter 25).
The principle of loss aversion, that is, that losses loom larger than gains
when they are weighted against each other, is interesting as it adds to what is
becoming a common thread in the research that has been reviewed; that emotions
or affect is important to ordinary decision making. Loss aversion would seem to
have evolutionary benefit, as the philosopher Quine (1970) put it “Creatures
inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency
to die before reproducing their kind” or in other words, since creatures that
treat threats as more urgent than opportunities have a better chance to survive
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and reproduce; making a good decision is rewarding, but there may be severe
punishments for getting it wrong. Identifying choices with reward in this way
allows some speculation about the underlying neurophysiology that might support
these decision making mechanisms.
2.7 Reinforcement and Neurophysiology
Clearly, the ability to make accurate predictions is of great importance in mak-
ing decisions, whatever the choice or decision is; in providing information about
possible outcomes the more accurate the prediction and the better the decision
or choice. This is important for learning and is consistent with reinforcement
learning models such as temporal difference learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998) and
classical conditioning models such as the Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla &
Wagner, 1972), where, in order to learn effectively, a prediction error is one of the
key variables. The finding that the same brain areas always seem to be implicated
in imaging studies of decision making has been highlighted in §2.2 and are often
associated with the neurotransmitter, dopamine.
2.7.1 Dompamine
Reinforcement learning based models, particularly temporal difference models
(Sutton & Barto, 1998), have had great success in developing an understanding
of how we learn to make choices in an uncertain world. The standard model uses a
one dimensional representation of reward, associated with the action of dopamine
(Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Schultz, 1998, 2010). The expected values
for rewards that originate from prior experience and used for predicition, are
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thought to be represented in the prefrontal cortex, with strong evidence suggest-
ing more specifically the orbitofrontal cortex (Kringelbach, 2005, 2005). Evidence
for how these priors are maintained is provided from neurophysiology where recent
research has shown that dopamine neurons, which project along the mesolimbic
and mesocortical pathways, code the subjective value of rewards (Schultz, 2010).
Both of these pathways originate in the ventral tegmental area, which is located in
the midbrain, projecting to the nucleus accumbens, in the case of the mesolimbic
pathway, and frontal cortex, in the case of the mesocortical pathway.
Dopamine neurons respond to rewards to the extent that a reward differs from
what was expected. If a reward is better than expected it produces activation
of dopamine neurons, but if the reward is worse than expected it produces a
depression. Accurately predicted rewards produce no response and is perhaps
the reason why rewards that do not change lose their influence and why there
is a drive for greater reward (Schultz, 2010). In other words, dopamine neurons
provide a reward prediction error, which maintains the prior values represented in
the prefrontal cortex (Tobler, Fiorillo, & Schultz, 2005). There is much evidence
to support the part played by dopamine in the reward system, however, a full
range from reward to punishment must be managed, which is thought to involve
another neurotransmitter, Serotonin.
2.7.2 Serotonin
Serotonin pathways originate in the raphe nuclei of the brain stem and project
both to the spinal cord and very widely to cortical and sub cortical areas; and
results of research suggest that the general function of serotonin in motivation
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is to encode aversive outcomes. For example, serotonin releasing neurons are
activated by aversive events such as inescapable shocks (Takase et al., 2004),
and animals with low serotonin levels show less behavioural suppression to cues
and contexts predictive of punishment (Soubrie´, 1986). Very often in the brain,
continua, such as a range of rewards and punishments, are managed by pairs of
systems through opponency: Somewhat controversially, recent research has also
proposed that prediction error, across a full range of rewards and punishments, is
managed through opponency between the dopamine and serotonin systems (Huys
& Dayan, 2009; Crockett, Clark, & Robbins, 2009; Boureau & Dayan, 2010; Cools
& Nakamura, 2010).
However, while serotonin has for a long time been implicated commonly with
affective processing of punishments and threats, these sorts of events have been
found to covary both positively and negatively with serotonin levels (Boureau
& Dayan, 2010), making the relationship between the serotonin system and the
dopamine system potentially complex.
Dayan and colleagues analysis of extant literature (Boureau & Dayan, 2010;
Huys & Dayan, 2009) suggests that the contrary findings for serotonin levels re-
lates to differences between threats and punishments attributable to classical type
conditioning and those attributable to instrumental type learning. The negative
covariance between serotonin and threat being the result of the refusal to engage
with potential or actual threats and punishments in the case of classical type con-
ditioning. Behavioural evidence that supports this hypothesis has been provided
by Crockett et al. (2009) using tryptophan depletion to demonstrate a difference
between sensitivity to aversive outcomes (attributable to classical conditioning)
and punishment induced inhibition (attributable to instrumental learning). In
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support of Dayan’s hypothesis (Boureau & Dayan, 2010), the authors claim that
they have shown that serotonin is critical for linking behavioural inhibition with
predictions of aversive outcomes rather than performing inhibitory or aversive
processing alone (Crockett et al., 2009).
In order to make good inferences and predictions about the world requires
that, as well as being able to predict on the basis of reward and punishment, we
have some idea about how sure the inference or prediction is; presumably, doing
so is an important function that our brains must contend with.
2.7.3 Acetylcholine and Norepinephrine
Dayan and Yu (e.g Dayan & Yu, 2002, 2006; Yu & Dayan, 2002, 2003; Yu, 2003;
Yu & Dayan, 2005) propose that what they refer to as expected uncertainty
is associated with acetylcholine (ACh) and unexpected uncertainty with nore-
pinephrine (NE, alternatively noradrenaline, NA). An example of these different
sorts of uncertainty might be the choice of wearing a raincoat when leaving for
work: this straightforward choice involves considering potentially conflicting in-
formation such as the forecast on the radio and the large black cloud overhead.
For an individual who notes the weather forecast, the chance of incorrect forecast
is a type of expected uncertainty, whereas a significant change in the reliability of
forecasts would be unexpected uncertainty, presumably resulting in the individual
to note other weather information (Yu & Dayan, 2005).
Research suggests that higher acetylcholine and noradrenaline leads to the
reduced influence of prior, experience based information in the integration of ex-
perience based and sensory based information. Acetylcholine and noradrenaline
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also play a role in experience based placiticity in the cortex (Gu, 2002), which pro-
vides for maintenance of representations based on new experience. Acetylcholine
and noradrenaline depletion has been shown to suppress experience based plastic-
ity (e.g. Baskerville, Schweitzer, & Herron, 1997) and increases of Acetylcholine
and noradrenaline shown to raise cortical reorganization when paired with sensory
stimulation (e.g. Kilgard & Merzenich, 1998).
The evidence from reinforcement learning and neurophysiology supports the
idea that somatic markers represent our reward structure, are three dimensional
and are maintained in the prefrontal cortex, further, they are maintained through
the action of neurotransmitters, dopamine for reward and serotonin for cost with
acetylcholine and noradrenaline involved with uncertainty.
2.8 Summary
In a natural environment the only sources of information that can be used to
inductively reason are an individuals own observations and experiences, supple-
mented by those signalled by others. This would seem to be as true today as
it was for our ancestors, although in the modern world we are presumably faced
with a greater quantity of information, presented in a greater variety of formats,
from wider social groups and media. It is uncontroversial that some form of pref-
erences must have existed prior to the evolution of intelligence or rationality and
that an evolutionary process cannot produce the cognitive machinery to input,
reason with or generally use, information in a format that was not available from
the environment (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Robson, 2001). It is reasonable to
suppose that one of the simplest forms of information available is and would have
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been in our evolutionary past, the frequency of good and bad things that oc-
cur and that this information is readily available through our emotional systems.
Simply put, things that make your world better are good and things that make
your world worse are bad.
While other theories propose that affect (feelings, emotion) provides informa-
tion that can then be used when making choices (e.g. Schwarz & Clore, 2007;
Schwarz, 2010) and are complementary, the somatic marker hypothesis provides
a framework where choices are intimately tied with affect (Damasio, 1994, 1998,
2000). The somatic marker hypothesis is consistent with, and supported by, re-
cent research in the areas of interoception (e.g. Craig, 2002) and moral psychology
(e.g. Greene, 2007) in particular, and also from psychology more generally (e.g.
Duckworth, Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002; Zajonc, 1980). When the areas
of the brain that are associated with affect, such as the pre-frontal cortices, are
damaged, people do not turn into hyper rational, decisive individuals, but rather
are unable to reach quick and effective choices. This suggests that feelings, far
from obscuring good decision making, are an important and integral part of the
process.
When faced with an uncertain or novel situation, the somatic markers are
used, often beyond conciousness, to reduce the potential options to perhaps an
obvious choice that can be used automatically, or to a manageable few, that
can then be considered on the basis of a cost benefit analysis, with one that is
appropriate, chosen. These processes, one which is fast and intuitive and the other
that is slow as calculating, are what Stanovich and West (2001) and Kahneman
(2011) refer to as system1 and system2 respectively.
Information for an uncertain or novel situation must be inferred or arrived
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at through a process of induction, reaching a general principle from particular
instances; whether this process can be rationally (philosophically) justified in
itself seems to be rather less important than whether somatic markers can be
rationally maintained. It is argued that they can be maintained and revised in the
light of experience which, in turn, can be well described using Bayes’ rule. Taking
this view and to base decision making on the somatic marker hypothesis implies
that certain characteristics are represented for every object, situation and action
we can make choices for. Somatic markers also imply that a one dimensional
reward structure, as used in temporal difference learning for example (Sutton &
Barto, 1998), is unsatisfactory because, consistent with Rushworth and Behrens
(2008), it ignores the risk or cost and uncertainty that is associated with the
reward.
In order to flourish in a particular environment then, our experiences can
(must) be used as part of the process of making advantageous choices, where
advantageous choices are generally rewarding. Indeed, it would seem strange if
our prior experiences were not used; all the more so in a social economy where
there are competitors and complicated situations that have to be navigated. As
highlighted by Neumann and Morgenstern, rationally gaining an advantage over
competitors, for whatever reason, in a social economy turns what should be a
simple maximisation problem into a “disconcerting mixture of several conflicting
maximum problems”.
Based on the ideas above, the broad question for the present thesis is: what
rules or processes govern people’s choices in a social economy? In the next chapter
it is proposed that relying on a single dimension, consisting simply of reward to
base choices on, is inadequate; this is because, as well as the expected reward,
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it is also important to know what the potential cost (risk/danger) might be in




Reward is assessed in three
dimensions
3.1 Introduction
While most aspects of meaning are specific to a particular concept (for example,
“has wings” is an appropriate feature for describing birds, but not for describing
situations), possibly only one characteristic has to be represented for all situa-
tions, actions and objects. If we are to make choices in everyday life and compare
different options, such as shall I go for a walk, or grab a coffee; or do I look
at my book rather than the person that just walked into the room, a ‘common
currency’ is needed. This quantity, used to compare possible alternatives, is gen-
erally known in economics as utility and in psychology as predicted reward or
payoff. Utility or reward is usually conceptualised as a single dimension, how-
ever, it seems obvious that to make a rational choice, it is also important to know
what the potential cost (risk/danger) might be in taking a particular choice is and
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how sure estimates or predictions are (Rushworth & Behrens, 2008). Here, the
possibility that people actually have a richer, multi dimensional, representation
of utility or reward is explored.
Chapter 2 (§2.5) identified the semantic differential as a very robust, widely
used and widely applicable instrument, however, besides the rather vague idea
that the semantic differential measures the connotative or affective meaning of a
concept, it is still far from clear what is actually being measured and why such
a robust, reproducible finding is found in so many domains and cultures. It is
proposed here that theoretical insight can be gained from one defining feature of
the semantic differential, its generality.
Understanding the benefit of more than one dimension on which to base
choices is straight forward and can be illustrated using the example of the n-
armed bandit (Sutton & Barto, 1998, §2.1). The n-armed bandit problem is to
maximise the expected reward when faced with multiple, n, one armed bandits1,
without knowing the distribution of rewards that is applicable to each of them. If
the distribution of rewards were known it would be easy to maximise them, always
choosing the one most likely to pay out. However, the distribution of rewards for
each of the bandits (or more generally concepts in the present experiment) has
to be learned. With a single dimension of reward and adopting what Sutton and
Barto (1998) call a greedy strategy, the rewards that are known can be exploited,
but no exploration (sampling) of alternative, albeit (apparently) inferior, choices
is made. While this might maximise immediate reward, it is unlikely to maximise
reward in the longer term or if the distribution of reward changes.
1A one armed bandit is a gambling machine, otherwise known as a slot or fruit machine, so
called because they were operated by a lever on the side (the arm) and the potential of leaving
the player with no money (bandit).
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Maintaining further quantities that represent risk and uncertainty means that
the currently known maximum reward can be chosen most of the time and explor-
ing actions can be made periodically, governed by risk and uncertainty, allowing
the known rewards, risks and uncertainties to be maintained. In this way, over
time, the reward structure is learned through experience of good and bad choices,
which will support the maximisation of reward in the longer term. Clearly, if
the distributions of reward are non-stationary, that is, the reward distributions
change over time as they do in the real world, the need for exploration in order
to maintain potential reward profiles becomes increasingly important.
The benefit of having more than one dimension on which to base choices
therefore seems obvious, particularly in the non-stationary real world; for exam-
ple, it allows assessment of the possible reward (or punishment) that might be
attained, and of the potential cost of being involved in an activity, to be made
independently of one another. This might have the result, say, that involvement
in some activity or making a particular choice could be vetoed if there were too
great a cost or risk. In addition a further uncertainty dimension will provide a
basis on which to explore and thereby gain better knowledge of potential rewards
and risks.
It has already been discussed that information from the environment must
be used to establish preferences (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Robson, 2001) and
that it is reasonable to suppose that one of the forms that this information takes
is, and would have been in our evolutionary past, the frequency of good and
bad experiences that an individual has. It is proposed that, rather than the one
dimensional representation of utility or reward that is implicitly assumed in most
theories, at least a two and probably a three dimensional representation of reward
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is built up through experiences of good and bad things happening and that this
is what is being used to make choices. It is also proposed that these dimensions
are what is represented by the semantic differential.
It is hypothesised that for some measure of good and bad experience there
will be a relationship with the scores for the factors in a typical semantic differ-
ential (see Chapter 2, §2.5). To test this hypothesis two things are needed; the
measured location in the semantic differential space of a large number of con-
cepts, together with a means to estimate the probability of the reward associated
with them. Obtaining the semantic differential scores is straight forward as there
are readily accessible and publicly available semantic differential dictionaries (e.g.
Francis & Heise, 2006). However, more difficult to estimate are the rewards and
punishments associated with these concepts in everyday life.
At first sight, the problem of estimating the distribution of the probability of
good or bad things happening across a wide range of contexts and concepts seems
impossible. Ideally, but somewhat impractically, someone would be observed
throughout their lifetime and for each of a large range of contexts and concepts,
the number of times good and bad things that happened, together with the
number of times that something good or bad could have happened, would be
recorded. Fortunately, a more practical solution to this problem is provided by
the recent phenomenon of the internet weblog or blog. Blogs are short descriptions





The semantic differential dictionary used here consists of 1500 concepts grouped
under the broad headings of behaviour (naming actions that one person can per-
form on another person), identity (naming different kinds of individual), setting
(naming places or times where social interactions might take place) and modifier
(naming emotions, traits, and statuses that might characterise people), offering a
broad selection for analysis. This dictionary, which was compiled during 2002/3
at Indiana University (Francis & Heise, 2006) was chosen because of a) accessi-
bility; it was straight forward to download the dictionary required b) scope; it
was the largest single dictionary that could be found c) age; it was the latest
large dictionary that could be found and d) pedigree; the principal researcher,
David Heise, has extensive experience with the semantic differential technique in
general and has also published extensively on the subject since the mid 1960’s.
To use the semantic differential data to establish counts of good and bad ex-
periences required a mechanism for searching blog space as widely as possible.
Initially use of the Google blog search engine was planned because a check of the
online documentation, while non specific, suggested extensive coverage of blogs
in much the same way as the Google web search engine covers web pages. It was
quickly found, though, that attempting to run automated search scripts using the
Google blog search engine was detected and blocked. Alternative search engines
were found (Technorati and Blogscope) that provided extensive coverage of blogs,
provided structured searching facilities and did not limit the use of automated
search scripts. Technorati (technorati.com) and BlogScope (blogscope.com) are
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both free at the point of use and provide extensive coverage1. Blogscope is be-
ing developed as part of a research project at the University of Toronto, while
Technorati is a commercial search engine funded by advertising. Since it was
used for the data gathering described here, Technorati has undergone extensive
restructuring.
MATLAB (2008) scripts were written to use the semantic differential data
to build queries and submit them to both of the blog search engines; Using this
method it is straightforward to find how many blogs, out of the millions indexed,
contain a given concept (say, knife).
3.2.2 Procedure
To approximately classify each blog post containing a concept as being associated
with positive, negative or neutral situations, a count was made of the number of
posts that contained the concept, Nt; the number of posts containing the concept
in combination with any of ten unambiguously good words, Ng, and the number
in combination with ten unambiguously bad words, Nb. The good and bad word
lists, shown in Table 3.1, were the highest and lowest evaluated in the modifiers
subgroup of the semantic differential dictionary that was used (Francis & Heise,
2006). The distribution of the frequency of occurrence in spoken and written
English of the good and bad modifiers (taken from the British National corpus
using their simple search (www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk)) was not significantly different
(t(10) = 0.55, p = .60). The presence of at least one of these modifiers was
taken to indicate generally positive or negative situations or experiences (but see
1In June 2008 Technorati claimed to index 112.8 million blogs, however, at the time of
writing no up to date figure was available. At the time of writing Blogscope claimed to be

















In order to carry out the blog searches, three statements were constructed for
each concept as follows:
The concept on its own (Nt)e.g.
bully
The concept and a disjunctive list of good words (Ng) e.g.
bully and (good or amused or polite or relaxed or pleased or helpful or
delighted or friendly or generous or honest or happy)
The concept and a disjunctive list of bad words (Nb)e.g.
bully and (bad or suicidal or evil or abusive or cruel or depressed or
miserable or rude or hurt or mean or unhappy)
in this way, a blog post containing a concept with a modifier (i.e. good or bad
word) appearing more than once was only counted once and the presence of one
or more modifiers was taken to indicate that the post described generally positive
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or negative situations. From an original 1500 items in the semantic differential
dictionary that was used (Francis & Heise, 2006), two data sets were compiled
each consisting of single word concepts that occurred at least once using each
search engine. Technorati provided a data set consisting of 972 concepts and
Blogscope provided a data set consisting of 1071 concepts (the concepts found
for Technorati and Blogscope can be found in Appendix C and Appendix D
respectively).
3.3 Results
In order to investigate the relationship between the reward associated with a con-
cept and its position in the semantic differential space, first six derived measures
of the positive and negative rewards associated with a concept were constructed.
The first two measures simply measure the proportion of times the concept was




(absolute positive and nega-
tive reward). The third measure quantifies the proportion of rewarded situations
where this reward was positive, Ng
(Ng+Nb
(relative reward). The fourth measure,
included since it is known that preference (Evaluation) can be caused simply
by exposure (Zajonc, 1980), was a measure of frequency, log(Nt). Lastly to in-
vestigate any interactions between the reward measures, the interaction between









, was also included. Using these as the independent measures step-
wise regressions were performed against the three dimensions of the semantic
differential (Evaluation, Potency and then Activity).
The full results for the analyses are given in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 where the beta
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coefficient, b, standard error of the beta value, SEb, standardised coefficient, β,
result of the t-test for the beta, t, multiple correlation coefficient, R, variance
explained, R2, and the variance explained adjusted for the number of terms in
the model, aR2, are given. It should be noted though that with the blogscope
data, using Evaluation as the dependent variable, there was a third step that
entered Nb
Nt
into the model, however, this was disregarded as the R2 change from
the previous step was only .002 and considered too small to include for such a
noisy data set. The analysis shows a similar pattern of results for both of the
data sets, with the same independent variables being included for each dependent
variable, with a similar amount of variance explained; a number of robust effects
were found:
1. Evaluation was strongly related to the relative reward (technorati R2 = .35,
F (2, 969) = 256.07, p < .001; blogscope R2 = .35, F (2, 1068) = 284.36,
p < .001); but perhaps surprisingly, not to absolute reward (technorati
R2 = .01, F (1, 970) = 5.72, p = .017; blogscope R2 = .01, F (1, 1069) =
9.923, p = .002), Figure 3.1.
2. For Potency the strongest relationship is with the absolute negative re-
ward (technorati R2 = .20, F (2, 969) = 108.02, p < .001; blogscope R2 =
.23, F (2, 1068) = 138.97, p < .001). Figure 3.2.





. Though this was highly significant, the level of
correlation was small (technorati R2 = .09, F (2, 969) = 44.80, p < .001;
blogscope R2 = .08, F (2, 1068) = 48.10, p < .001), Figure 3.3.
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Table 3.2: Technorati stepwise multiple regression for each factor using
absolute positive and negative reward,
Ng
Nt












DV Step IV b SEb β t R R2 aR2
E 1 (Constant) -14.21 0.66
Relative reward 23.78 1.09 0.57 21.86 0.57 0.33 0.33
2 (Constant) -14.24 0.65
Relative reward 22.03 1.14 0.53 19.40
Exposure 0.12 0.02 0.13 4.83 0.59 0.35 0.34
P 1 (Constant) 2.08 0.13
Negative reward -5.06 0.40 -0.37 -12.55 0.37 0.14 0.14
2 (Constant) 0.45 0.26
Negative reward -3.70 0.44 -0.27 -8.47
Exposure 0.13 0.02 0.23 7.10 0.43 0.18 0.18
3 (Constant) -0.10 0.30
Negative reward -4.83 0.49 -0.36 -9.89
Exposure 0.13 0.02 0.23 7.08
Positive x Relative reward 3.32 0.67 0.16 4.96 0.45 0.20 0.20
A 1 (Constant) 1.67 0.14
Negative x Relative reward -6.76 0.78 -0.27 -8.72 0.27 0.07 0.07
2 (Constant) 0.85 0.27
Negative x Relative reward -5.51 0.85 -0.22 -6.51
Exposure 0.06 0.02 0.12 3.55 0.29 0.09 0.08
All p <= .001, n = 972
4. In each case the effect of the best predictor seems to be mediated by the
amount of exposure that there has been to the concept, making good things
slightly better and bad things slightly worse.
Given the high level of noise associated with our method of evaluating reward
and the inherent noisiness of the semantic differential, the correlations could,
perhaps, be considered surprisingly strong. In order to gain further insight into
the relationship between the semantic differential factors and the measures of
reward, the data were averaged across a range of factor values, in other words the
data were binned, and further regressions carried out. The advantage of binning
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Table 3.3: Blogscope stepwise multiple regression for each factor using
absolute positive and negative reward,
Ng
Nt












DV Step IV b SEb β t R R2 aR2
E 1 (Constant) -9.06 0.42
Relative reward 15.88 0.72 0.56 22.05 0.56 0.31 0.31
2 (Constant) -10.11 0.43
Relative reward 14.47 0.73 0.51 19.93
Exposure 0.16 0.02 0.19 7.54 0.59 0.35 0.35
P 1 (Constant) 1.81 0.09
Negative reward -3.62 0.25 -0.40 -14.36 0.4 0.16 0.16
2 (Constant) 0.17 0.23
Negative reward -2.90 0.26 -0.32 -11.04
Exposure 0.12 0.02 0.23 7.77 0.45 0.21 0.21
3 (Constant) -0.37 0.25
Negative reward -3.40 0.28 -0.38 -12.35
Exposure 0.12 0.02 0.23 8.03
Positive x Relative reward 2.57 0.48 0.16 5.38 0.48 0.23 0.23
A 1 (Constant) 1.39 0.11
Negative x Relative reward -4.81 0.55 -0.26 -8.81 0.26 0.07 0.07
2 (Constant) 0.50 0.24
Negative x Relative reward -40 0.58 -0.22 -6.92
Exposure 0.06 0.02 0.13 4.06 0.29 0.08 0.08
All p <= .001, n = 1071
is that there is a reduction in noise, which may help in gaining insight into average
behaviour. In ‘real’ data there is always some amount of noise associated with
a measurement or signal, which may be random or systematic. In the present
case noise is assumed random and unavoidable. By binning the data i.e. placing
multiple measurements into a bin, the ratio of signal to noise can be made larger.
For example if four measurements are placed in a bin, each with an amount of
signal and noise, the ratio will be 4×Signal√
4×Noise ; because it is random, noise adds as
the square root, making the signal to noise ratio bigger.
One obvious drawback to this approach is the reduction in the number data
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Figure 3.1: Correlations (R2) between evaluation and each of the derived
measures of reward, which clearly shows that relative reward is the best
single predictor of evaluation. Dark bars represent the technorati search
engine, and light bars blogscope. The bars labelled “best predictor” rep-
resent the adjusted R2 for the best fitting regression model.
Figure 3.2: Correlations (R2) between potency and each of the derived
measures of reward showing that the best predictor of Potency is the
probability of bad events (risk), though a number of other predictors are
of reasonable size on their own. Dark bars represent the technorati search
engine, and light bars blogscope. The bars labelled “best predictor” rep-
resent the adjusted R2 for the best fitting regression model.
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Figure 3.3: Correlations (R2) between Activity and each of the derived
measures of reward. The main observation for this dimension is that
though many of the measures of reward are significantly correlated with
activity, the absolute level of correlation is small. Dark bars represent
the technorati search engine, and light bars blogscope. The bars labelled
“best predictor” represent the adjusted R2 for the best fitting regression
model.
points that are available for further analysis. However, in the present case, due
to the initial number of data points this was not considered to be a particular
problem. The width of each bin was 0.2 for each of the semantic differential
factors and regression analysis on the ‘new’ binned data points revealed:
1. for Evaluation predicting relative reward, Ng
Ng+Nb
, b = 0.01, t(47) = 14.86,
p < .001 R2 = 0.82, adjusted R2 = 0.82, F (1, 47) = 220.73, p < .001;
2. for Potency predicting the probability of bad events (risk), Nb
Nt
, b = −0.02
t(36) = −6.80 p < .001 R2 = 0.56, adjusted R2 = 0.55, F (1, 36) = 46.23,
p < .001;





, b = −0.01, t(35) = −7.99, p < .001 R2 = 0.65, adjusted R2 =
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0.64, F (1, 35) = 63.77, p < .001.
Figure 3.4 shows the form of the relationships with each of the semantic differ-
ential factors, and as can be seen, the relationships are all very close to linear.
Figure 3.4: The relationships between the semantic differential factors
and their respective experienced rewards with mean data calculated in
bins of width 0.2. Each of the resulting data points is shown with error
bars representing the standard error of the mean of the original values
that were used to calculate it.
Using the predictors identified in the stepwise multiple regressions for each
data set, further multiple regressions were carried out for each sub group of
concepts (described in §3.2.1), the results of these analyses are shown in Tables
3.4 and 3.5 for the Technorati and Blogscope data respectively. It can be seen
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that the predictability of the three dimensions of the semantic differential varies
considerably between these categories. For instance, for concepts within the
settings category for the Technorati concepts, the correlation coefficient reached
0.72 (p < .001) for predicting Evaluation.
Table 3.4: The amount of variance accounted (R2) for in the Technorati
data from multiple regression for each factor for each subgroup of concepts
using the predictors identified in the stepwise multiple regression.
Group Dim r R2 F p
Behaviour n = 261
E .46 .21 33.54 <.001
P .36 .13 12.90 <.001
A .14 .02 2.78 =.063
Identity n = 360
E .63 .40 118.12 <.001
P .40 .16 23.29 <.001
A .32 .10 19.71 <.001
Modifier n = 262
E .66 .44 102.28 <.001
P .54 .29 34.32 <.001
A .28 .08 10.60 <.001
Setting n = 89
E .72 .52 46.13 <.001
P .48 .23 8.22 <.001
A .10 .01 0.47 n/s
Exploring the relationship of the interaction for the Activity factor, as shown
in Figure 3.5, suggests that concepts that are considered passive are ones that are
a) associated with a larger probability of something bad happening; and b) the
probability of something good is smaller. This suggests that, in general, experi-
ence of higher probabilities of bad things occurring may be associated with lower
potency scores and lower evaluation scores.
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Table 3.5: The amount of variance accounted (R2) for in the Blogscope
data from multiple regression for each factor for each subgroup of concepts
using the predictors identified in the stepwise multiple regression.
Group Dim r R2 F p
Behaviour n = 305
E .47 .22 42.10 <.001
P .36 .13 15.04 <.001
A .14 .02 2.86 =.05
Identity n = 392
E .61 .37 116.02 <.001
P .40 .16 23.77 <.001
A .30 .09 18.62 <.001
Modifier n = 263
E .71 .50 130.36 <.001
P .58 .34 45.20 <.001
A .30 .09 13.00 <.001
Setting n = 111
E .66 .44 42.76 <.001
P .45 .20 8.82 <.001
A .10 .01 0.47 n/s
Figure 3.5: Form of the interaction probability of a good event occurring




To explore the gross properties of the data and whether this pattern of positive
and negative rewards was associated with the different levels of the semantic
differential, the data were simply split into positive and negative values, based on
the Evaluation and Potency dimensions, and the means calculated for good and
bad things occuring as illustrated in Tables 3.6 and 3.7.
Table 3.6: Mean probability of a good event occurring for the semantic






Table 3.7: Mean probability of a bad event occurring for the semantic






Two analyses of variance, one for good probabilities and the other for bad,
comparing the probabilities described above were carried out for each of the
Blogscope and Technorati data sets. For Blogscope there was a main effect of
quadrant on probability of bad F (3, 1067) = 117.297, p < .001 and post-hoc anal-
ysis using Tukey’s test showed a significant difference between the mean proba-
bilities of all of the quadrants (p < .05) with the exception of E+P- and E+P+
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where there was no significant difference. There was also a main effect of quad-
rant on probability of good F (3, 1067) = 125.801, p < .001. Post-hoc analysis,
again using Tukey’s test, revealed a significant difference between the mean prob-
abilities of all of the quadrants (p < .05) with the exception of E+P- and E+P+
where there was no significant difference.
For Technorati there was a main effect of quadrant on probability of bad
F (3, 968) = 83.932, p < .001. Post-hoc analysis using Tukey’s test again revealed
a significant difference between the mean probabilities of all of the quadrants
(p < .05) with the exception of E+P- and E+P+ where there was no signif-
icant difference. There was also a main effect of quadrant on Probability of
good F (3, 968) = 117.252, p < .001. Post-hoc analysis, again using Tukey’s
test, revealed a significant difference between the mean probabilities of all of the
quadrants (p < .05) with the exception of E-P- and E-P+ where there was no
significant difference.
As can be seen in Table 3.6, where the probability of something being good
increases, it is evaluated more highly, but, the effect on Potency seems negligible.
This however, is not the same for the probability of something being bad. In
this case, as can be seen in Table 3.7, the experience of higher probabilities of
bad things attracts lower Potency and Evaluation, while lower probabilities of
bad things occurring attracts higher Potency and Evaluation. This interaction is
shown graphically in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: The interaction between potency and evaluation. Shown
is the risk (probability of bad context) for positively evaluated (Evalua-
tion > 0) and negatively evaluated concepts (Evaluation < 0). These are
subdivided into concepts that are considered potent (Potency > 0; light
line) and not potent (Potency < 0; dark line). In general more potent
concepts seem to be associated with lower probabilities of risk. Positively
evaluated concepts, whether of high potency or not seem to be associated
with lower and similar probabilities of risk, whereas, for concepts evalu-
ated negatively there seems to be a significant difference in risk between
potent and impotent things, with potent things associated with lower risk
and impotent things with higher risk..
3.4 Discussion
This chapter started out with the observation that when factor analysis is applied
to rating scales, in a very large number of domains, three factors emerge: Evalu-
ation, Potency, and Activity. Whilst this fact has been known for over 50 years,
why it happens has been less clear. Here it is proposed that these three factors
are, in fact, a representation of the history of reward associated with a concept
and that this representation of reward is required whenever we need to compare
and decide between alternatives. What does this representation look like?
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The factor that almost always captures the most amount of variance in the
semantic differential is Evaluation. This we found was very strongly correlated
with the proportion of rewarded events that were positively rewarded (technorati
r = .57, blogscope r = .56): Evaluation is to first approximation simply relative
reward. Perhaps the most surprising thing about this is that there is essentially
no correlation with the absolute proportion of positively rewarded events (techno-
rati r = −.08, blogscope r = −.10): Evaluation does not measure the probability
of good events happening, but the ratio of good to bad. The second characteristic
associated with Evaluation is the (log) frequency of occurrence; things that hap-
pen more often are preferred to those that are infrequent. This is simply the well
known Mere Exposure effect (Zajonc, 1980) and once the semantic differential is
identified with reward, it is not surprising to find this, things that are commonly
encountered (and therefore well understood) are preferred to things that are only
rarely evaluated.
The second dimension, Potency, was most strongly related to the absolute
probability of negative reward (technorati r = −.37, blogscope r = −.40). Po-
tency essentially measures the risk (of bad things happening), making it clear why
Potency needs to be represented for every object we can make decisions about;
it is important to know not only the average reward associated with an option,
but what the cost (risk/danger) might be in obtaining it.
Taking the findings for Evaluation and Potency together suggests that, in gen-
eral, experience of higher probabilities of bad things occurring may be associated
with lower potency scores and lower evaluation scores. Calculating the mean
probability of a bad experience based on the gross positive and negative values
for Evaluation and Potency (as described on page 57) shows that this is the case.
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The data analysis has less to say about the third dimension of the semantic
differential, Activity. Despite this, by identifying Activity with part of a repre-
sentation of reward, one potential role is suggested. As well as a representation
of the average relative reward and risk associated with an option, in order to
make effective decisions, we also need to know how certain we are of this assess-
ment. Uncertainty can come in two forms. Either we have limited and variable
experience of a concept or, often more importantly, we have little control over
the concept e.g. an object or a situation. Concepts of high Activity (e.g. ones
that are fast, noisy and active) are very often associated with less certainty and
less controllability than ones that are slow, quiet and inactive. This is not di-
rectly measurable in the data analysis, but to make effective decisions, we need
to know the level of controllability/certainty associated with an option: Activity
is proposed as that measure.
In conclusion, it is proposed that two representations from very different dis-
ciplines; reward (or utility), and the semantic differential, are in fact the same
thing. Identifying the semantic differential as a characterisation of reward offers
a solution to the main theoretical issue with the semantic differential (what it
is), and suggests why it is ubiquitous across domains, languages, and cultures.
Almost all objects, actions and contexts need at some time to be compared with
others (do I attend to this object or that, do I perform this action or another...).
To do this one needs to have an estimate of the reward associated with each al-
ternative. It is proposed that the semantic differential is this representation and
“connotative meaning” is to first approximation a summary of reward history. It
also tells us potentially why three dimensions are needed: To make a choice, we
need not only to know how rewarding an alternative is, but also how potentially
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dangerous it is and how sure we are of this. A single dimension will be blind to
risk and uncertainty, unable to efficiently balance exploration and exploitation,
and choose options that, whilst of very high average reward, could be associated
with high levels of uncertainty and risk. The perils of making decisions that
simply maximise reward, while ignoring risk and uncertainty, have been amply
demonstrated by many of the transactions made before the credit crunch.
Finally, identification of the semantic differential with reward allows us to
draw relationships with the underlying neurophysiology. As discussed in §2.7,
reinforcement learning based models, particularly the Temporal Difference mod-
els (Sutton & Barto, 1998), have helped in developing an understanding of how
we learn to make choices in an unknown world. The standard model uses a one
dimensional representation of reward, associated with the action of dopamine
(Schultz, 1998, 2010; Schultz et al., 1997). This dopamine associated dimension
clearly corresponds most closely to the Evaluation dimension of the semantic
differential. The strong and significant relationship between the probability of
a good experience in a rewarded situation, Ng
(Ng+Nb)
, and Evaluation is particu-
larly interesting because it accords very well with findings in the literature that
dopamine neurons respond only to rewards, providing a reward prediction error
that scales to the relevant range of magnitudes (Tobler et al., 2005) maintain-
ing the prior values represented in the prefrontal cortex. Accordingly, accurately
predicted rewards and unrewarded events would be of no consequence and have
no part to play in maintaining these values. Though most computational models
only have a single dimension of reward, more recent work has begun to look at cost
or punishment (or negative reward) and associated it with serotonin (Boureau &
Dayan, 2010; Cools & Nakamura, 2010; Crockett et al., 2009) and corresponding
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to the Potency signal; and uncertainty, the Activity signal and associated it with
acetylcholine and noradrenaline (Dayan & Yu, 2006; Yu & Dayan, 2005).
The correlations between the semantic differential and internet blog data do
not, however, show that this relationship is causal. In order to establish this, an
experiment where arbitrary shapes were associated with different distributions of
positive, negative and neutral events was conducted. According to the present
hypothesis, providing participants with a sufficient number of random trials of
these shapes should be enough to affect the reward summary for a given shape
and be capable of changing the semantic differential associated with it. This is






If the semantic differential represents our reward structure as hypothesised, it is
reasonable to expect that the reward structure and thereby the relevant semantic
differential, can be manipulated by changing the rewards that are applicable to a
particular concept. Indeed, it was proposed at the end of Chapter 3 that any novel
object can gain connotative meaning simply by being associated with a reward
history. In other words, the connotative meaning or sentiment towards something
can be learned through good and bad experiences. This chapter describes an
attempt to manipulate the reward structure applicable to simple coloured shapes
(see Figure 4.1) based on an experiment reminiscent of the Iowa gambling task
and the use of different distributions of rewarding events.
The Iowa gambling task (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994)
was introduced as an instrument for investigating patients with ventromedial
prefrontal cortex damage and it is used to provide supporting evidence for the
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Somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994). The Iowa gambling task is con-
sidered to simulate real-life decision making as it involves uncertainty as well as
reward and punishment; it is also considered robust (for example, Dunn, Dal-
gleish, and Lawrence (2006) identifies more than 100 papers that use the Iowa
gambling task). The task is simple, presenting participants with four decks of
cards, typically on a computer screen, with each card indicating an amount that
can be won or lost, however, the distribution of winning and losing amounts is
different in each of the decks.
Participants are informed that they should attempt to maximise the amount
of money they win in a long series of selections, but unknown to the participants,
because of the different distribution of winning (good) and losing (bad) amounts,
two decks are ’good’ and will win in the long term and the other two are ’bad’
and will lose in the long term (winning and losing amounts are only available
after a card has been selected). Participants are though allowed to switch from
any deck to another freely whenever and as often as they want to, but they are
not told the number of card selections to make (in fact, the task is stopped after
100 trials) (Bechara et al., 1994; Damasio, 1994).
Typically, most healthy participants are good at sticking to the more advan-
tageous decks after forty or fifty trials, suggesting that they have overcome the
uncertainty and learned the distributions of reward. This is contrasted with pa-
tients that have prefrontal cortex damage, who do not appear to know which
decks are disadvantageous, often continuing to lose overall. Interestingly, mea-
surements taken using galvanic skin response shows that healthy participants
exhibit a reaction to the bad decks after as few as ten trials and before conscious
awareness the decks are bad (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996). In
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contrast, prefrontal patients do not exhibit the same reaction to potential losses.
Bechara et al. (1994) and Damasio (1994) use these results in support of the
somatic marker hypothesis.
It seems obvious to say that good or bad things occurring is dependent on
the context or concept in question; to consider a few extremes for example, birth-
days, weddings and Christmas are associated with good things happening, while
house fires, and earthquakes are associated with bad things happening. It is also
worth noting that these concepts are not exclusively associated with good or bad
things, we all know of fights at weddings and arguments at Christmas, while dis-
asters such as earthquakes can be the scenes of good acts and heroism. There
are also those occasions when an outcome is neither particularly good or bad,
but indifferent. What is clear is, that given certain contexts or concepts, there
is a higher or lower probability of good or bad things happening; in other words,
there is a distribution of good and bad events and these distributions can be dif-
ferent for different concepts. Accordingly, the purpose of the experiment below
is to influence participants reward structure (and therefore semantic differential)
by changing the rewards associated with novel concepts: In this case, after ex-
posure to shapes with differing reward statistics, do the shapes gain a semantic
differential like factor structure and are the characteristics of these dimensions
predictable from their reward histories?
The approach used in the experiment is reminiscent of the Iowa gambling task
to the extent that the objective is to maximise reward, based on repeated trials
where gambles are made against six initially unknown distributions. However,
the reward distributions were created so as to reflect the sort of thing that occurs
in the world i.e. that expected events do not always occur and even when they
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do, a concept that is associated with predominantly good outcome can turn out
to have bad things that occur and vice versa.
Two experiments were produced and based on pages presented via a ‘web
browser’, the first was a rating experiment and the second a betting experiment.
In experiment one it was assumed, consistent with the mere exposure literature
(e.g. Zajonc, 1980; Duckworth et al., 2002), that even novel things can attract
at least some sort of evaluation: Participants were therefore asked to carry out
a semantic differential on the shapes only, in order to capture any pre-existing
sentiment that the shapes might have and which is assumed to be similar for
everyone.
4.2 Experiment 1 - Ratings
The mere exposure effect is the idea that people tend to prefer things that they
have been repeatedly exposed to, presumably because they are more familiar
(Zajonc, 1980). The mere exposure effect has been demonstrated with words,
faces, paintings etc. It has also been shown that novel things are (or can be)
evaluated after being displayed very briefly (250ms in the case of Duckworth et
al. (2002)). In this initial experiment it is assumed that the coloured shapes
are likely to be familiar to participants in one way or another and/or will be
evaluated rapidly; in other words, the shapes were expected to have pre-existing
sentiment, accessible in the form of a semantic differential, associated with them.
It was reasoned that any manipulation of semantic differential values should be
with reference to this base line.
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4.2.1 Method
4.2.1.1 Participants
Forty participants volunteered to take part in the experiment. Two participants
declined to provide details of both age and sex with a further three participants
declining to provide details of sex. Of the thirty eight participants providing
their age, the mean was 27.74 years, SD=8.45 (female M =27 years, SD=9.38,
N =21; male M =27.43 years, SD=6.85, N =14). All participants reported normal
or corrected to normal vision and all participants provided their informed consent
prior to commencement of the experiment.
4.2.1.2 Materials
The experiment was produced as a PHP1 script. This provided ‘web browser’
based access to the experiment on demand, from any location with access to the
server where the script was located. The shapes that participants were asked to
rate are shown in Figure 4.1 below.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 4.1: The shapes used for the rating and AlphaBet experiments
together with the numbers used to identify each shape.
Nine scales, based on slider bars, were used to rate each shape (see Table
1PHP is a powerful, fast and widely used general purpose server side scripting language
that is particularly suited to Web development. PHP is available from www.php.net and is
distributed under an open source licence.
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4.1), these scales were the three identified as the most heavily loaded for each of
Evaluation, Potency and Activity in a factor analysis carried out by Osgood and
Suci (1955, p336) and were typical of reliable scales. Each slider was initialised
to the middle of the scale and produced values between 0 and 100. Participants
moved the slider towards one extreme or the other, as indicated by the noun, in
order to record their rating.
Table 4.1: The nine scales used for rating the shapes
Evaluation Potency Activity
Awful - Nice Light - Heavy Slow - Fast
Ugly - Beautiful Weak - Strong Passive - Active
Dirty - Clean Small - Large Dull - Sharp
4.2.1.3 Design
This experiment used a repeated measures design. Independent variables were
the shapes presented for rating and the dependent variables were the rating scores
given by the participants using the sliders. The rating page was a simple, one
screen design that collected brief demographic information and presented all of the
shapes to be rated. For each shape nine sliders were presented to the participant
with each slider presented between two nouns of opposite meaning. A button was
included at the bottom of the screen in order to allow results to be submitted.
The rating page is shown in Figure 4.2.
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4.2.1.4 Procedure
On entering the URL for the experiment, participants were presented with brief
instructions as follows: “On the following page you will be presented with six
different shapes. Please take as long as you need to provide a considered rating
for each of the shapes based on each pair of words, using the sliders provided. It
is important to provide a rating for ALL of the shapes using ALL of the sliders.”.
Participants were asked to rate every shape by using every slider bar. Once all of
the ratings were completed, participants were asked to press the submit button
at the bottom of the page and were then presented with a thank you page, from
which they could navigate away from the experiment.
Figure 4.2: The shape rating page consisting of two questions collect-
ing demographic information, then the six experimental shapes each with
9 sliders for participants to indicate their ratings between the extremes
indicated by the two opposite words.
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4.2.2 Results
The rating data for one participant was removed due to incomplete use of all of
the rating scales, leaving ratings for thirty nine participants for the analysis.
4.2.2.1 Factor analysis
The data collected from participants for each of the rating scales were first checked
for ‘factorability’ using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy
(.68) and with Bartletts test of sphericity (χ2(36)=674.26, p <.001).
On the basis of these checks, factor analysis was carried out on the data.
Three principal components with eigenvalues greater than 1 were revealed, ac-
counting for 67.36% of the variance in the ratings. Table 4.2 shows loadings of
the component matrix following a varimax rotation.
Table 4.2: Rotated Component Matrix showing factor loadings greater
than .5. Extracted using principal component analysis, with varimax ro-
tation which converged in five iterations.
Scale Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Awful - Nice 0.867
Ugly - Beautiful 0.878
Dirty - Clean 0.518
Light - Heavy 0.736
Weak - Strong 0.802
Small - Large 0.579
Slow - Fast 0.867
Passive - Active 0.856
Dull - Sharp 0.743
Though the factors were in a slightly different order from previous semantic
differentials, three factors, consistent with previous findings, were revealed by the
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factor analysis, each containing three variables. Factor one related to rating scales
indicating Activity, Factor 2 to rating scales indicating Evaluation and Factor 3
to rating scales indicating Potency. The factor score coefficients calculated for
each scale are shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Factor score coefficients.
Scale Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Awful - Nice 0.004 0.399 0.076
Ugly - Beautiful -0.067 0.59 -0.007
Dirty - Clean -0.046 0.05 -0.113
Light - Heavy -0.023 -0.014 0.451
Weak - Strong 0.057 0.029 0.352
Small - Large -0.074 0.012 0.225
Slow - Fast 0.371 -0.074 0.079
Passive - Active 0.425 -0.052 0.127
Dull - Sharp 0.219 -0.019 -0.052
If the connotative meaning of these shapes were to be altered, then presumably
the results found here are the initial values that need to be changed. Manipulating
the connotative meaning of the shapes was attempted in Experiment 2.
4.3 Experiment 2
If, as proposed, any novel object can gain connotative meaning simply by being
associated with a reward history, then a semantic differential carried out after
participants have attempted to maximise their reward based on arbitrary shapes
that were paired with differing reward statistics, should reflect this. The Iowa
gambling task offers some evidence for this alteration of reward structure, in that
it shows that participants can recognise ’good’ decks after reasonably modest
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numbers of samples. In experiment 2 the experimental shapes were each assigned
a different reward structure, but, unlike the Iowa gambling task, a win or a loss
did not occur on every gamble.
In order to try and better reflect real world choices, that is, sometimes when
we make a choice there is an indifferent outcome, a win or a loss only occurred
based on certain probabilities (see Table 4.4). Of the different reward structures
two shapes had distributions where the probability of something happening was
high and the probability of winning was low, two shapes had distributions where
the probability of something happening was high and the probability of winning
was high and two shapes had distributions where the probability of something
happening was neither low nor high and the probability of winning was also
neither low nor high. The result of these different distributions is that two shapes
were ‘bad’, two shapes were ‘good’ and two shapes were indifferent,.
Participants were repeatedly exposed to the distribution of rewards assigned
to the experimental shapes on the basis of a betting game and since they would
become equally familiar with each shape it was reasoned that the reward asso-
ciated with each shape and which they would experience, would determine the
changes in sentiments towards the shapes.
4.3.1 Method
4.3.1.1 Participants
A total of sixty five participants volunteered to take part in the experiment. Four
participants declined to provide details of both age and sex with a further three
participants declining to provide details of sex. Of the sixty one participants pro-
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viding their age, the mean was 26.4 years, SD=8.5 (male M =26.4 years, SD=7.2,
N =20; female M =26.1 years, SD=8.9, N =38). All participants reported normal
or corrected to normal vision and all participants provided their informed consent
prior to commencement of the experiment.
4.3.1.2 Materials
As with the rating experiment above, this experiment consisted of a set of web
pages produced as PHP scripts, which provided ‘web browser’ based access to
the experiment on demand, from any location with access to the server where
the script was located. The web pages are shown in Appendix E and provide
a means for participants to place bets on the shapes shown in Figure 4.1 and
receive feedback on those bets. At the end of the experiment participants were
also resented with a ratings page consisting of same nine rating scales as in the
initial experiment above and shown in Table 4.1.
4.3.1.3 Design
This experiment used a repeated measures design. Independent variables were the
shapes and the position that they were presented on the screen. The dependent
variables were the amounts of the bets that were placed by the participants during
the experiment and the rating scores provided by the participants at the end of
the experiment using the sliders.
The shapes were presented in distinct horizontal positions across the screen.
The presentation locations were randomised for each participant but maintained
for an experimental session, as it was reasoned that the position of the shape
might influence betting amounts or ratings. The order that the shapes were
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presented in was randomised. For each random presentation of a shape whether
a win or loss would happen was calculated using the distributions shown in Table
4.4.
Table 4.4: Means for distributions governing the occurrence of either a
win or loss. Each distribution has a standard deviation of 0.05.
Shape Probability of Probability of Probability of Distribution
win or loss win loss type
occurring
.85 .10 .90 Bad
.65 .25 .75 Bad
.55 .50 .50 Indifferent
.55 .50 .50 Indifferent
.65 .75 .25 Good
.85 .90 .10 Good
First, whether an event would happen was calculated and then, if an event was
to happen, whether that event would be a reward or a punishment was calculated.
Distributions were created so that shapes with the highest probabilities of an
event happening attracted the highest probability of reward or punishment.
4.3.1.4 Procedure
The experiment was accessible via the internet so that participants could choose
to undertake it at a time and location that was convenient to them. Once the URL
for the experiment was entered and consent provided, participants were presented
with a page of instructions (see Figure E.1 in Appendix E). The instructions page
explained that the experiment was concerned with making choices when some
information was unknown, but could be learned. It was further explained that
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choices would be associated with six shapes and that each shape could generate
a win, a loss, or nothing may happen. It was emphasised that there were no right
or wrong answers and that what was of interest was ‘gut reactions’, in order to
encourage quick responses.
For each presentation of a shape the participant was asked to risk a proportion
of the banked total on the outcome, with the aim of building a bank total as
large as possible. Along with the first randomly presented shape, participants
were informed that they had been given an initial banked total of 100 (see Figure
E.2).
If a win (good outcome) occurred with the shape the participant was returned
the stake and won the equivalent amount, increasing the banked total; if a loss
(bad outcome) occurred with the shape the participant lost the amount bet from
the banked total; and if the event was indifferent the participant was returned the
stake and the banked total was unaltered. After specifying the amount to bet on
the currently displayed shape and pressing the next button, the participant was
given feedback about the outcome of the event involving the shape using smiley
faces displayed for a short duration (1000ms).
For a win a conventional smiley face was displayed (with the mouth turned
up), for a loss a sad ‘smiley’ face was displayed (with the mouth turned down) and
for an indifferent outcome a neutral ‘smiley’ face was displayed (with the mouth
displayed as a horizontal straight line). An example of this feedback is shown in
Figure E.3. After the feedback had been provided the experiment continued with
the next randomly generated shape (see Figure E.4).
The experiment was self paced with no limit to the number of bets that par-
ticipants were able to make and the experiment could be terminated at any time
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by pressing the ‘Finish experiment’ button; participants were, however, asked to
make at least fifty bets as this quantity was thought sufficient to ensure that they
experienced the full range of the experimental shapes and their distributions. It
was possible for participants to go ‘bust’ if a stake of 100% of the banked total
was placed on what turned out to be a loss, in which case the information gather-
ing screen was displayed automatically, as if the ‘Finish experiment’ button had
been pressed.
On finishing the experiment (or going bust), participants were presented with
a rating page requesting brief demographic information and presenting all of the
shapes to be rated based on the same rating scales as the initial ratings experiment
(see Figure E.5 and Table 4.1). As with the initial experiment, participants were
asked to rate each shape by using a slider bar situated between two nouns of
opposite meaning. Each slider was initialised to the middle of the scale and the
participants moved the slider towards one end (extreme) or the other to indicate
their rating.
Once all of the ratings were completed, participants were asked to press the
submit button at the bottom of the page and were then presented with a thank
you page, from which they could navigate away from the experiment.
4.3.2 Results
Of the sixty five participants that completed the experiment a total of thirty
eight either failed to complete the requested fifty bets or provided fewer than fifty
percent of the ratings that were required, leaving twenty seven for the remainder
of the analysis. Eighteen out of the thirty eight excluded participants chose not
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to complete the fifty bets requested, while eight were unable to complete enough
bets because were they went bankrupt and taken automatically to the rating
page; the remainder provided fewer than fifty percent of the ratings that were
requested.
More than 57% of the excluded participants had been presented with every
shape fewer than five times, seven participants having had zero or only one presen-
tation of at least one of the shapes. Overall, the mean number of trials undertaken
was M =108.56, SD=46 with each shape presented for the mean numbers of trials
shown in Table 4.5.
4.3.2.1 Factor scores
Factor scores were calculated using the factor score coefficients established in the
factor analysis for the initial ratings experiment (see Table 4.3).
To make the results more comprehensible the reward distributions were re-
duced from six to three by combining the good, bad and indifferent distributions
that were identified in Table 4.4; the mean reward values of the combined dis-
tributions are shown in Table 4.6. Accordingly the results for the initial ratings
(experiment 1) and the present experimental ratings were combined to provide
results sets for shapes & , & and .
Independent samples analyses of variance, with dependent variables Evalua-
tion, Potency and Activity, comparing the differences between each distribution of
the initial semantic differential and the experimental semantic differential, were
carried out on the data. The analyses revealed significant interactions for the
Evaluation (F (2, 390) = 3.83, p = .022) and Potency (F (2, 390) = 3.10, p = .046)
dimensions, but not for the Activity dimension (F (2, 390) = 0.48, p = n/s). Post-
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Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics for the presentations of shapes.







Table 4.6: Combined means for distributions governing the occurrence of
either a reward or punishment. Each distribution has a standard deviation
of 0.1.
Shape Probability of Probability of Probability of





hoc analysis, carried out using the Tukey HSD test, for each of the combined
shape distributions revealed that for the Evaluation dimension the experimental
semantic differential was significantly lower than the initial semantic differential
for the combined distributions of shapes & , but not the other combined
distributions (results of the analysis and descriptive statistics are given in Ta-
ble 4.7). For the Potency dimension the experimental semantic differential was
significantly lower than the initial semantic differential for the combined distri-
butions of shapes & , & but not & . Both semantic differentials
are shown in Figure 4.3, where the differences can be seen, however, perhaps
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more illustrative are just the differences shown for each factor of the semantic
differential in Figure 4.4. Note that whether the pairwise differences between the
combined shapes are or are not significant is not of interest here, only that the
series of betting trials has influenced the semantic differential.
Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics and results of Tukey’s test for compar-
isons of initial and experimental ratings for each of the semantic differential
factors for the combined distributions.
Initial Experimental
Distribution Factor Mean SD Mean SD Diff p
E 50.60 21.74 35.49 21.45 -15.10 < .001
P 55.50 18.64 51.52 19.10 -3.99 n/s
A 47.32 27.92 45.20 18.66 -2.11 n/s
E 52.69 18.54 42.10 14.68 -10.59 = .015
P 72.99 15.65 63.75 13.17 -9.24 = .017
A 42.16 18.43 40.34 11.58 -1.82 n/s
E 60.54 15.30 57.97 16.49 -2.56 n/s
P 60.43 16.77 61.27 10.72 0.83 n/s
A 46.76 20.25 48.95 11.24 2.19 n/s
4.3.2.2 Reward histories
The numbers of good (wins), bad (losses) and indifferent outcomes were also
recorded for the experiment and these were collapsed across participants and
shapes in order to provide a basis to investigate the relationship between the
reward histories for each of the shapes and the semantic differential for the shapes.
In order to do this the same measures of reward as for the blog search data
discussed in Chapter 3 §3.3, were calculated and correlated with Evaluation,
Potency and Activity.
Although they were modest, significant correlations suggest that both Eval-
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Figure 4.3: Ratings for the initial (light bars) and experimental (dark
bars) semantic differentials. The left panel shows ratings for the Evalua-
tion dimension for each combined distribution of shapes, the right panel
ratings for the Potency dimension and the bottom panel the activity di-
mension. Ratings were between -50 to 50 with 0 indicating neutral. Error
bars are standard error of the mean.
uation and Potency were changeable by being exposed to the different reward
distributions in the shapes experiment. In particular relative reward, Ng
Ng+Nb
, was
correlated with the change in Evaluation, r(159) = 0.43, R2 = 0.18, F (2, 159) =
18.01, p < 001; and negative reward, Nb
Nt
, was correlated with Potency, r(159) =
−0.19, R2 = 0.03, F (2, 159) = 2.84, p = .049. There was no significant correlation
for Activity, r(159) = 0.11, R2 = 0.01, F (2, 159) = 0.89, n/s
Taken together, these results suggest that, at least for the Evaluation and
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Figure 4.4: The differences between the initial and experimental seman-
tic differential for Evaluation (lighter left bars), Potency (darker middle
bars) and Activity (darkest right bars) for each combined shape distribu-
tion. Error bars are standard error of the mean.
Potency dimensions, the semantic differential has been significantly influenced by
the series of bets carried out by participants.
4.4 Discussion
This chapter addresses the idea that, if the semantic differential represents our
three dimensional reward structure, as proposed in Chapter 3, it will be possible
to influence that reward structure and thereby the associated semantic differential
through exposure to stimuli associated with varying rewards. Based on an ap-
proach reminiscent of the Iowa gambling task, which has been used extensively for
investigating the Somatic Marker hypothesis, the AlphaBet experiment achieved
this using arbitrary coloured shapes that were associated with differing reward
distributions, in a betting game. It was hypothesised that providing participants
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with a sufficient number of random trials of these shapes should be enough to
affect the reward summary for a given shape and be capable of changing the
semantic differential associated with it.
An initial rating experiment, using the semantic differential technique, cap-
tured pre-existing connotative meaning for each of six arbitrary coloured shapes.
The results of analysing the ratings provided by participants showed that, a
semantic differential was formed with the expected dimensions of Evaluation,
Potency and Activity. Although there is no discernible pattern across the shapes
in the context of a simple rating experiment, participants were shown to have
preconceived ideas about such simple things as coloured shapes. It might be, of
course, that the shape/colour combinations used were novel in which case presum-
ably prior associations were used to assess the shape and arrive at a rating. For
example the shape/colour combination of yellow star was associated with good
things, which would seem to be reflected in everyday meaning (he/she is a star,
pop star, sports star, have a gold star etc.). Alternatively, it might also be that,
for example, something green would be rated positively, as it was, since green
is most commonly associated with nature. Accordingly, by expressing any post-
exposure ratings relative to this baseline the effects of any pre-existing colour
or shape biases associated with these shapes be minimised or eliminated from
experiment 2.
Experiment 2 exposed participants to the different rewards statistics of the
shapes through a betting experiment. Unfortunately a sizeable proportion of par-
ticipants’ data was eliminated from the analysis, due to too few bets, as there
was concern that some shapes may have been insufficiently sampled, and insuf-
ficient use of the rating scales. Nonetheless, even though statistics confirmed
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insufficient sampling by some, the remaining number of participants was suffi-
cient for the analysis. A further semantic differential was calculated and found to
be significantly different from the semantic differential produced from the initial
ratings; this can only be attributable to the participants’ reward structure and
hence semantic differential, having been influenced by the reward statistics of
the experimental shapes. Perhaps more interesting are the differences between
the combined shape distributions for each of the semantic differential dimensions,
shown in Figure 4.4.
The dimension labelled as reward in Chapter 3 (Evaluation) showed the great-
est change between the experiments, with the ‘losing’ shape combination attract-
ing the largest difference and, as can be seen in Figure 4.4, being significantly
different to the difference in reward for the ‘winning’ shape combination. Given
that the participants were exposed to approximately the same numbers of trials
for every shape, suggests that ’more notice’ was taken of the more negative distri-
butions, which might be considered to be consistent with loss aversion (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979), where sensitivity to a loss is more acute than an equivalent
win.
Sensitivity in the ‘indifferent’ shapes combination included the risk dimension
(again as labelled in Chapter 3) (Potency), which showed a significant difference
between the experiments. Considering this distribution of shapes as risk or danger
is interesting because while these shapes had equal probability for a good or
bad outcome, they also had equal probability of something happening or nothing
happening. The result of this is that, although taken together these shapes are not
as ‘objectively bad’ as those shapes in the losing distribution, they are somewhat
tedious and considerably more difficult to predict; consistent with the argument
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put forward in Chapter 3 this constitutes greater risk and is presumably the
reason for the worse ratings. As already observed in Chapter 2, it is important
to be more sensitive to threats and potentially dangerous things since doing so
provides better opportunities to survive and reproduce. This seems to be evident
even in the context of a simple betting experiment.
The comparison above raises an interesting question of whether the overall
pattern of reward/Evaluation and risk/danger/Potency is similar for the internet
blog data and for the shapes experiment data. The present data set obviously has
many fewer data points than the Internet data set, therefore, to see if the same
pattern of positive and negative rewards was associated with the different levels
of the semantic differential, the data were simply split into 4 bins, calculating
mean probabilities for bad things occurring for each quadrant described by axes
representing Potency on the vertical ‘y’ axis and Evaluation on the horizontal ‘x’
axis. The results of this binning process are shown in Figure 4.5, which shows this
relationship for the internet blog data and shapes experiment data respectively.
As can be seen, there is a correspondence between the rewards associated with
certain locations in the semantic differential, both when induced experimentally
and when induced by the nature of our environment: The semantic differential
appears simply to be a summary of the reward history.
However, although the winning shape distributions are the only ones to have
a reduced level of activity (and as argued here uncertainty) it is not significant;
neither the analysis of internet blog data, nor the AlphaBet shapes experiment,
seem to directly address anything to do with Activity. Based on the idea that
this latent factor is more accurately described as control or certainty, Chapter
5 attempts to focus on this dimension, by keeping other variables, such as the
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Figure 4.5: The relationship between potency and evaluation for Tech-
norati data set (top panel) and AlphaBet data set (bottom panel). Shown
is the risk (the probability of a bad event) for positively evaluated (Eval-
uation > 0 ) and negatively evaluated concepts (Evaluation < 0). These
are subdivided into concepts that are considered risky or potent (Potency







The AlphaBet shapes experiment in Chapter 4 attempted to show that the rela-
tionship hypothesised in Chapter 3 between connotative meaning and the reward
structure of individuals, as represented by arbitrary shapes, can be manipulated.
The AlphaBet experiment, reminiscent of the Iowa gambling task (Bechara et al.,
1994; Damasio, 1994), required participants to use the experience that they gained
during the course of the experiment to maximise the amount of money/points that
could be won from betting on the appearance of six coloured shapes; the exper-
iment provided explicit rewards for the participants following a bet on a shape;
where either nothing happened (according to different probability distributions
for each shape) or if it did participants could lose their stake or win the equivalent
amount (also according to different probability distributions for each shape).
This scenario, however, is not representative of many of the situations where
we make choices, especially in everyday life: Often there is no explicit reward or
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feedback. We may perhaps have only vague feedback information or even just
a subjective belief that a correct choice has been made. Consider, for example,
many of the choices that are made when deciding and buying clothes or footwear;
a new pair of shoes may feel reasonably comfortable and look nice, but this is a
feeling which is subjective and not like winning a bet. In addition, the Alphabet
experiment did not help a great deal in gaining a better understanding of the
Activity or uncertainty dimension.
In order to attempt to address both of these issues in one experiment, and to
remove any pre-conceived ideas that participants might have about the stimuli (it
was clear, for example, that the initial ratings taken in the AlphaBet experiment
showed that participants did have pre-conceived ideas about the shape and colour
combinations that were used), the same shape and colour was used, a black
triangle, but displayed in different orientations depending on a pre-determined
distribution. In order to try and manipulate Activity the triangles experiment
required participants to predict the size that a shape would be the next time it
was displayed in the same position. Everything was held constant apart from
the way that the size of each presentation was manipulated. In addition, for the
predictions that the participants made, no feedback was provided either when the
prediction was made or when the shape was displayed the next time.
Accordingly, the purpose of the experiment below is to influence participants
reward structure (and therefore semantic differential) by changing the rewards
associated with the concepts, that is, the shapes. However, in this experiment
reward is considered to be associated with predictability since there are no explicit
rewards. In this case, after exposure to shapes with differing predictability, do the
shapes gain a Semantic Differential like factor structure and are the characteristics
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of, particularly the Activity dimension, predictable from their reward histories?
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Participants
Nineteen participants volunteered to take part in the experiment and were re-
cruited from amongst the post graduates and staff in the School of Experimental
Psychology. There were seven male and twelve female participants with mean age
27.53 years SD=6.85. All participants reported normal or corrected to normal vi-
sion and all participants provided their informed consent prior to commencement
of the experiment.
5.2.2 Materials
Because it has been reported that people have better memory for content that is
shown on a larger screen (e.g. Detenber & Reeves, 1996) it was considered that
participants would have the best chance of learning the distributions of triangle
shapes if they were projected onto a large screen. The equipment used to display
each experimental trial consisted of a standard desktop computer connected to
a high resolution Canon XEED SX6 projector with the user interface presented
as an interactive computer program written using the MATLAB Graphical User
Interface, shown in Figure 5.1. The area where the trials were displayed was 700
millimetres by 700 millimetres, giving visual subtense of 20.05 degrees for both
width and height.
Within a large (white) square presented on a mid grey background, a black
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of how the triangles were presented.
triangle was displayed randomly (one at a time) at every corner. The size of
the triangle that was displayed in each trial was governed by four, predefined,
distributions. The distributions assigned to the triangles varied in size as fol-
lows a) random; b) probabilistically increasing; c) uniform; d) increasing in equal
increments for first 50% of trials then decreasing in equal increments. The dis-
tributions are shown graphically in Figure 5.2:
5.2.3 Design
In a repeated measures design, independent variables were the four triangles
that were presented in each corner of the display, each of which had a different
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Figure 5.2: The size changes that were assigned to each of the four
triangles. The x-axis represents the trial number and the y-axis the size
of the triangle in pixels for each trial.
distribution of change in size (see Figure 5.2). Dependent variables were size
predictions for the next triangle, presented in the same position and made graph-
ically using the mouse wheel, the confidence levels for each prediction entered
using a slider and Semantic Differential rating scores given by the participants
at the end of the experiment. For each triangle participants completed a twenty
scale Semantic Differential with each of the scales presented between two nouns
of opposite meaning. Participants were asked to complete the ratings for each
triangle on a separate sheet of pre formatted paper (shown in Appendix F) by
marking a seven point Likert type scale. The order and direction of the scales
were counterbalanced.
5.2.4 Procedure
Participants were asked to make themselves comfortable and after completion
of an informed consent form, requested to read some brief instructions for the
experiment. The instructions were also reiterated verbally. Participants were
informed that they would be presented with a triangle in one of the four corners
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of a (white) square, as shown in Figure 5.1, and that the experimental task
was to predict the size of the triangle the NEXT time it is presented in that
position. Predictions were made by using the mouse wheel to make the triangle,
that was currently displayed, larger or smaller. Once a prediction had been made,
participants were also asked to indicate how confident they were of their prediction
using a slider bar towards the bottom of the screen. Once the participant was
happy with the prediction and confidence rating the ‘Next’ button at the bottom
of the screen could be pressed to display the next trial. The experiment was self
paced with no time pressure, however, participants were asked not to spend too
long thinking about their predictions, but rather to go on ‘gut’ feel.
The experiment consisted of twenty presentations of a triangle from each dis-
tribution making eighty presentations in total. The presentations for each dis-
tribution were displayed in order, but which distribution was displayed for a
particular trial was randomised. The overall task, therefore, consisted not only
of learning the distributions in order to be able to make predictions for the next
size to be displayed for a particular corner, but also remembering the last size of
triangle that was displayed for a particular corner. Once all of the presentations
had been completed participants were asked to complete the Semantic differential
ratings for each triangle. Following completion of the ratings, participants were
debriefed and thanked for their participation.
5.3 Results
The scale data were collapsed across participants providing eighty mean scale
values and a factor analysis carried out. The analysis revealed the three compo-
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nents usually associated with the semantic differential, although they were found
in the order Activity, Potency and Evaluation; Table 5.1 shows loadings of the
component matrix following a varimax rotation.
Table 5.1: Rotated Component Matrix showing factor loadings greater
than .8. Extracted using principal components, with varimax rotation
which converged in five iterations.















This analysis may not seem entirely appropriate given the reduction in sample
size through using mean values across participants, however, previous research
regarding sample sizes and factor/principal components analysis (e.g. Guadagnoli
& Velicer, 1988; Osborne & Costello, 2004) has established that the validity of
the analysis is most importantly dependant on component loadings and absolute
sample size. The analysis above appears to be valid based on previously published
data, most particularly that each of the latent factors had loadings of > .8 for
the first four components for each factor, and also to the extent that, in common




The factor scores were then calculated, using the factor score coefficients cal-
culated above, for each distribution for every participant. A repeated measures
analysis of variance was then carried out on the scores for each latent factor (Ac-
tivity, Potency and Evaluation) with distribution as the factor for the analysis.
For the Activity factor, Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity
had been violated, χ2(5) = 11.45, p = .04, so degrees of freedom were corrected
using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity, ε = .68, which revealed a main
effect of distribution, F (2.03, 36.50) = 4.56, p = 0.017, see Figure 5.3. Post-hoc
analysis, using Tukey’s test, revealed that the uniform distribution was rated sig-
nificantly lower (or less active) than the other distributions (Random difference =
3.60, p = .002; Probabilistically increasing difference = 4.05, p < .001; Up/down
difference = 6.73, p < .001).
For Potency, Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had
also been violated, χ2(5) = 20.26, p < .001, so degrees of freedom were again
corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity, ε = .63, which re-
vealed a main effect of distribution, F (1.88, 33.89) = 4.43, p = 0.021, see Figure
5.4. Post-hoc analysis, using the Tukey test, showed that the random distribu-
tion was rated significantly higher, in other words more potent, than the other
distributions (Probabilistically increasing difference = 3.60, p = .002; Uniform
difference = 2.60, p = .02; Up/down difference = 4.56, p < .001).
For Evaluation, Mauchly’s test again indicated that the assumption of spheric-
ity had been violated, χ2(5) = 19.00, p = .002, so degrees of freedom were cor-
rected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity, ε = .59, which showed
that there was no significant effect of distribution on Evaluation, F (1.76, 31.76) =
98
5.3 Results
Figure 5.3: The mean factor scores for Activity for the distributions of
size changes. The uniform distribution was found to be significantly lower
than each of the other distributions. Error bars are standard error of the
mean.
3.18, p = n/s, see Figure 5.5.
Further repeated measures analyses of variance were also carried out on the
probability of a correct prediction, the certainty associated with predictions and
the squared prediction error, each with distribution as the factor for the anal-
ysis. For the probability of correct predictions Mauchly’s test of sphericity was
significant, χ2(5) = 11.70, p = 0.039, and as for the previous tests above, de-
grees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity,
ε = .98. Using the corrected degrees of freedom revealed a significant effect
of distribution, F (2.94, 1113.78) = 16.53, p < .001. The sphericity assumption
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Figure 5.4: The mean Potency factor scores for distributions of size
changes. The random distribution was found to have the highest level of
potency and was significantly different from each of the other distributions.
Error bars are standard error of the mean.
was also tested for the certainty given for predictions and Mauchly’s test was
significant, χ2(5) = 92.36, p < .001; degrees of freedom were corrected using
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity, ε = .87, and the resulting values
showed a significant effect of distribution, F (2.60, 984.70) = 32.64, p < .001. For
squared prediction error in pixels, again, sphericity was tested using Mauchly’s
test and found to be significant, χ2(5) = 198.05, p < .001, degrees of freedom
were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity, ε = .74, which
revealed a main effect of distribution, F (2.21, 839.16) = 67.83, p < .001.
Post-hoc analyses using Tukey’s test revealed that, for the probability of cor-
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Figure 5.5: The mean Evaluation latent factor scores for each of the four
distributions of size changes. Error bars are standard error of the mean.
rect prediction, all of the pairwise comparisons were significantly greater than the
critical difference, this is shown in Table 5.2. As can be seen in the table, this
was also the case for certainty of prediction and prediction error, with the excep-
tion of comparison of the errors for the probabilistically increasing and Up/down
distributions.
These analyses suggest that the different distributions of change of size sig-
nificantly effect the probability of predicting the correct outcome, confidence in
the prediction and the accuracy of the prediction. The differences for each dis-
tribution are shown graphically in Figure 5.6.
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Table 5.2: Results of Tukey’s test for pairwise comparisons of distribution
for each of probability of correct prediction, certainty of prediction and
squared error of prediction.
Distribution Correct Certainty Error
comparison Diff. p Diff. p Diff. p
Random Increasing 2.437 = .021 2.695 = .011 15.317 < .001
Random Uniform 10.133 < .001 9.821 < .001 31.406 < .001
Random Up/down 6.078 < .001 5.961 < .001 14.146 < .001
Increasing Uniform 7.238 < .001 7.516 < .001 8.401 < .001
Increasing Up/down 3.473 = .001 3.451 = .001 0.776 = .030
Uniform Up/down 3.039 = .004 4.737 < .001 4.107 < .001
Figure 5.6: Measures of prediction accuracy for each distribution. Left
panel: Probability of correctly predicting the change in size; Centre panel:
How certain the prediction was; Right panel: The squared value of the
difference (error) between the prediction and the actual size of the triangle.




The present experiment successfully attempted to both a) present a scenario to
participants that was perhaps more like real life choices, to the extent that there
was no explicit feedback and success in the task was due to experience alone; and
b) to investigate the Activity/uncertainty dimension by varying the distribution
of changes to the size of shapes while maintaining their colour and shape (only
changing their orientation).
For the Activity/uncertainty dimension, this can be seen clearly and directly
by comparing Figures 5.3 and 5.6 where the least active distribution in Figure 5.3
is the same as the distribution that is most certain in the centre panel of Figure
5.6; this distribution is the uniform distribution and by any judge is the least
active and should be the easiest to see and so be certain of. Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, this is also supported by the numbers of correct predictions and squared
prediction errors for the uniform distribution shown in the left and right panels
of Figure 5.6 respectively.
It is also evident from a comparison of the two figures that the random distri-
bution is rated significantly higher for the latent Potency/risk factor, that is to
say it is more risky, than the other distributions. Again, this is supported by the
objective measure of the lower number of correct predictions and the significantly
higher squared prediction error for the random distribution, shown in the left and
right hand panels of Figure 5.6 respectively.
The Evaluation dimension was not significantly different across the distribu-
tions, which was expected since there were no explicit rewards and other at-
tributes of shape and colour did not change. Indeed the lower value for the
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probabilistically increasing distribution, which was approaching significance, was
unexpected. Perhaps the reason for this difference for the probabilistically in-
creasing distribution in evaluation is that the final two presentations for that
distribution were reductions in size (as can be seen in Figure 5.2) where partici-
pants were more likely, based on their previous experience with the distribution,
to expect a size increase. In retrospect it was probably an error for this distribu-
tion to finish with two reductions in size.
It may reasonably be asked whether the experimental task was too easy for
the participants to recognise the distributions. It is, though, believed that this is
not the case for several reasons. The experimental task is, in fact, quite difficult;
remembering some representation of the last presented size for an orientation
and learning the pattern of the distribution challenged all of the participants.
While it seems clear that some of the participants must have recognised one
or more of the patterns in the changes due to the different distributions, the
majority claimed not to have recognised them (even the uniform distribution)
in an informal discussion during the debrief. Also, if the distributions did not
evoke some sort of emotional reaction or feeling, consistent with the Somatic
marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994), that could be differentiated, then a three
factor semantic differential would presumably not result.
The results of the present experiment suggest that, unlike the Iowa gambling
task (Bechara et al., 1994) and the AlphaBet shapes experiment described in
Chapter 4, that although explicit rewards (or reward histories) may be sufficient
to learn which are the good things to choose and which are bad, they are not a
necessary requirement; our learning, in the present case making good predictions,
appears to be sensitive to rather small and quite subtle differences. The histories
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associated with these predictions have been shown to affect the latent factors of
a semantic differential, as hypothesised.
The present experiment adds to the evidence presented in the Alphabet shapes
experiment that our reward structure is three dimensional and is represented by
the semantic differential. Each of the dimensions of the semantic differential
does seem to be capable of being relabelled reward, risk/danger and uncertainty
respectively and this has been shown using an approach based on explicit rewards,
mimicking, to some extent, an economic decision, and one based on subjective
rewards and perhaps representative of a more everyday type of choice.
If, as hypothesised in the somatic marker hypothesis and described in Chap-
ter 2, our choices are intimately related to feelings that come about through
’bodily’ changes, then it is reasonable to consider that this will be found with
choices that are made based on lower level perceptual information. The following
Chapter investigates whether choices are influenced by perceptual information







It is known that the mere perception of colour triggers evaluative processes (Elliot
& Maier, 2007) and that perceptual information, in the form of colour, is included
in the gist of scene. This chapter uses this idea to investigate the premise that the
somatic marker hypothesis, and hence our reward structure, is created through
physiological states and learned associations, and that our reward structure will
be evident from this ‘lower level’ perceptual information. A number of images
are rated and the semantic differential that is produced with factor analysis then
used, with the probability of particular colours appearing in the image, to carry
out regression analysis. Two different models of colour are used, the first based
on the eleven basic colours proposed by Berlin and Kay (1969) and the second
based on eleven colours found from a set of images representing ‘the world’. The
colour models were produced using a Gaussian mixture model, which makes it
straight forward to calculate the probability of colours appearing in an image.
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It is concluded that our reward structure is evident from low level perceptual
information in the form of colour and in addition, a proposal for how the Berlin
and Kay (1969) basic colours arise is made. First, however, the basic colour
opponency theory is described.
One of the mainstays of vision research is the opponent process theory of
colour, originally proposed by Hering in 1878 (Hering, 1964). Herings theory,
largely arrived at through introspection, for example, that certain colour combi-
nations, such as a bluey yellow or greeny red, cannot be imagined or produced,
suggested that there are four primary colours and that they are detected by pairs
of opponent processes, one for red/green and one for blue/yellow. However, com-
pelling empirical evidence had to wait until Hurvich and Jameson (1957) and an
experiment based on hue cancellation. Hue cancellation experiments start with a
colour (e.g. yellow) and attempt to determine how much of the opponent colour
(e.g. blue) must be added to eliminate any of that component from the start-
ing colour, for example, Hurvich and Jameson (1957) asked their participants to
move a control backwards and forwards until what they saw was neither yellowish
or bluish. Nevertheless, questions do remain, not over an opponency process per
se, but rather, whether there are exactly two pairs of opponent processes (e.g.
Saunders & Brakel, 1997, p173).
Based on the opponency theory, a unique green is neither yellowish nor bluish
and a unique blue is neither greenish nor reddish; effects that were considered
by Berlin and Kay (1969) in their influential colour naming theory. The original
Berlin and Kay (1969) analysis was based on a comparison of colour words in
20 languages from around the world that were used to choose exemplars from
320 Munsell colour chips. Most research into colour naming since Berlin and
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Kay (1969) has investigated saliency using an approach based on the frequency
of description used by participants for a range of colours that are presented to
them (e.g. Hays, Margolis, Naroll, & Perkins, 1972; Boynton & Olson, 1990; Taft
& Sivik, 1997). Boynton and Olson (1990), for example, presented participants
with two trials of 424 colours, asking them to name the colours with a single term
of their choice, and found that the basic colour terms have greater agreement
between participants and are used more consistently within participants than
any other terms. McManus (1983, 1997) on the other hand, used frequency of
occurrence of colour terms in poetry and literature, finding that the colour terms
and their order of evolution correlates very strongly with Berlin and Kay (1969).
However, despite the general acclaim for the theory, many detailed reviews of
Berlin and Kay (1969) were critical of their methods of gathering and presenting
data, few more so than Saunders and Brakel (1997, 2002) who are severely critical
of many of the aspects of the original, as well as much of the subsequent, research.
Saunders and Brakel (2002, pp335-336) argues in particular that all that has been
accomplished is to confirm what was already known, because the system and
methods used by Berlin and Kay (1969) and subsequent research, determine in
advance how facts relate to each other, to participants and to the colour stimuli
used and that the scientific evidence for the universality of the basic colour terms
is flimsy at best. For example, Saunders and Brakel (2002, p336) argues the
Munsell colour chips that were used as a basis to gather data were assumed
to be exhaustive of colour, but all that was established was that participants
could discriminate the most saturated, salient, Munsell chips in the set that was
used. Whatever the eventual outcome of this debate, the Berlin and Kay (1969)
basic colour terms are controversial; however, from the perspective of the present
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thesis, the original and subsequent research does not address how the colour that
is gleaned from a scene may be utilised.
Gist normally refers to the substance or essence of something, for example,
understanding the main point or essence of an argument is getting the gist of that
argument, alternatively a statement such as Anna didn’t catch every word between
them, but she heard enough to get the gist of the conversation also illustrates the
meaning. In vision research, gist is commonly used in a very similar way to
describe the information that can be gleaned from a scene in a brief glance (e.g.
Rousselet, Joubert, & Fabre-Thorpe, 2005) and also more broadly from a longer
look, as it is here, to allow more complete descriptions of a scene (e.g. Fei-
Fei, Iyer, Koch, & Perona, 2007; Potter, 1976). It has long been known that
people are exceptionally good at getting the gist of a scene, especially in terms of
scene classification and recognition (e.g. Fei-Fei et al., 2007; Potter, 1975, 1976;
Rousselet et al., 2005); presumably, being able to act on the information gained
from the gist of a scene is an especially useful evolutionary adaptation, both for
prey and predator alike.
Colour vision evolved because it provided a means to gain better information
about the world and to better recognise and detect things that contributed to
survival (Cornelissen, Brenner, & Smeets, 2003), it therefore seems intuitively
right that colour has more than aesthetic value; colour provides information and
has specific meaning according to context and, consistent with a model by Elliot
and Maier (2007), influences behaviour through learned associations that may be
the cognitive expression of emotions and feelings. It has been found, for example,
that avoidance behaviour is promoted by red (compared with blue for approach
behaviour) (Mehta & Zhu, 2009), without conscious awareness. Interestingly, the
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same research also found that performance on a creative task was improved by
blue, while red improved performance on detailed task.
These colour associations are learned from infancy and some may be developed
from evolutionarily embedded dispositions, with the result that simple percep-
tion of a particular colour in a particular context will influence cognition and
behaviour accordingly (Jacobs, 1981; Mollon, 1989); in this way colour acts as an
unconscious prime. That is to say that the colour association acts on behaviour
unintentionally and without conscious awareness. There is compelling evidence
for just this sort of priming effect in the automaticity literature (e.g. Bargh &
Chartrand, 1999; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001).
But what of colour preferences?
Colour preferences are complicated and the literature that discusses them has
been described as “bewildering, confused and contradictory” (McManus, Jones,
& Cottrell, 1982). As an illustration of this complexity, it has been argued that
red is particularly powerful as a colour because of associations with blood and
also because of its unusualness, for example, in sunsets (e.g. Humphrey, 1983);
Elliot and Niesta (2008) suggests that red has a positive effect and enhances men’s
attraction to women, but Elliot, Maier, Moller, Friedman, and Meinhardt (2007)
suggests that prior exposure to red has a detrimental effect on performance (in an
IQ test). In general though, blue is preferred over reds and yellows of equivalent
hue and chroma (McManus et al., 1982), but, people tend to have preferences
for high chroma colours and when they are presented with them, red is preferred
to blue; however, it is difficult to reproduce high value/chroma blues and the
equivalent reds/yellows often look brownish or washed out, even with digital
media (I.C. McManus, personal communication, October 15, 2009).
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On the basis that colour has the sort of priming effect on behaviour described
above, it is hypothesised that the colour composition of images, depicting differing
content and contexts, will influence the semantic differential (reward structure)
for those images in a similar way to the influence that winning and losing had on
the reward structure for the shapes in the AlphaBet experiment. The semantic
differential has been successfully used with images previously, both for objective
and non-objective art (non-objective art is art that has no recognisable subject)
(e.g. Springbett, 1960; Hagtvedt, Hagtvedt, & Patrick, 2008) as well as for
aesthetic subjects that are not art, such as coastal landscape (Kim & Kang,
2009).
Assuming that ‘our world’ consists of a limited set of digital images also
provides the opportunity, using an approach based on a Gaussian mixture model,
to test whether a reasonable approximation of the 11 basic colours identified by
Berlin and Kay (1969) is produced. With the colour information contained in
the mixture model and based on the idea that colour has meaning according to
context, the influence of colour on the semantic differential ratings produced from
short duration viewing of the images, will be apparent. Nevertheless, given that
colours and combinations of colours will provide different information in different
contexts, it should perhaps not be expected that there will be a conventional
preference order to the extent that each colour contributes, though the extent of
the contribution of each colour is expected to be different.
The remainder of this Chapter falls into four distinct areas, contained in the
next two sections: a) establish a test set of digital images and carry out a rating
experiment with that image set; b) calculate a semantic differential from the
experimental ratings data; c) build a Gaussian mixture model from the Berlin and
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Kay (1969) focal colours and analyse the model and semantic differential in order
to investigate the contribution of colour to the ratings; and d) for comparison,
carry out the same analysis but with a Gaussian mixture model built from samples
of images depicting everyday scenes.
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Participants
Three participants volunteered to take part in the rating experiment and were
recruited from amongst the post graduates from the School of Experimental Psy-
chology. All participants were male and reported normal or corrected to normal
vision and all of the participants provided their informed consent prior to com-
mencement of the experiment.
6.2.2 Materials
A set of 235 images was collected from digital media, including the internet,
that were judged to be representative exemplars of action, classical art, surreal
art, nature and romance genres (an example of each of these genres is given in
Appendix H, Figures H.1, H.2, H.3, H.4 and H.5 respectively).
The images were displayed one at a time on a web page written in PHP.
Below each image nine scales, based on slider bars, were used to rate the image
(see Table 6.1), these scales were the three identified as the most heavily loaded
for each of Evaluation, Potency and Activity in a factor analysis carried out by
Osgood and Suci (1955, p336) and were typical of reliable scales. Each slider was
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initialised to the middle of the scale and produced values between 0 and 100.
Table 6.1: The nine scales used for rating the images
Evaluation Potency Activity
Awful - Nice Light - Heavy Slow - Fast
Ugly - Beautiful Weak - Strong Passive - Active
Dirty - Clean Small - Large Dull - Sharp
A button was included at the bottom of the screen in order to allow partic-
ipants to move to the next image. Examples of the rating page are shown in
Appendix H, Figure H.6.
6.2.3 Design
This experiment used a repeated measures design. The independent variables
were the images in the test set that were to be rated. The dependent variables
were the rating scores provided by the participants following presentation of an
experimental image, using the sliders. The images were displayed in a random
order.
6.2.4 Procedure
Participants were asked to rate every image by using every slider bar. Each slider
was initialised to the middle of the scale and the participants moved the slider
towards one extreme or the other, as indicated by the noun, in order to record
their rating. Once the participant had completed the ratings, the ‘Next Image’
button at the bottom of the screen could be pressed to display the next trial.
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The experiment was self paced with no time pressure, however, participants
were asked to make their ratings quickly and not to spend too long thinking about
them, in other words, participants were asked to go more on ‘gut’ feel. Once all of
the ratings were completed, participants were presented with a thank you page.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Factor analysis
The data collected from participants for each of the rating scales were first checked
for ‘factorability’ using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy
(.73) and with Bartletts test of sphericity (χ2(36)=2821.63, p <.001). On the
basis of these checks, factor analysis was carried out on the data.
Three principal components with eigenvalues greater than 1 were revealed,
accounting for 74.23% of the variance in the ratings. Table 6.2 shows loadings of
the component matrix following a varimax rotation.
Though the factors were in a slightly different order from previous semantic
differentials, three factors, consistent with previous findings, were revealed by the
analysis. Factor one related to rating scales indicating Evaluation, Factor 2 to
rating scales indicating Activity and Factor 3 to rating scales indicating Potency.
The factor score coefficients calculated for each scale are shown in Table 6.3.
The purpose of the analysis was to relate the probability (or proportion) of a
colour appearing in a set of images to the dimensions of a semantic differential
produced by rating a set of images. Therefore, having calculated the semantic
differential, a way to calculate the colour proportions in the images was required
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Table 6.2: Rotated Component Matrix showing factor loadings greater
than .5. Extracted using principal component analysis, with varimax ro-
tation which converged in five iterations.
Scale Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Awful - Nice .889
Ugly - Beautiful .866
Dirty - Clean .861
Light - Heavy -.777
Weak - Strong .796
Small - Large .849
Slow - Fast .888
Passive - Active .905
Dull - Sharp .579
Table 6.3: Factor score coefficients.
Scale Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Awful - Nice .293 .045 -.002
Ugly - Beautiful .293 .006 .129
Dirty - Clean .284 -.042 .045
Light - Heavy -.245 -.016 .130
Weak - Strong -.071 -.051 .494
Small - Large .066 -.130 .572
Slow - Fast -.031 .490 -.169
Passive - Active -.001 .480 -.097
Dull - Sharp .090 .243 .189
and for this an approach based on a Gaussian mixture model was chosen.
6.3.2 Gaussian mixture model
A Gaussian mixture model is a probabilistic model that assumes that data points
are generated from a mixture of a finite number of Gaussian distributions with
unknown parameters. Fitting the best mixture of Gaussians for a given dataset
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(as measured by the log likelihood) results in a probability distribution of classes
that can be used to predict the probability (posterior) of new data points be-
longing to those classes. Fitting Gaussian mixture models is an example of an
unsupervised learning method, however, the computing required for fitting a mix-
ture of Gaussians is exponential for the number of latent Gaussian distributions,
so approximate inference techniques are often used. While this does not guaran-
tee the optimal solution, models do converge quickly to a ‘local’ optimum. To
improve the quality it is usual to fit many of these models and choose the model
that best fits the data, often on the basis of log likelihood or similar approach.
Here the Gaussian mixture model functions from the Netlab toolbox (Nabney
& Bishop, 2004) are used, these functions initialise the model using a clustering
process known as k-means and then use the expectation maximisation (EM) al-
gorithm. EM is an iterative method for obtaining maximum likelihood estimates
of parameters for models that depend on unobserved variables, in the present
case a finite number of Gaussian distributions.
For comparison, Gaussian mixture models were built from two sources: a) colour
data that is freely available at the World Color Survey website (Cook, Kay, &
Regier, 2011); and b) a reference set of 233 randomly chosen digital images of ev-
eryday scenes (with mean width and height of 1512 and 1127 pixels respectively;
see Appendix H, Figure H.7 for examples). The mixture models were built using
CIEL∗a∗b∗ colour space values. A description of CIEL∗a∗b∗ colour space and how
the values were obtained is provided in the next section.
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6.3.3 Mixture model (World Color Survey)
The World Color Survey began towards the end of the 1970’s in order to test
the hypotheses that were proposed by Berlin and Kay (1969) and was specifically
involved with research into the existence of colour naming across languages and
cultures, together with the evolution of colour terms in languages over time. From
the World Color Survey data three files were used in the following way to obtain
values for the eleven basic colour terms that Berlin and Kay (1969) proposed
and which would provide the centres of the Gaussian distributions in the mixture
model.
Using the World Color Survey data meant that the centres of the Gaussian
distributions that formed the model could be fixed at the outset (although the
mean values were calculated for those colours consisting of multiple points, see
Figure 6.1) and therefore did not require repeated processing in order to arrive at
the best model, rather, a procedure was needed to fix the priors and covariance
matrix of the model.
The definitive names, abbreviations and order of emergence for the colour
terms were obtained from BK-dict.txt. The abbreviations were then used to
obtain the ranges of cells in the World Color Survey colour chart (shown in
Figure 6.1) that represent the basic colours.
These cell ranges were then used to obtain the CIEL∗a∗b∗ colour values from
the cnum-vhcm-lab-new.txt table. Where multiple values represented a basic
colour term, it was a simple matter to calculate the mean values for that colour.
The colour terms, their numbers and CIEL∗a∗b∗ values are shown in Table 6.4 and
a representation of the colours in Table 6.5. CIEL∗a∗b∗ is a perceptually uniform
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Figure 6.1: The World Color Survey colour chart with the centres rep-
resenting the ‘best’ colours marked with white dots.
colour space, where perceptually uniform means that a change of a certain amount
in a colour value should produce a similar change in visual importance. Unlike the
RGB (used in most display devices) and CMYK colour models, the CIEL∗a∗b∗
colour space includes all perceivable colours and its gamut exceeds that of other
colour models. It is clearly important to use a perceptually plausible colour
model, however, the benefit may, to some extent, be obviated here because the
images that were used were only available in RGB.
Table 6.4: The Berlin and Kay (1969) basic colour terms, their numbers
and CIEL∗a∗b∗ values taken from the World Color Survey.
Term Number L∗ a∗ b∗
Black 1 15.60 -0.02 0.02
White 2 93.54 -0.06 0.06
Red 3 36.00 54.64 37.53
Green 4 46.40 -58.43 26.12
Yellow 5 81.35 7.28 109.12
Blue 6 51.57 -10.34 -38.57
Brown 7 20.54 13.14 18.05
Purple 8 25.66 31.26 -22.32
Pink 9 66.65 40.06 -3.07
Orange 10 51.57 55.20 68.32
Grey 11 51.57 -0.03 0.04
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Table 6.5: Representation of the Berlin and Kay (1969) basic colour
terms using CIEL∗a∗b∗ colour values from the World Colour Survey, to-













Once the necessary data (the CIEL∗a∗b∗ values) for the mixture model centres
had been obtained, the mixture model was created based on the structure used in
Netlab (Nabney & Bishop, 2004). In order to complete the model, a 1% sample
of the pixels from every image in the reference set was taken. The samples were
taken from each image as RGB values and converted to the CIEL∗a∗b∗ colour
space, resulting in a sample of 4.04 million colour values; these values were used
to calculate the prior probabilities for each of the centres together with their
covariance matrix.
Using all of the colour values from every image in the rated test set of images,
posterior probabilities for each colour (the probability that a colour appears in the
image) were then calculated using the model that had been constructed. Mean
posterior values for each image were calculated, which, along with the semantic
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differential discussed above, provided a data set that could be analysed using
multiple regression.
6.3.4 Regression (World Color Survey)
To investigate the relationship between the World Color survey colours (i.e. the
Berlin and Kay (1969) colours) and semantic differential obtained from the ratings
of the set of test images, multiple regression was carried out using the mean values
for each image, for each dimension of the semantic differential. The three multiple
regressions used Evaluation/reward, Potency/risk and Activity/uncertainty in
turn as the dependent variable, together with the mean values of the posterior
probability of the colours for each of the images in the test set, as the independent
variables.
Significant relationships were found for Evaluation/reward (R = .49, R2 =
.24, aR2 = .21, F (10, 224) = 7.232, p < .001) and Potency/risk (R = .32, R2 =
.10, aR2 = .06, F (10, 224) = 2.570, p = .006), while Activity/uncertainty was
short of significance (R = .25, R2 = .06, aR2 = .02, F (10, 224) = 1.520, p = n/s).
Colinearity diagnostics indicated that the tolerance for black was < 0.0001, so it
was excluded from the analysis. Inspecting the beta coefficients for the regressions
showed that the contribution of the colours was in the order shown in Table 6.6.
While this model provides a reference point for further comparisons, it is
unrealistic, simply because the model centres were artificially set at the values
given by Berlin and Kay (1969) and the World Color Survey. The model produced




Table 6.6: The standardised beta coefficients from multiple regressions
using the semantic differential and the Gaussian mixture model posterior
probabilities built with the World Color Survey colour centre values.
Evaluation Potency Activity
(Reward) (Risk) (Uncertainty)
Term Beta Term Beta Term Beta
Grey 0.398 Brown -0.226 Grey 0.174
White 0.201 Pink 0.173 Purple 0.121
Green 0.131 Yellow 0.117 Yellow -0.080
Orange 0.120 White 0.087 Orange 0.080
Blue 0.079 Red 0.059 Green -0.068
Red 0.074 Green -0.044 Blue 0.052
Pink 0.058 Blue 0.041 White 0.038
Purple 0.048 Purple 0.024 Red 0.033
Brown 0.034 Grey -0.024 Pink 0.009
Yellow -0.007 Orange -0.007 Brown 0.009
6.3.5 Establishing the number of centres
To establish the best estimate of the number of Gaussians (centres) that describe
the colour data from the reference images, a large number of models were pro-
duced. For each of 100 relatively modest random samples of 100,000 pixels from
the 4.04 million sampled from the reference set, mixture models were produced
for 2 to 20 centres, each repeated 10 times. From the 10 repetitions for each of
the models the best log likelihood was obtained and from these, the minimum
description length calculated, as shown in Equation 6.1 (Nannen, 2003, p14).
L(D) = min
[





where D is the data set, Mk is the model, k is the number of Gaussians or centres
and N is the number of points in the data set.
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While obtaining the minimum description lengths, the number of centres re-
sponsible for that minimum description length was also obtained. From the 100
centre values obtained, the mean number of centres that were responsible for the
minimum description lengths was calculated. The mean number of centres was
12.8 and the standard deviation was 4.96, this is illustrated in Figure 6.2. In view
of these estimates 18 centres was set as the upper limit for the Gaussian mixture
model used for the image data.
Figure 6.2: Histogram of the numbers of centres for each of the 100 min-
imum description lengths calculated for the mixture models and showing
the mean (thick line).
6.3.6 Mixture model (image data)
Ten mixture models, each with 18 centres, were created using the 1% sample
consisting of the 4.04 million colour values described above and the model best
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fitting the data was chosen using log likelihood. A graphical representation of
the colours that were found by the mixture model is shown in Table 6.7.
It is interesting to note that, of the 18 centres that were found, four of the
centres are clearly shades of blue and a further four centres were clearly shades
of purple, also, two centres were clearly shades of brown. Not only does this bear
striking similarity to the centres provided by the World Color Survey, but, if the
multiple shades of blue, purple and brown are collapsed into a single colour value
for blue, a single colour value for purple and a single colour value for brown,
there are a total of eleven centres, exactly the number argued by Berlin and Kay
(1969), the CIEL∗a∗b∗ values for these colours are shown in Table 6.8.
Table 6.7: Representation of the colour centres found by the Gaussian
mixture model. The best matching Berlin and Kay (1969) basic colour















Table 6.8: Colour centre CIEL∗a∗b∗ values generated by the Gaussian
mixture model based on samples from the test image set, together with the
matching Berlin and Kay (1969) colour terms and numbers for reference.
Term Number L∗ a∗ b∗
Dark 1 15.60 -0.02 0.02
Light 2 96.00 -0.06 0.06
Red 3 59.17 59.36 19.67
Green 4 41.23 -33.18 41.15
Yellow 5 88.65 -33.80 12.41
Blue 6 52.10 -2.17 -35.23
Brown 7 36.06 12.34 36.94
Purple 8 48.98 29.49 -34.06
Pink 9 78.91 38.97 -10.98
Orange 10 76.48 38.22 29.22
Grey 11 56.64 -0.03 0.04
6.3.7 Regression (image data)
To investigate the relationship between the colours found by the mixture model
and the semantic differential obtained from the ratings of the set of test images,
multiple regression was carried out using the mean values for each image, for each
dimension of the semantic differential. As with the regressions described above for
the initial mixture model, the three multiple regressions used Evaluation/reward,
Potency/risk and Activity/uncertainty in turn as the dependent variable, together
with the mean values of the posterior probability of the colours for each of the
images in the test set, as the independent variables.
Significant relationships were found for Evaluation/reward (R = .47, R2 =
.22, aR2 = .19, F (10, 224) = 6.403, p < .001), Potency/risk (R = .32, R2 =
.10, aR2 = .06, F (10, 224) = 2.520, p = .007), but, as with the previous model, Ac-
tivity/uncertainty was found to be short of significance (R = .23, R2 = .05, aR2 =
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.01, F (10, 224) = 1.268, p = n/s). Colinearity diagnostics indicated that the tol-
erance for grey was < 0.0001, so it was excluded from the analysis. Inspecting the
beta coefficients for the regressions showed that the contribution of the colours
was in the order shown in Table 6.9.
Table 6.9: The standardised beta coefficients from multiple regressions
using the semantic differential and the Gaussian mixture model posterior
probabilities built with the image colour data centre values.
Evaluation Potency Activity
(Reward) (Risk) (Uncertainty)
Term Beta Term Beta Term Beta
Black -0.380 Yellow 0.159 Black -0.137
Brown -0.141 White 0.153 Yellow -0.132
Orange 0.120 Orange 0.142 White 0.125
White 0.082 Red 0.126 Brown 0.037
Yellow 0.076 Brown -0.107 Green -0.028
Purple -0.076 Black 0.106 Orange 0.017
Blue 0.055 Blue 0.104 Red 0.016
Pink -0.033 Purple -0.088 Blue 0.014
Red 0.031 Pink -0.064 Purple 0.011
Green 0.027 Green -0.043 Pink -0.010
6.4 Discussion
This chapter addresses the idea that our reward structure, as represented by
the semantic differential and as proposed in Chapter 3, will be available from
perceptual information. Perceptual information in the form of colour, gained
from the gist of a set of visual scenes, was expected to be related to how those
scenes were rated, since it is known that the mere perception of colour triggers
evaluative processes, and this is what was found. Initially, the rating experiment,
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based on ratings of exemplars of action, classical art, surreal art, nature and
romance genres showed that a semantic differential was formed with the expected
dimensions of Evaluation, Potency and Activity. However, what was of particular
interest in the present experiment was how the semantic differential or reward
structure related to the colour composition of the images.
In order to establish the colour composition, a Gaussian mixture model was
created from mean colour values from the World Color Survey that represented
the Berlin and Kay (1969) basic colour terms and samples from a set of images
that provided a reference set of everyday scenes (which were different from the
rating test set); multiple regression was then used to investigate the relationship
between the model and the dimensions of the reward structure. The World Color
Survey data has previously been analysed using clustering techniques (e.g. Lind-
sey & Brown, 2006) where the relationships between colour and language are
argued for, however, an approach to these colour categories in terms of choice
or reward has not been made. A significant relationship was found for Evalua-
tion/reward and Potency/risk dimensions and the colour composition of the set
of scenes used for testing.
However, in the present case, a mixture model built from the focal colour
values contained in the World Color Survey, while successful, is unsatisfactory
just because the values for the Gaussian centres (the focal colours) come from an
external source and can not be said to have been learned by the model (although
the priors and covariances clearly were). This approach can be criticised in the
same way that Saunders and Brakel (1997, 2002) criticised Berlin and Kay (1969)
as merely confirming what is already known by assuming that the basic colours
are correct. More satisfactory is to use focal colour values that were learned by
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the model and this was what was carried out with a second Gaussian mixture
model. First though, an upper limit for the number of centres for the model was
needed.
Through running a Gaussian mixture model many times with a modest set of
test data and with a number of centres from two to twenty, the log likelihood was
used to calculate a minimum description length for each model and the number
of centres best fitting the data established. The mean number of best fitting
centres was calculated and an upper limit on the number of centres to use in
the model set at 18. Running the model with a much larger sample from the
reference set of scenes resulted in the mean colour centres shown in Table 6.11.
Several of the centres were clearly shades of basic colours i.e. Blue, Purple and
Brown, a similar outcome to the World Color Survey for several colours e.g.
Blue, Purple, Brown, Red etc. Calculating the means for these multiple colour
centres resulted in eleven colours that are plausible facsimiles of the basic colour
terms defined by the World Color Survey and Berlin and Kay (1969). As with
the initial mixture model, multiple regression was used in order to investigate
the relationship between the model and the dimensions of the reward structure
obtained from image ratings. Again, the regression analysis showed significant
relationships with Evaluation/reward and Potency/risk dimensions of the reward
structure, similar to the initial model.
Inspecting the beta coefficients for the regressions showed a different order in
the contributions of each colour between the models. The reasons for this are
unclear and are perhaps to do with the effect of chroma on preferences, which
was highlighted by McManus (I.C. McManus, personal communication, October
15, 2009) and discussed above, nonetheless, the present analysis does not extend
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far enough to be able to draw any clear conclusions in this area. However, the
model colours can be considered in a different way.
Using the World Color Survey colour chart and setting the central colour
value in every cell that was named as that colour, provides a colour chart that
illustrates the composition of each colour in terms of the chart; this is illustrated
in Figure 6.3. Presumably, if the present model is a good representation of the
basic colour terms, obtaining posterior probabilities for the World Color Survey
colour chart colours using the model should provide a reasonable approximation
of the centre version of the World Color Survey chart (Figure 6.3).
Figure 6.3: The World Color Survey colour chart with the central colour
value set in every cell that was named as that colour, together with the
cells representing the ‘best’ colours marked with white dots.
Rather than the 330 colours that form the World Color Survey colour chart
as shown in Figure 6.1, the full range of colours that the World Color Survey
used was 998 and these were used to produce the colour chart shown in Figure
6.4. While this colour chart appears to contain a representation of the basic
colours, it could not be said to show ideal or even especially definite shades of
those colours. However, neither the World Color Survey nor Berlin and Kay
(1969) were interested in what people thought the mean or central value for a
colour was, but rather what people considered the typical or best representation
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of a colour from a constrained set of colours that was presented to them. The
present model should therefore be able to achieve a similar outcome, using the
same data. It is argued that this is what happens in a phenomenon known as
peak shift.
Figure 6.4: Colour chart based on mixture model centre values with the
central colour value set in every cell that was closest to that colour centre,
together with the cells representing the ‘best’ colours marked with white
dots.
Peak shift is a well known psychological phenomenon that is found in animal
discrimination learning and in humans (e.g. Thomas, Mood, Morrison, & Wierte-
lak, 1991; Wills & Mackintosh, 1998; Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999; Baddeley,
Osorio, & Jones, 2007). In the peak shift effect, animals respond more strongly
to exaggerated versions of the training stimuli, as in the often quoted example
of rats discriminating between squares and rectangles (e.g. Ramachandran &
Hirstein, 1999). When rats are rewarded for discriminating a square from a rect-
angle they rapidly learn to choose the rectangle, interestingly though, response
to an extreme, longer and thinner, rectangle provokes a significantly stronger re-
sponse than the original training rectangle. Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999)
argues that rats are learning a rule (of ‘rectanglularity’) rather than a prototype
and that similar, peak shift, phenomena also occur in people where they apply
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to many visual experiences, especially to art. Instances of peak shift in art seem
to be too common to be ignored, for example, in representations of the human
figure by Michelangelo, Rubens, and Renoir, and the distortions of El Greco, Gi-
acometti and Modigliani, although, perhaps the extremes of colour used by the
Impressionists are more relevant to the present chapter. How then does the peak
shift effect apply to, say, our choice of the reddest of reds?
It seems clear that what most people would choose as the ‘ideal’ or most
representative red does not appear often in the natural world and even if it
did it is hard to understand why a particular shade out of all of the shades
would be chosen as constitutive as ideal redness. To paraphrase an example
in Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999), a skilled caricaturist will subconsciously
subtract average features, while exaggerating the differences, and thereby create
a cartoon that is more like the original than the original (for example, imagine a
Gerald Scarfe cartoon of Margret Thatcher or Tony Blair), it is argued that the
rat responds to ‘rectangularness’, and the perfect red is identified, in the same
way.
In order to establish a peak shift value for each colour centre (or in the present
case the colours in the World Color Survey colour chart), first, the mixture model
is used to calculate the posterior probability that each sampled colour point, used
to create the model, belongs to each centre. The Netlab toolbox (Nabney &
Bishop, 2004) contains a routine to allow this to be achieved easily (gmmpost).
The Gaussian centre that each colour belongs to is then established, that is, for
every sampled colour the nearest centre is established by calculating the Euclidian
distance from the sampled colour to each centre and choosing the centre that is
the minimum distance from it. Having established the points belonging to each
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centre the posterior probabilities are then used and the point with the maximum
posterior value identified, this point is the peak shifted value that is used for
the centre in question. Carrying out this procedure for the learned (image data)
model results in the peak shifted colours shown in Table 6.10 and having the
CIEL∗a∗b∗ values shown in Table 6.11.













The peak shift effect for the centre version of the colour chart is shown in
Figure 6.5. As can be seen, the representations for each of the colours is much
more as expected for representative colours, with, for example, redder reds, and
greener greens than the mean values shown in Figure 6.4. Indeed, given the lim-
ited ‘world’ that the mixture model has learned the colours from, the peak shifted
colours are a remarkably good representation of the 11 basic colours hypothesised
by Berlin and Kay (1969). The peak shifted version of the focal colours found
by the Gaussian mixture model is indicating that what might be considered a
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Table 6.11: Colour class CIEL∗a∗b∗ values generated by the Gaussian
mixture model based on samples from the test image set that have been
peak shifted. The best matching Berlin and Kay (1969) basic colour terms
and their numbers are included for reference.
Term Number L∗ a∗ b∗
Dark 1 15.600 -0.020 0.020
Light 2 96.000 -0.060 0.060
Red 3 51.570 58.010 30.520
Green 4 41.220 -19.480 36.560
Yellow 5 91.080 -5.250 45.240
Blue 6 53.702 -2.497 -29.760
Brown 7 39.876 16.290 38.240
Purple 8 61.700 20.070 -26.920
Pink 9 76.475 40.040 -2.700
Orange 10 71.600 34.960 37.540
Grey 11 56.635 -0.030 0.040
perfect, or ideal, representation of a colour is not the typical or average value
that is typically seen or is most common; rather it is an extreme value. Does this
provide support for Berlin and Kay (1969)?
Figure 6.5: Colour chart based on peak shifted mixture model centre
values with the central colour value set in every cell that was closest to
that colour centre, together with the cells representing the ‘best’ colours
marked with white dots.
The present experiment does not offer any insight into colour terms with
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respect to language. However, what it does provide is an objective method to
assess the most effective number of colours that can be profitably used to describe
the world. It can also be claimed that the criticisms of Saunders and Brakel (1997,
2002) do not apply to the present approach, at least insofar as particular ranges
of colour are not assumed (except that all colours came from digital images). The
number of colours was found to be around 11 and to the extent that this was the
number of colour terms found by previous research, adds support to the Berlin
and Kay (1969) hypothesis.
Despite this, the modelling approach used here could be used to extend the
investigation of basic colour terms, particularly in specific environments or car-
rying out specific tasks. Taken together, the semantic differential, the Gaussian
mixture model and the relationships that were revealed between them, suggest
that perceptual colour information from gist, gained during short duration view-
ing of images representing a range of genres does evoke evaluative processes.
These processes are the basic mechanisms that establish whether a stimulus is
hostile or hospitable (Elliot & Covington, 2001), which in turn produce motivated
behaviour such as choices.
The experiments that have been reported in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 have
argued that a single dimension of reward or utility is insufficient to represent the
prior information that must be considered when making inductive inferences that
lead to choices and that a richer three dimensional representation is needed. A
large data source was used to investigate the plausibility of this idea and then, in
subsequent experiments whether the hypothesised representation can be directly
affected, or learned. This was investigated on the basis of a choice with rewards
in the AlphaBet experiment and a choice based on a more subjective inference
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in the triangles experiment, with the present experiment investigating if this
reward structure is apparent based on perceptual information. The chapters
that follow provide a mathematical model, based on the ideas that have been
investigated, consisting of a value function and probability weighting function,
beginning with a brief discussion that reiterates the importance of uncertainty,
introduces Bayesian modelling and discusses a feature of the decision making







Problems involving choices amongst such things as simple lotteries and gambles
have been intensively studied over the last forty years. Research involving these
sorts of choices is important because it represents in an abstract way how people
deal with risky and uncertain decisions. As Neumann and Morgenstern (1944,
§2.1.1, p. 8) observe, understanding these choices is also important because it is
the decision making of individuals that constitutes the community. It is obvious
that choice behaviour has implications in many economic contexts, from why we
gamble and why we buy insurance, through to international relations. This sort
of research is also of further importance because peoples behaviour is not well
described by expected utility theory, which is taken as the normative theory of
choice, particularly for economics.
Expected utility theory tells us that, for each of a set of alternatives that we
want to choose between, we ought to assign a real number or value to an outcome,
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then multiply that value by its probability, add them up and then use the best re-
sult to choose an alternative. This is the expectation principle (Kahneman, 2011)
and has been taken to be the essence of rational behaviour, however, it depends
on having complete information; recall from Chapter 2 that the classical model of
rationality requires knowledge of all the relevant alternatives, their consequences
and probabilities, and a predictable world without surprises (Simon, 1979, p500).
Indeed, Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Marschak (1950) explicitly con-
sider only the situation where there is complete information, neither considers
what rational behaviour might be under incomplete information, with all of the
vagueness of uncertainty and risk (in the sense of danger or difficulty) that it
might entail for the individual in a social economy, attempting to make a choice.
Recall also from Chapter 2 the often quoted view associated with Knight (1921),
that an uncertain alternative is one where some of the outcomes may occur with
a probability that is known, others may occur with a probability that is unknown
and others may be unknown.
This chapter briefly introduces the following three chapters, which consider
how the empirical findings discussed in the preceding chapters might be pulled
together into a coherent mathematical model. The research that led to the ques-
tioning of expected utility theory and production of prospect theory are briefly
recapped and an outline of the approach taken here provided. One of the most




The main condition for expected utility theory to be rational is that the stated
probability for an alternative has no uncertainty associated with it, that is, there
is complete information for that alternative. If a probability of 50% has the same
information content as the statement we will observe 5 × 1010 successes out of
1 × 1011 trials, then no amount of previous knowledge should affect it. This is
at least plausible in artificial situations, for example, those involving randomly
drawn coloured balls from urns, however, for the kinds of situations we are evolved
to deal with there are four reasons that such extreme levels of certainty never
occur.
The first reason is that a probability statement made by a signaller (or other-
wise available to a person) is based on finite levels of experience. Not only does
such knowledge have uncertainty associated with it, but the ‘precision’ of an esti-
mate only improves very slowly with additional measurements (as the square root
of the number of measurements for independent trials). (Jacob) Bernoulli (1713),
after inventing much of what we understand of probability theory and promising
many practical applications, is said to have given up when he calculated that
the number of draws, from an urn containing twenty black and thirty white peb-
bles, that is required to reach ‘moral certainty’ that the ratio of black and white
pebbles in the urn is 2:3, was larger than the population of Basel, Switzerland
(Mlodinow, 2008; Polasek, 2000). Most probability signaller’s experience of sit-
uations, indeed the experience of most people, is not so extensive. Even given




The fact that the world changes over time limits how confident we will or can
be about future events. Statements about probability made in a changing world
must be uncertain since, unsurprisingly, the world may have changed. Although
finite, limited, experience and non-stationarity are the most fundamental sources
of uncertainty they must also potentially be combined with problems associated
with, the third problem, (inaccurate) memory and even, the fourth problem, the
possible dishonesty of the person making the probability statement (or, to state
matters more positively, the receiver has perfect trust in the communicator).
Together these reasons mean that, except in rather artificial situations, real life
probability statements rarely contain complete information and are never certain.
Given probabilistic statements with potentially incomplete or vague infor-
mation, associated uncertainty and risk, the rational way of dealing with them
is to combine them, using Bayes’ rule, with prior experience. Indeed, rational
models, often based on Bayesian inference (Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Griffiths,
Kemp, & Tenenbaum, 2008), provide very good accounts of many other aspects
of cognition.
7.3 Bayesian modelling
A Bayesian approach to a problem starts by defining three aspects of a given
problem, beginning with the formulation of a model, that is, the representation of
the problem needs to be defined together with the relevant quantities of interest,
the hypothesis space (Griffiths et al., 2008). Then, the relationship between
observations and the model (likelihood) can be established; and then all relevant
knowledge of the quantities of interest (priors), that capture our beliefs, can also
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be established.
From these three definitions all other quantities are calculated using standard
mathematical identities. Given the complexity of many Bayesian calculations
some approximations often need to be specified, however for the problems de-
scribed in the following chapters all of the relevant distributions can be calculated
analytically. The result of many Bayesian calculations is a probability distribu-
tion and to ease interpretation of this distribution, some summary statistics are
often required.
In the following chapters a Bayesian approach is adopted for modelling a
value function and a probability weighting function. Accepting Kahneman and
Tversky’s empirical findings and that the two functions described by prospect
theory are required in order to describe choice behaviour, several other factors
must also be considered as the basis of an expected utility theory that matches
human performance.
7.4 An Expected Utility Theory That Matches
Human Performance.
As has been previously described, maximising expected utility has long been
accepted as a valid, and very often the preferred, model of rational behaviour,
however, it has limited predictive and descriptive accuracy simply because, in
practice, people do not always behave in the prescribed way. Accordingly, this
is interpreted as evidence that either humans are not rational; expected utility
is not an appropriate characterisation of rationality; or, some combination of
141
7.4 An Expected Utility Theory That Matches Human Performance.
both of these. The following chapters argue that this observed behaviour can
be considered rational and expected utility an appropriate characterisation of
rationality, provided it is accepted that:
1. most utility/reward has no meaning unless it is in the presence of potential
competitors;
2. there is uncertainty in the nature of the competitors;
3. all statements of probability are also associated with uncertainty;
4. utility is marginalised over uncertainty, with framing effects providing con-
straints; and
5. utility is also sensitive to risk (that is, the potential for punishment or
danger), which when taken together with reward and uncertainty suggests
a three dimensional representation of utility.
The model produced is tested against three groups of decision making para-
doxes (preference reversals, dominance effects and context effects (Busemeyer &
Johnson, 2008)) and found to be predictively accurate. While these so called
decision making paradoxes are confined to what have become known as ‘descrip-
tion based decisions’ there is a distinction in the literature between these and
‘experience based decisions’ (e.g. Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig, Barron, Weber,
& Erev, 2004; Newell & Rakow, 2007).
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7.5 Decisions from experience
Description based decisions, such as the following prospect:
1. Would you prefer option A or option B?
A £3 for certain.
B £4 with probability 80% otherwise nothing.
2. Would you prefer option C or option D?
C £300 with probability 25%.
D £400 with probability 20%.
contrast the answers to two questions posed to the same participants. These
prospects are based on explicit information about alternatives, particularly gains
or losses and their probability of occurring. Decisions from experience, on the
other hand, are based on information gained from the outcome of previous choices,
be they good, bad or indifferent. Decision makers presumably learn about the
outcomes associated with each alternative through repeated sampling. Interest-
ingly however, the finding, for description based decisions, that low probability
events are overweighted has been shown to be reversed for experience based de-
cisions. For example, Hertwig et al. (2004) found that people make choices as if
they underweight the probability of rare events and explored reliance on relatively
small samples of information and overweighting of recently sampled information.
These findings though have been attributed to sampling errors (Fox & Hadar,
2006), however, according to other researchers this explanation may not be quite
so straight forward. Ungemach, Chater, and Stewart (2009) carried out further
research with experience based decisions that sought to eliminate the under sam-
pling that was thought to potentially cause the difference in weightings between
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description based decisions and experience based decisions. The results showed
that the extent of underweighting of small probabilities and overweighting of
higher probabilities was reduced for experience based decisions but apparently
not eliminated or reversed, suggesting that under sampling is not responsible for
the entirety of the effect.
Alternatively, L. Hadar and Fox (2009) proposes that the cause of, what has
become known as, the ‘experience gap’ is a combination of sampling error and the
amount of information available in each of the paradigms (i.e. description based
decisions compared with experience based decisions) and testing what they refer
to as ‘information asymmetry. They find that accounting for under sampling
and information asymmetry drastically reduces the extent of overestimation for
small probabilities with experience based decisions compared with description
based decisions, but does not reverse it. Hadar and Fox (2009) conclude that
there is no need for an alternative theory for decisions from experience. Decisions
from experience, as well as the other areas discussed above are considered in the






Historically, choosing on a rational basis meant selecting an alternative with the
greater or greatest expected value, EV (Eq. 8.1). It is commonly accepted that
Pascal’s solution to a gambling problem, known as the problem of points or
division of the stakes (Pascal, 1665), shown in Appendix G, is the first example
of using expected values, which in turn was the basis of Huygens (1657) De





While basing rational decisions on expected value is an appealing and elegant
solution it was clear that, particularly highlighted by another gambling problem
first stated by Nicolas Bernoulli in a letter to Pierre Montmort (1713), it was not
adequate. The St Petersberg paradox, or prospect, as it became known (shown in
Appendix B), is a gambling problem that is intended to illustrate that a rational
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person would be willing to part with only modest amounts in order to play in a
game that is considered to have infinite expected value.
The St Petersberg problem was eventually resolved by Nicholas Bernoulli’s
cousin Daniel (1738) by suggesting that the utility of money increases non-linearly
at a decreasing rate as the absolute value increases:
...the determination of the value of an item must not be based on
its price, but rather on the utility it yields. The price of the item
is dependent only on the thing itself and is equal for everyone; the
utility, however, is dependent on the particular circumstances of the
person making the estimate. (D. Bernoulli, 1954, §3 p. 24)
In other words, the objective value of the monetary gain of the gamble was











where c is a constant, dU is change in utility, x is a monetary amount and dx is
the change in the amount, forming a logarithmic utility function.
Fast forwarding to the twentieth century, game theory attempts to extend the
study of rational decision making to situations that involve other agents. In the
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) the
authors, as well as axiomatising expected utility theory (see Appendix A), effec-
tively returned to using the objective value of money, for simplicity (Neumann
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& Morgenstern, 1944, p. 8): For vonNeumann and Morgenstern, those involved
in games, decisions and the economy more generally, want to maximise mone-
tary income rather than a Bernoulli type utility. Nevertheless the quantity was
labelled as utility and expected utility theory in this guise rapidly became the
most influential theory of choice behaviour.
However, experiments quickly showed systematic violations of expected utility
theory’s axioms and its standing, particularly as a descriptive theory of choice,
was questioned and alternatives proposed. Although there are a number of al-
ternatives to expected utility theory they retain the central idea of D. Bernoulli
(1738) in multiplying the probability of an outcome by its value or utility. Prob-
ably the most influential of the modified theories is Kahneman and Tversky’s
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which proposes two functions,
where the value (or utility) of an outcome is multiplied by a subjective decision
weight.
The modification to the value function in Prospect Theory is to replace the
absolute utility function with a non-linear value function that is expressed relative
to an individual’s current position, convex (risk averse) for gains, concave (risk
seeking) for losses and the curve for losses is steeper than for gains; in other
words, things that make your world better are good, and things that make your
world worse are bad. The individual’s current position or reference point, which
divides the area between losses and gains will be non-zero, dynamically changing
over time and between decisions. Prospect theory suggests that because they are
risk averse above the reference point and risk seeking below it people are loss
averse; Figure 8.1 shows a hypothetical value function.
The reference point and shape of the value function are clearly important,
indeed, Kahneman (2011, Part IV, Chapter 25 & 26) cites inclusion of a refer-
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ence point, utility (value) being based on changes in wealth (though, of course,
this is reminiscent of (D. Bernoulli, 1738)), and losses being treated differently
from gains as the significant contributions that prospect theory made; Kahneman
(2011) also expresses considerable surprise that what, on reflection, appear to be
rather obvious anomalies in expected utility theory, had been overlooked for so
long.
Figure 8.1: A hypothetical value function.
Accepting Kahneman and Tversky’s empirical findings and that the two func-
tions of Prospect Theory are required in order to describe choice behaviour, the
following sections present a series of models of the value function, each offering a
solution to a problem (or problems) raised by the previous one. The value func-
tion is cast in terms of a competition where an independent observer would judge
the decision maker to have won a competition against one or more competitors:
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This would be straight forward if the nature of the perceptual system of the judge
and the competitors were known, however, in a real situation this can only be
uncertain at best.
Proposing an independent judge may seem strange, but it harks all the way
back to a time before Pascal (1665) and the expected value hypothesis, arguably
to the heart of what expected value and, more importantly here, expected utility
means. Teira (2006) argues that Nicholas and Daniel Bernoulli did not consider
the St Petersburg problem as just a probabilistic puzzle but rather as a contra-
diction between expected value and ‘common sense’ and that the key to Daniel
Bernoulli’s solution (D. Bernoulli, 1738) was transferring the idea of expecta-
tion from a legal frame to an economic frame. Teira’s (2006) argument is that
ideas about expectation can be traced back to the work of Spanish Dominican,
Domingo de Soto (1495–1560) and analogies that were drawn between a gambling
game, which is a kind of contract voluntarily arranged by the gamblers and an
agreement to insure seaborne commodities. The details are not of concern except
to the extent that gambling games as contracts include a juridical standard of
fairness, or just prices, which can arguably be seen in Bernoulli’s solution (e.g.
D. Bernoulli, 1954, p. 24).
8.2 Perfect Judge
Considered as a competition, a representation of both ‘my’ current position and
winning potential together with the inferred position and winning potential of
the opposition is required (and then combined) in order to produce the value
function. For the simplest model, the value function consists of a single known
competitor and a judge with a perfect memory and perfect perceptual system. In
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this case making a judgement is simple and resembles a step function as illustrated
in Figure 8.2.
Figure 8.2: A simple step function representing a perfect judge where
the slightest change in gain from below to above a reference point is rep-
resented by a snap from no probability of advantage to certainty of ad-
vantage.
To the left of the reference point there is a loss in a competition between
‘me’ and the competitor and to the right of the reference point there is a win
against the competitor. The significance of this is that the perfect judge will
be sensitive to the smallest change and snap from a certain probability of losing
advantage when the outcome is below the reference point, to a certain probability
of gaining advantage, when the outcome is above the reference point. However,
this situation, as well as being the simplest, is the most unrealistic and changes




It is unrealistic to suppose that the judge will be perfectly sensitive, or error free,
when making choices based on infinitesimal changes to gains. In other words,
the perceptual system will be noisy and this must be represented in the value
function. In addition the reference point must be considered. The the reference
point, or current position, for ‘me’ is straight forward; it can be arbitrarily set at
some value and the winning potential calculated. However, the opposition is more
difficult because their current position is not ‘known’, that is, their reference point
is uncertain and must be inferred. Fortunately, these values can be estimated on
the basis of a psychometric function.
Psychometric functions describe the relationship between a physical stimulus
and the responses of a person who has to make a judgement about the stimu-
lus, for example, whether the difference in weight between two stimuli can be
perceived; this resembles a sigmoid with the probability of a correct judgement








where p is the probability that a change will be judged to have been made, x ∈ R+,
µ is the mean and σ is the standard deviation (providing the slope for the function
or its sensitivity). The smallest detectable difference (sensitivity) between two
stimuli that a person can detect is referred to as a just noticeable difference (or
jnd). In many sensory modalities the jnd is a constant proportion of the initial






where I is the initial stimulus intensity, ∆I is the change in the initial stimulus






where ∆S is change in sensation; Note here the similarity with Bernoulli’s (1738)
relation between wealth and utility, above. This is known as Weber’s Law or the
Fechner-Weber Law and k as the Weber constant or fraction (Ekman, 1959).
The Weber constant provides the slope for the sigmoidal psychometric func-





where I0 is the initial stimulus intensity and I1 a further stimulus intensity) ap-
proximately holds in many modalities and it is assumed that it also approximately
holds for the value function. In order to introduce perceptual noise into the model,
realistic values for the Weber fraction were sought and those from Teghtsoonian
(1971) were used. Table 8.1 shows these typical values for the Weber fraction
for various modalities and, since a Weber fraction would be difficult to establish
across a wide range of choices, the overall mean of these values was used as an
approximation for the model.
It is straight forward to introduce the perceptual noise into the model and it









where o represents the reference point or offset and k the Weber constant or slope
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of the function (which replaces the σ shown in Equation 8.4). C represents the
competitor and is introduced at this stage simply to indicate that a competitor is
present (the parameters and assumptions for competitors are discussed in sections
8.4 and 8.5). A representation of the effect of incorporating a ‘noisy judge’ on the
model is shown in Figure 8.3, where it can be seen that greater gains (or losses)
are now needed in order for higher probabilities of winning or gaining advantage
to be judged.
As alluded to above, Bernoulli’s (1738) relation between wealth and utility
and Weber’s Law are logarithmic functions, indeed, it is commonly held that
perception is approximately logarithmic. Accordingly the value function models
will be calculated in ‘log space’. This provides the characteristic shape of the
value function of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kah-
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Figure 8.3: The effect of including perceptual noise based on a Weber
constant into the value function model.
neman, 1992) where the part of the curve representing losses is steeper than that
representing gains; this is illustrated in Figure 8.4.
The model now incorporates an imperfect judge, introducing uncertainty
through use of the Weber constant; as ‘my’ personal reference point gets larger,
greater gains are needed in order for the higher probabilities of gaining advantage
to be judged. The value function as it is now calculated exhibits loss aversion,
that is to say, risk aversion for gains greater than the reference point and risk
seeking for gains less than the reference point, the curve for gains less than the
reference point is also steeper than for gains greater than the reference point.
However, until this point only one competitor has been considered and even then
their reference point is not known. As implied above and discussed in Chapter 2




Figure 8.4: The effect of carrying out the calculations on ‘log space’
and including perceptual noise based on a Weber constant into the value
function model.
8.4 Multiple Competitors
The idea of competition, however, immediately raises the problem of what our
competition is and how it can be assessed. First though, a way to combine
the psychometric curves for potentially many competitors with the psychometric
curve for ‘me’ is required.
On the basis of a competition, given a choice between prospects (and depend-
ing on how the prospects are framed, together with the magnitudes involved), the
rational way of dealing with them is to combine what I know of my current posi-
tion with what can be inferred, based on what I know of one or more competitors,
using Bayes’ rule, choosing the prospect with the higher probability of gaining
an advantage. For the value function this requires combining what I know of my
own current position with a prior that represents what I can infer for the current
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position of potential competitors.
This is achieved using a generalisation of the sigmoid activation function,
which implements Bayes’ rule, as follows (adapted from Elkan, 1997): Of inter-
est is the probability of winning or gaining advantage, W , given a number of
competitors, n, P (W |C1, · · ·Cn); by bayes’ rule
P (W |C1, · · ·Cn) = P (C1, · · ·Cn|W )P (W )
P (C1 · · ·Cn) (8.8)
then the probability of winning would be




P (Ci|W = win)
)
P (W = win) (8.9)
and the probability of losing would be




P (Ci|W = lose)
)
P (W = lose) (8.10)








+log(P (W = win))−log(P (W = lose))
(8.11)
For the present model, the prior probability of winning or losing is equal so





















This type of function is typically found in neural network applications (Elkan,
1997) and its purpose is to make the sum of an output neuron responses equal
to one. The outputs are interpretable as posterior probabilities and are thought
to be a biologically plausible approximation (Cadieu et al., 2007). To this the
values representing ‘me’ can be added to the sum and providing the basis of the
posterior probability, p, of winning in a competition between ‘me’ and a number,















How, though, can competitors be assessed, what can be inferred about them?
Using random competitors i.e. using random reference points, would seem to be
intuitively inadequate since the world is not random and presumably our choices
are not random either. What can be plausibly assumed about competitors that
are unknown?
8.5 Shared Environment
It seems plausible to assume that ‘me’ and my competitors exist in an environment
that is essentially common or shared and in the context of the present thesis
competitors are assumed to be ‘something like me’. This is based on the common
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sense idea that the competitors in a particular scenario are likely to have the same
concerns and that these will be the influences on the choices that they make.
Imagine, for example, the thirty players on the field in a game of rugby union;
they are all playing in the same limited space, attempting to score points in a
limited number of ways, based on a limited number of set pieces - individual skill
and flair is certainly evident from time to time, but for the most part the general
run of play is predictable and experience of playing the game is of great benefit.
It might be said that those competing exist in a ‘small world’. In addition to
the idea of a shared environment, support is found in psychology from areas
such as Meltzoffs “like me” hypothesis (e.g. A. Meltzoff & Moore, 1977), which
attempts, from an infants intrinsic ability to imitate others, to identify how an
understanding of other minds is developed. In this development of the value
function, it is shown that, rather than being random, the prior for the competitors
can be estimated based on the assumption that they are ‘something like me’ and
then combined with ‘my position’.
The foregoing does not imply a real competition, but rather, one that is
metaphorical and private, where the values for competitors, C, must be estimated.
The values for each competitor are calculated in the same way as they are for
‘me’ i.e. P (x|o, k), where o is the reference point and k is the Weber constant or
slope of the function. The value for k is assumed to be the same as the value for
me, however, the reference point for a competitor must be estimated. In order to
achieve this, the reference point for competitors will be represented by a normal
distribution having the same mean as ‘me’, but the distribution of competitors
will have some variance. In other words, this distribution will represent the
uncertainty in competitors. From experience (and considering the rugby union
analogy), it is clear that other people may be like me, but they vary widely and
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certainly are not all the same as me.
A competitor therefore is calculated from the weighted marginal probability





where oi comes from P (x|o, σ) = N(o, σ2) a normal distribution representing com-
petitors based on the same mean or offset, o, as ‘me’ and with standard deviation,
σ, representing the uncertainty in the competitors. oi is then
t∑
s=1
P (xs|o, σ), the
marginal probability of t samples from this distribution, where t is proposed to
represent working memory capacity. It would, of course, be possible to vary the
weight, w, for competitors, in other words making some competitor more likely
to win by perhaps giving that competitor a higher weighting.
To reiterate, for the competition that is proposed as the basis of a choice, the
competitors must be inferred. Inferring the psychometric function for competitors
is based on the plausible idea that they are ‘something like me’ and that values
representing me can be used as a basis for this inference: o is the inferred reference
point or mean of the distribution, the same as the reference point, or offset, for
‘me’; σ is a new parameter, the standard deviation for the competitor distribution
and accordingly higher values represent greater uncertainty; w is also a new
parameter, the weight for a competitor (although all competitors are taken as
being of equal weight in the testing that follows); and t is the number of samples
taken from the competitor distribution, perhaps representing working memory
capacity.
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8.6 The Value Function
Having obtained these values we can calculate the value function for a particular
option in a prospect, which will be the mean (expected value) of a number of







where U is simply the expected value or the mean probability of winning or
gaining an advantage, d is the number of iterations and perhaps represents the
amount of risk; and p is the probability of winning or gaining an advantage for a
particular iteration calculated using Equation 8.14.
In order to establish how each of the parameters (d, the number of times
to repeat the process to establish the mean; t, the number of samples from the
inner distribution representing a competitor; σ the standard deviation of the
distribution representing a competitor; and n, the number of competitors) affects
the value function, each parameter was systematically varied while keeping the
others unchanged (see table 8.2).
Table 8.2: Values used for the value function parameters
Parameter Values
d 8 16 32 64
t 2 3 5 10
σ 1 5 10 50




The number of times that the estimation process is repeated is represented by
d and is taken to indicate the amount of difficulty, deliberation or risk that is
inherent in the options that have to be decided on. Figure 8.5 shows the effect
of changing the number of times that the process is repeated, d, which has been
tentatively labelled ‘difficulty’; larger values of d produce a value function that
is less risk averse (i.e. the value function gets more step-like as the number of
repetitions increases).
Figure 8.5: The value function showing increasing values (black, red,
green, blue) for difficulty, d. It can be seen that, as the values increase,
the shape of the curve gets more concave.
In the present context t represents the extent of ‘my’ experience of competitors
in some domain. Figure 8.6 shows the effect of changing the number of samples,
t, that are taken from the normal distribution in order to represent a competitor,
which has been tentatively labelled ‘experience’; larger values of t produce a
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value function that is less risk averse (i.e. the value function gets more step-like
as the number of samples increases). This might suggest that higher values of
this parameter imply more experience with an uncertain problem or perhaps that
a problem has been experienced before.
Figure 8.6: The value function showing increasing values (black, red,
green, blue) for experience, t. It can be seen that, as the values increase
the shape of the curve gets more concave.
The variability in ‘my’ experience of competitors, in other words ‘my’ uncer-
tainty, in some domain is represented by σ. Figure 8.7 shows the effect of changing
the variance of the normal distribution representing competitors, σ, which has
been tentatively labelled ‘uncertainty’; larger values for variance produces a value
function that is more risk averse (i.e. the value function gets less step-like as the
variance increases), suggesting that larger values of variance relate to greater
uncertainty in the potential competitors.
The number of competitors that is assumed is given by n. Figure 8.8 shows
the effect of changing the number of competitors, n, for a particular problem.
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Figure 8.7: The value function showing increasing values (black, red,
green, blue) for uncertainty, σ. It can be seen that, as values increase, the
shape of the curve gets less concave i.e. more risk averse.
Larger numbers of competitors produce a value function that is less risk averse
(i.e. the value function gets more step-like as the number of samples increases).
This surprising result suggests that, as the number of competitors grows, the
more risk someone might be prepared to accept.
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Figure 8.8: The value function showing increasing values (black, red,
green, blue) for the number of competitors, n. It can be seen that, as
the values increase, the shape of the curve gets more concave i.e. less risk
averse.
8.8 Discussion
The present chapter has shown that a value function based on the idea of a
competition, where one or more competitors are assumed to be ‘like me’, shows
all of the features of the value function from Prospect Theory; that is, a function
that is risk averse above the reference point, risk seeking below the reference
point and loss averse overall. As well as the ‘like me’ or shared environment
assumption, the value function also incorporates the idea of winning or gaining
advantage based on a fair but not necessarily unbiased observer judging that ‘I’
would have won the competition.
A juridical element to expected utility arguably goes back to a time before
Bernoulli’s solution to the St Petersburg paradox and involves an analogy between
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insuring goods on sea voyages and games of chance (Teira, 2006) and it can also
be found in Savages personalistic view of probabilities (e.g. Savage, 1972, §2,
p57). What is judged fair is based on the experience of the observer and this is
incorporated into the present model using a form of Bayes’ rule (illustrated in
§8.4). In addition, according to D. Bernoulli (1738) the relationship between gains
and utility is logarithmic as is (approximately) the relationship between stimulus
and perception in many modalities according to the Weber-Fechner law, which
has been the subject of much empirical research. Accordingly, the present model
is calculated in ‘log space’, which helps in defining the characteristic pattern of
the value function produced from the competition.
The competition being referred to was stated as being metaphorical and pri-
vate (§8.5), this is because, even in a real game of say, chess, for example, the
choice of next move is made on an entirely endogenous basis, inferring how your
opponent might react to any given move of yours and how you might gain best
advantage. It was suggested above (§8.5) that this shared environment for making
choices might be referred to as a ‘small world’; referring to a shared environment
in this way inevitably draws comparison with small worlds as talked about by
Savage in The Foundations of Statistics (Savage, 1972).
In The Foundations of Statistics (Savage, 1972), the phrase ‘look before you
leap’ is used to describe small worlds and ‘you can cross that bridge when you
come to it’ for expanded worlds. However, as pointed out and quoted by Binmore
(2007), Savage explicitly states (1972, p. 16) that “...the look before you leap
principle is preposterous if carried to extremes...”, which is problematic for the
present value function. Nevertheless, in the remainder of paragraph that this
quote comes from (Savage, 1972, p. 16), rather than rejecting small worlds as
suggested by Binmore (2007), Savage goes on to say that to cross bridges when
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they are arrived at actually means to tackle relatively simple choice problems by
constraining attention to a small world where the ‘look before you leap’ does ap-
ply. Savage goes on to say that he can not formulate specific criteria for selecting
small worlds in this way but believes it to be based on judgement and experi-
ence. Shared environments as envisaged here are therefore very similar to those
of Savage. Despite the plausibility of this argument no compelling evidence has
been offered that potential competitors are ‘something like me’; fortunately how-
ever, much better empirical evidence comes from psychology by way of Andrew
Meltzoff’s ‘like me’ hypothesis.
The first step in this process is the infants intrinsic ability to connect observed
acts and similar executed acts i.e. to imitate others (A. Meltzoff & Moore, 1977,
1983). Through this imitation and everyday experience, infants take the second
step, associating their actions with their own mental states. Thereafter, the third
step, infants project their own experiences onto similar acts that are performed
by others. Meltzoff argues that, in this way, infants develop an understanding
of others minds and their mental states. While there is continued development,
especially in sophistication, through childhood and into adulthood people asso-
ciate the acts of others with connotative meaning because others are processed
“like me” (A. Meltzoff, 2005; A. N. Meltzoff, 2007).
Based on these ideas, in addition to the similarities with Prospect Theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) there are some novel predictions that come from a
value function construed this way, particularly in terms of risk and competitors.
It is interesting to note that larger values of risk, d, appear to produce a more
concave, or more step like, value function.
Less risk aversion would seem to be counter intuitive since apparently larger
amounts of risk ought, presumably, to cause greater risk aversion. Note though
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that from the earlier experiments with the semantic differential, particularly in
Chapter 3, that as concept values on the potency dimension became more potent,
the potency value got more negative or smaller. The potency dimension, which
was relabelled as risk, is therefore consistent with the proposed three dimensional
reward structure based on the semantic differential. It is also worthy of note
that as the value function gets steeper, the more stark or black and white, the
choice will become. A further prediction of the model is that as the number of
competitors increases, the more risk someone might bear.
Again, bearing more risk might seem to be odd if more competitors equates to
more risk and more risk simply makes us more risk averse. However, it is argued
here that, on the contrary, this might be intuitively correct if it is considered
that, as the number of competitors increases, the more risk someone would be
prepared to bear in order to win or to gain an advantage and as with risk as the
value function gets steeper, the more stark or black and white, the choice will
become. This argument would seem to be all the more plausible if what was at
stake was a reward such as food.
The value function, however, is not the only function found in prospect theory,
because people behave as if they use a transformed version of a given probability, a
further function, the probability weighting function, weights the given probability








Empirical research has shown that, when making choices based on probabilistic
options, people behave as if they overestimate small probabilities, underestimate
large probabilities, and treat positive and negative outcomes differently. These
distortions have been modelled using a non-linear probability weighting function,
which is found in several non-expected utility theories, including rank-dependent
models and prospect theory (see Figure 9.1); here a Bayesian approach to the
probability weighting function is proposed and with it, a psychological rationale.
As already stated in Chapter 7, this function is an inverted ‘S’ shaped func-
tion and has four robust characteristics; it increases the effective probability of
improbable events; decreases the probability of probable events; crosses the line
of equality at a probability less than 0.5; and is systematically different for the
assessment of positive and negative prospects. Here it is proposed that uncer-
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tainty plus prior experience gives rise to this function and that it is based on
Bayes’ rule.
Figure 9.1: The probability weighting function of cumulative prospect
theory for positive (thin line) and negative outcomes (thick line) (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1992). The line of equality, as predicted by a expected
utility theory is shown for comparison (diagonal line). Given a stated
probability s, subjects behave as if the probability were p. This function
has four main and robust deviations from expected utility theory; small
probabilities are over weighted, large probabilities are underweighted, the
function crosses the line of equality at a point below 0.5 and the distortions
for positive outcomes are more extreme than for negative.
Logically there are two classes of prior; either a situation is like those that have
been encountered before and an empirical prior of inference should be used, or a
situation is novel and unlike anything that has been previously encountered and
a prior representing ignorance should be used. Both classes of prior are routinely
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used in Bayesian analysis, but unfortunately, on their own, each has problems.
Empirical priors rely strongly on the fact that the situation is similar to those
encountered before and can be very biased if this is not true, while ignorance
priors that ignore previous experience are, potentially, disastrously inefficient.
For the present probability weighting function it is argued that the efficiency
of empirical priors and the robustness of ignorance priors should both be used
by combining them using standard Bayesian model comparison techniques. This
is illustrated using the approach to internet blog searching from Chapter 3 to
estimate the prior of inference for generic contexts of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ events.
The weighting function that is produced accounts for all the major characteristics
of the probability weighting function of Prospect theory.
Given any uncertainty in a probabilistic statement (i.e. some probability
distribution over the probability), the optimal response for a receiver of such a
statement is to combine it, using Bayes rule, with any previous knowledge they
have. The model that is described below allows for the possibility that previous
experience is not relevant by utilising a combined prior based on a mixture of a
form of uniform prior, expressing the possibility of novelty, with a prior based on
what has been learned from previous experience.
It is proposed that it is this combination that results in the systematic distor-
tions shown by the probability weighting function. Related methods have been
proposed in order to perform robust statistics within the Bayesian framework
(e.g. by Jaynes, 1995); a similar approach is used in computer vision systems to
model background objects and also in models of animal categorisation to allow for
the possibility that an object is novel (Baddeley et al., 2007). It is also proposed
that this model can account for the distinction in the decision making literature
between description based decisions and experience based decisions, which was
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discussed in Chapter 7.
In the following the basics of Bayesian modelling that were described in Chap-
ter 7 are expanded to show how the relevant prior distributions were estimated
and how these can be combined, using a Bayesian model comparison framework,
to form a posterior probability distribution over probabilities given a particular
statement. The median of the function very closely resembles the probability
weighting function of Prospect theory.
9.2 Method and results
Prospects are statements consisting of the probability of good or bad events hap-
pening, so in this case the representation simply consists of s, the stated prob-
ability; the inferred distribution of probabilities, p; and the context, c, whether
the stated event is good or bad.
It is proposed that when a signaller states that there is an “80% chance” of
an event happening, what they mean is closer to a statement like “I have expe-
rienced the situation 10 times and 8 were successful” rather than something like
“I have experienced the situation 2 × 1020 times and 1.6 × 1020 were successful”
as implicitly assumed using objective (frequentist) probabilities. More specifi-
cally, it is proposed that when someone states a given probability it is interpreted
in terms of two components; an explicit probability, s, and an implicit number
of events that the statement is based on, N . Statements made by trusted and
experienced people about unchanging characteristics of the world are associated
with high implicit N (and with modifiers such as “precisely” or “exactly”), while
statements made by less reliable people in unusual situations about changeable
characteristics (and associated with modifiers such as “roughly”, “approximately”
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or “about”) are associated with lower implicit N . Note that in this way N is akin
to a measure of confidence or certainty in the statement (N does not refer to the
amount of experience or numbers of samples that may have been used to form
the prior distribution of inference).
This means that a given statement of probability is not an exact statement,
but equivalent to a statement of the form s × N out of N . If N approaches
infinity the prospect reduces to the uncertainty free definition usually used, but
for humans it is proposed that N ≈ 5− 100 where it is lower in situations where
there is less confidence in a prospect e.g. the signaller has modest experience
or is not wholly trusted or the characteristics of the world are believed to be
changeable (or some combination of these). For example, a stated 80% would
be represented as 8 out of 10 (or s × N = .8 × 10 out of N = 10) for modest
uncertainty or say 164 out of 205 (or s × N = .8 × 205 out of N = 205) for
greater certainty. For present purposes, unless explicitly stated, it is assumed
that probability statements are made in terms of the number of successes out of
10 (N = 10), but the sensitivity of the model to this assumption is discussed.
Given such a definition, the likelihood is binomial and may be calculated using a







This defines the representation and the likelihood, but leaves the prior; before
specification of the prior, one general property of most plausible priors should
be acknowledged. Given a particular probability statement associated with un-
certainty and a prior with a given mean, after applying Bayes rule the posterior
distribution of probabilities will have a mean that is closer to the prior than
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the original statement. This implies that as long as the mean of the prior for
the probability is roughly 50%, small probabilities will be ‘overestimated’, and
large probabilities ‘underestimated’, and if we assume, as argued in Chapter 2,
that Bayes rule is rational, for rational reasons as well. Figure 9.2 shows this
for a B(5, 5) prior, a prior with a beta distribution and a mean of 0.5. As can
be seen, though this probability weighting function does not match the details
that are measured empirically, it shows that the over and underweighting can be
simply due to applying a prior. As long as probability statements are associated
with uncertainty, applying a prior results in systematic distortions of the effective
probability weighting function, but leaves open what kind of prior people might
be expected to use.
There are two forms of prior that are relevant here. Either the situation is
unlike any encountered before, in which case the relevant prior captures this ig-
norance (a prior of ignorance), or in contrast, the situation could be like good or
bad situations that have been encountered before (an empirical prior of inference).
Both types of prior have virtues for the statistical analysis of data. Indeed empir-
ical priors are almost always assumed in models of human performance. Despite
this, individually, they have strong drawbacks as the basis of inference in hu-
mans. These drawbacks are illustrated below using the simple case of estimating
the probability of heads or tails occurring in a coin toss.
Most people have reasonably extensive experience of coin tosses, for example,
experiencing 1000 would not be unreasonable in an average student. Such empiri-
cal experience would be naturally summarised by the empirical prior B(501, 501),
a prior very peaked at a probability of 0.5 and representing previous experience
of 500 heads and 500 tails. If a person encounters a new situation involving a coin
toss and the coin is ‘normal’, all proceeds well with such an empirical prior. If
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Figure 9.2: A probability weighting function using a single prior based
on a B(5, 5), a prior with a mean of 0.5 (thick line). This probability
weighting function demonstrates that over and underweighting can be at-
tributed simply to applying a prior, though it does not match the details
that have been shown empirically.
someone starts with a prior with a mean around 0.5 then observes a few more fair
coin tosses, given the highly peaked prior, the result of these further coin tosses
will be essentially irrelevant and the posterior will be dominated by previous
experience; the person will still have a posterior with a mean of approximately
0.5.
This situation is not maintained, however, if the person now encounters a
biased coin (say, one with two heads). After viewing twenty coin tosses, each
coming up heads, a reasonable person would become suspicious that their orig-
inal model of the coin might somehow be flawed. However, even in the face of
such strong evidence, a standard empirical prior will still dominate. Compared
175
9.2 Method and results
to previous experience, 20 coin tosses is very few, and based on an empirical
prior, will continue to predict that the probability of a tail was roughly 0.5. In
fact, even after observing 500 heads in a row, the guess will still be that the
probability of a tail occurring is 1
3
. The empirical prior is therefore very efficient
for estimating events that are known to have the same characteristics as when
encountered before, but disastrously biased if the world has changed, or the event
is misclassified.
Priors of ignorance do not share this problem though; if we know that the cur-
rent situation is unlike any we have encountered before, then it makes sense that
our prior should express our initial ignorance of the situation. Much discussion
has taken place on what prior best represents our ignorance about a probabil-
ity. Laplace’s original suggestion was that ignorance is a uniform distribution,
that is, all probabilities are equally likely. In terms of a beta distribution, this





) and B(0, 0) (Tuyl, Gerlach, & Mengersen, 2008), however, for
the present situation, all of these choices generate essentially equivalent predic-
tions and Laplace’s uniform distribution is used as the prior of ignorance. With
such a prior of ignorance, encountering a two headed coin presents no problem.
With such a weak prior, experience will rapidly allow us to conclude that the
coin is biased. After observing 20 heads, our mean probability of a tail will be
1
21
(or 0.05), but this robustness to novel situations comes at a high cost. By ef-
fectively treating all situations as novel, we are throwing away all of our previous
experience. This experience is expensive and potentially dangerous to collect,
and while throwing it away may be robust, it is ridiculously inefficient.
Clearly both commonly used priors have problems in certain situations, but
it seems clear that what is required is the benefit of both; employ the efficiency
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of an empirical prior when this is consistent with the evidence we have encoun-
tered, but fall back on our prior of ignorance when the evidence is incompatible
with our prior experience. Fortunately, this is straight forward to do using the
standard Bayesian machinery. The details are given below, but essentially we can
effectively use both priors, weighting each by the (posterior) probability that it
is appropriate. The probability that one or other prior is appropriate can be cal-
culated using the evidence based model comparison method (based on MacKay,
2003) and by doing this we can efficiently utilise our previous experience for situ-
ations we have come across before, but be robust when the world is not the same
as we have previously encountered.
In order to address this and because much of the data used in research on
choices does not have a well established context, it is important to base the prior
of inference on ‘real’ data from the environment. Accordingly, the data obtained
from internet blogs and described in Chapter 3 was used as a representative data
source. The details of how the blog data were obtained and used is given in
Chapter 3, however, in essence, 1500 concepts were searched for, each associated
with good or bad events occurring (by combining them with with a set of mod-
ifier words that are relatively unambiguous in their goodness and badness e.g.
happy, evil). Marginal probability was then obtained by summing (or integrat-
ing, more generally) the conditional probabilities over all outcomes and obtaining
the probability distribution of these probabilities.
To illustrate this, consider that birthdays, weddings and Christmas, for ex-
ample, are associated with good things happening, while house fires, and earth-
quakes are associated with bad things happening. Nevertheless, these concepts
are not exclusively associated with good or bad things, we all know of fights at
weddings and arguments at Christmas, while disasters such as earthquakes can
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be the scenes of good acts and heroism. There are also those occasions when an
outcome is neither particularly good or bad, but indifferent. It is clear that, given
certain contexts or concepts, there is a higher or lower probability of good or bad
things happening; in other words, there is a distribution of good and bad events
and these distributions can be different for different concepts. On the basis of the
millions blogs indexed it is straightforward to estimate the probability of good
or bad events happening. Across all concepts, a distribution of probabilities is
obtained and to characterise each of these two distributions (one for good events
and one for bad) the best beta distribution was fitted using maximum likelihood.
Figure 9.3 shows the distribution of good and bad events together with the best
fitting beta distribution. As can be seen, there is significant uncertainty asso-
ciated with the distribution of probabilities, the average probability is less than
half, good things are more common than bad, and the data is well summarised
by a beta distribution.
Given these priors and a probability statement, posterior distributions can be
calculated, each associated with good inference and bad inference, then combined
with the ignorance prior. In order to combine ignorance with good inference and
ignorance with bad inference to form the distributions required for the weight-
ing function, an evidence based Bayesian model averaging framework (based on
MacKay, 2003) was used. This last step is important as it provides the means
to identify the extent to which a situation is like something we have encountered
before and therefore the weight to apply to it.
It should be noted that a single data set was not relied on in order to establish
these priors, rather, three separate sets of data were explored. Figure 9.4, in addi-
tion to the technorati data set that is duplicated from Figure 9.3 for comparison,
shows a data set from an alternative blog search engine, Blogscope, together with
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Figure 9.3: The probability distribution of the probability of good (thick
line) and bad (thin line) outcomes. The figure shows the data from
analysing 1500 different “word” contexts across millions blogs using tech-
norati.com. The lines superimposed show the best fitting (maximum like-
lihood) beta distributions. There are three robust properties: the mean is
less than 50%, there is a fair amount of spread, and they show a Pollyanna
effect: “good” events are more probable than bad.
data from analysing 19,043 articles from Reuters-21578 data set (Lewis, 1997).
While the exact details across the data sets are different three robust properties
can be seen; the mean is less than 50%, there is a fair amount of spread and they
show “good” events are more probable than bad, even in the somewhat cynical
and pessimistic world described in newspapers.
Essentially the two priors (ignorance and inference) are simply models of the
world and their relative probability is determined by the compatibility of the
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Figure 9.4: The probability distribution of the probability of good (thick
line) and bad (thin line) outcomes. The top left panel shows the data from
analysing 133 million blogs using the technorati search engine, the top
right panel the results from the blogscope search engine and the bottom
middle panel shows the results from analysing 19,043 articles from Reuters-
21578. The lines superimposed show the best fitting (maximum likelihood)
beta distributions.
probability statement with the probability distribution associated with each prior.
In statements compatible with previous experience, the effective distribution is
dominated by the prior of inference and for statements incompatible with previous
experience, the effective distribution is dominated by the prior of ignorance. This
is achieved automatically by the application of the rules of probability theory.
In order to calculate the distribution of the inferred probability p and hence
its mean and median, the following approach and calculations were used. The
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posterior distribution is a function of the stated probability, s, the uncertainty in
the statement given by an implicit N and is based on two models, one representing
ignorance, ig, and the other inference, in, calculated from the internet blog search
data. Each of these models consists of a beta distribution with parameters α
and β that depend on the model (as stated the ignorance model is simply a
B(1, 1) distribution). For completeness, a prior probability for the models is also
provided, which unless otherwise specified, is assumed to be 0.5. The effective
posterior distribution that is of interest, given these two models, is simply the
sum of the posteriors for each of the models (ignorance and inference), weighted
by the probabilities that they are correct (Equation 9.2).
P (p|s,N) = P (p|s,N,M = ig)P (M = ig|s,N)+P (p|s,N,M = in)P (M = in|s,N)
(9.2)
To be able to calculate this value two quantities for each of the models need to be
calculated: First the likelihood of a probability, given a stated probability, inferred
N and model (ignorance or inference), P (p|s,N,M); and second, the probability
that a model is correct given a stated probability and an inferred N , P (M |s,N).
Calculation of the first of these quantities,P (p|s,N,M), was achieved using the
beta-binomial Equation 9.3, because the priors for the two models (ignorance
and inference) are expressed as beta distributions with parameters α and β, an






B(Ns+ α,N(1− s) + β)
B(α, β)
(9.3)
Next, calculating P (M |s,N), relies on Bayes’ rule and because there are only
two possible models, it can be calculated for the ignorance model as shown in
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Equation 9.4. To calculate this value for the other model, the inference model,
appropriate values would be substituted into the numerator.
P (M = ig|s,N) = P (s|N,M = ig)P (M = ig)
P (s|N,M = ig)P (M = ig) + P (s|N,M = in)P (M = in)
(9.4)
There are two things to note about this calculation: a) this stage is where the
prior probabilities of the two models enter the calculations. In general these are
assumed to be both 0.5, but in practice, framing effects are expected and the
general level of trust in the source of the probability to have an effect on this
value; and b) that this calculation is different from the more common “Bayes’
factor”, which is the log ratio of the two probabilities. However, in order to carry
out this calculation a further value is needed for each model, P (s|N,M).
This calculation (shown in Equation 9.5) is arguably the most technical stage;
in essence the problem here is that the two models have different flexibility, the ig-
norance model will provide a good account of almost any data, while the inference
model will only provide a good model for data that is compatible with previous
experience. The problem of comparing highly flexible models (such as high or-
der polynomials), with simple ones (say a linear model), is common in statistics.
The Bayesian “evidence” solution to appropriately penalise complicated models
is to integrate the likelihoods over the prior. In general this step is intractable
and requires either approximations or sampling based methods, however, for the
models proposed here, it is possible to analytically derive the relevant quantity:
P (s|N,M = ig) = B(Ns+ α,N(1− s) + β)
B(α, β)
(9.5)
where α and β are the shape parameters from the beta distribution prior for the
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ignorance model. The equation for the inference model is the same but with the
appropriate values of α and β.
The equations above provide all of the mathematical machinery required here,
but a more detailed treatment of related problems is given in MacKay (2003).
Figure 9.5 shows the posterior distributions for two probability statements (top
panels), together with the combined probability (bottom panels) of the state-
ment being due to the prior of inference (thick line), or ignorance (thin line).
Extreme probability statements that are incompatible with previous experience
are dominated by P(ignorance). The top left panel shows the posterior proba-
bility distribution for the probability statement of 30%. This is compatible with
previous experience and in this case the distribution is dominated by the prior for
good events (P(good)=63.85% ), and is relatively tightly peaked (mean = 38.43%,
median = 39.06%, mode = 36.92%, SD = 9.72% ). The right top panel shows the
posterior for a probability statement of 70% that is incompatible with previous
experience of “good” events (P(good) = 17.54% ), and is therefore dominated by
the prior of ignorance. This distribution is based on less “experience” and is
therefore more vague (mean = 72.28%, median = 75.42%, mode = 77.99%, SD
= 11.78% ).
The results of all the calculations are (for any given probability statement, s,
and implicit uncertainty, N) a probability distribution over the posterior prob-
abilities. To simplify this the median was calculated, which is the solution to∫ 1
0
P (p|s,N)dp = 0.5. Figure 9.6 shows the mean posterior probability for good
(thick line) and bad (thin line) statements, based on priors of inference from the
analysis of internet blogs (left panel), the Reuters data set (middle panel) and on
the right the probability weighting function based on Prelec (1998) for compar-
ison. As can be seen the present Bayesian function shows all the main features
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Figure 9.5: Posterior probability distributions for two probability state-
ments. The top figures show the posterior distributions for priors of in-
ference and ignorance separately and the bottom figures show them com-
bined. The figures on the left show the posterior probability distribution
for the statement 30% (implicit N=10 ) that is reasonably compatible with
previous experience of good events. The combined distribution is there-
fore dominated by the prior for good events. On the right is shown the
posterior distributions for a probability statement of 70% (implicit N =
10 ) that is incompatible with previous experience of “good” events and is
therefore dominated by the prior of ignorance.
of the probability weighting function of Prospect Theory; in both cases it over
weights small probabilities, under weights large probabilities, crosses equality be-




Figure 9.6: The median posterior inferred probability for good (thick
line) and bad (thin line) statements (implicit N=10 ) based on priors of
inference from the analysis of blogs (left panel) or the Reuters-21578 data
set (middle panel). Also shown is the probability weighting function based
on Prelec (1998). As can seen the Bayesian functions shows all the main
features of the probability weighting function of prospect theory.
9.3 Discussion
It was proposed that because of the inevitable uncertainty that exists in all but
exceptional cases when making a choice, that a weighting function is constructed
from experience based on a mixture of two priors, one that represents ignorance
and one that represents inference. In order to test this hypothesis real world data
are needed and two internet blog search engines together with the Reuters-21578
data set were chosen. By proposing that probability statements are uncertain
and that people use Bayes rule to incorporate previous knowledge to calculate
the most probable probability, it was found that the present Bayesian weight-
ing function accounted for all of the main features of the probability weighting
function of cumulative Prospect Theory. This is based on three assumptions.
The first assumption is that a 50% probability of winning is interpreted as
equivalent not to an infinite number of wins out of twice this number of bets, but
more like five wins out of ten. The important difference is that whereas the for-
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mer has no associated uncertainty, the latter does, in other words, it is consistent
with a range of probabilities, with 0.5 being only the most probable. Given the
finite and non-stationary nature of the world, treating probability statements as
having uncertainty is rational. It also makes sense of such statements as exactly
50%, indeed it is not uncommon to hear children saying “I’ll have the bigger
half” when they are trying to share, say, a bar of chocolate equally, which under
the traditional interpretation is tautological. When given probability estimation
problems, such as what is the chance of you being home by 6pm?, people naturally
prefer to use verbal labels like probably, with their answers appropriately associ-
ated with uncertainty, rather than to reply 52.2% with some unrealistic level of
certainty (Windschitl & Wells, 1996).
Uncertainty implies that the optimal way to use this information is to update
a probability distribution over probabilities. To some, this concept of the proba-
bility of a probability is very unnatural, but it is routinely used in diverse areas
from machine learning to the analysis of neuronal data. It also implies that any
explicit probabilistic statement is (often) associated with an implicit statement
conveying the uncertainty associated with it; normally conveyed by context, per-
ceived knowledge, trust of the conveyor of the probability and by adjectives such
as about, roughly or exactly. This is quantified in terms of the equivalent num-
ber of measurements where the more trusted, knowledgeable and unchanging the
probability is believed to be, the closer it is to the line of equality. Significantly,
even with relatively high equivalent N statements, the effects of the prior are still
evident (Figure 9.7 shows the effect of this quantity).
The second proposal is that evaluating probabilities is, at least partly, based
on prior experience. The prospects were interpreted as being unfamiliar and the
probability distribution of quantities of rather generic good and bad events was
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Figure 9.7: The effect of inferred confidence in a “good” probability
statement. The left hand panel shows the median posterior probabili-
ties for good outcomes (thick line) and bad outcomes (thin line) for a
very uncertain statement (implicit N=5 ); the middle panel a statement
with medium implicit uncertainty (implicit N=10 ), and the right panel, a
statement of very low uncertainty (implicit N=50 ). As can be seen, the
greater the uncertainty associated with the statement, the larger the effect
of any prior experience and the greater the deviation from expected utility
theory.
calculated. A very large collection of blogs was taken as a representative data
set and searched in order to calculate these probabilities, but there is a worry
that this may be a rather biased data source, however, two arguments militate
against this. Firstly, essentially equivalent results were obtained using different
data sources; an alternative blog search engine ‘blogscope’ and the Reuters-21578
data set (a collection of 19,043 articles that appeared on the Reuters newswire
in 1987). Secondly, the characteristics of the distribution required to obtain the
results are general i.e. there should be a range of probabilities, that the average
probability should be less than 0.5, and that good things should be more probable
than bad.
That good things are more probable than bad should not be surprising, the
Pollyanna hypothesis, which is a tendency to use positive evaluations more fre-
quently than negative evaluations in communicating, is widely recognised and
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has been extensively researched (e.g. Boucher & Osgood, 1969; Matlin & Stang,
1978). The effect has also been found across cultures and languages, and ar-
gued to be a universal tendency (Boucher & Osgood, 1969). Interestingly for the
present proposal, research on autobiographical memory has also shown that posi-
tive events come to mind more readily than negative ones (Holland & Kensinger,
2010). However, it is possible that there is a bias to reporting unusual events
in blogs; data sources such as Twitter may provide a better characterisation of
everyday probabilities, but at the time of writing no machine readable database
was known to be available to search.
The last and important assumption is that the prior allows for the possibility
that previous experience is not relevant. The idea of utilizing a combined prior
based on a mixture of some form of uniform prior, expressing the possibility of
novelty, with a prior based on previous experience, is not a new idea and has been
applied to a number of different areas of analysis. The main work of appropriately
applying the prior is achieved by the model comparison calculations but these, in
turn, require a prior for each model (which for the example calculations here was
assumed to be 0.5). This though should be susceptible to framing effects where
situations described as strange or unusual will be associated with larger values
of P(ignorant) (Figure 9.8 shows the effect of varying this parameter). On this
basis the present model provides for a prior for a new situation to be built from
a position of extreme ignorance, based on the experience gained.
Accepting the conclusions of L. Hadar and Fox (2009) to the extent that
under sampling and information asymmetry would be the result of building a
new prior of inference in a situation that has been recognised as novel (because
the likelihood for the inference prior is insignificant): When a situation does not
conform to our previous experience the present model is sensitive to it and rather
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Figure 9.8: The effect of varying the prior probability that this is a novel
context: left panel P(ignorant) = 0.15; P(inference) =0.85; right panel
P(ignorant) = 0.85; P(inference) =0.15. As can be seen, the more clues
that this is a novel context; the less the probability weighting function is
distorted.
than slavishly sticking to something that is inappropriate, as might be the case
if there were only a single prior, a new prior for that situation can be built from
the position of ignorance, based on the experience gained. In building up this
new prior it will be susceptible to bias and all the problems of sampling error
and information asymmetry that are familiar from the experience based decisions
literature and it is argued, accounts for many of the findings in that literature.
The top left panel of Figure 9.9 illustrates the results of the present model using
an inference prior representing an extreme event, beta(1,30), and the posterior
distributions for a stated probability of 10%.
So far the similarities to the predictions of Prospect Theory have been empha-
sised, but there is a difference. In Prospect Theory, if you are told a probability
is zero, you believe it. In the present account, particularly for bad outcomes, as
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Figure 9.9: Underweighting of small probabilities. The top left panel
shows the results of the model based on an inference prior representing an
extreme event, beta(1,30), the top right panel the posterior distributions
for the priors of inference (thick line) and ignorance (thin line) for a stated
probability, s, of 10% and implicit N = 10. The bottom middle panel
shows the combined effective distribution for these posteriors.
can be seen in Figure 9.7, the probability never goes to zero; you never believe
the impossibility of a negative event. Picking up on one of Andersons (1990)
arguments, this function embodies an element of regression towards the mean;
discounting statements that state or imply certainty, for example, I’m sure that
will happen or there hasn’t been a run on a bank for 150 years, is the rational
thing to do. This is not, though, in any way to question Allais’ paradox, for
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example, that offers no uncertainty and a guaranteed gain or loss.
Consider the following choice:
You have £250,000 to buy a house. There are two houses on offer,
which are identical in design, location etc. The difference between
them is that one house costs £250,000 and the other £249,000.
However, the cheaper one has an unexploded bomb under it, but it’s
okay, the bomb has been checked and estate agent has assured you
that there is a 0% chance of it exploding.
Which house will you buy?
This has not been investigated except informally, but without fail people, un-
surprisingly, opt for the more expensive house: they do not accept the stated
impossibility.
Taken together the value and probability weighting functions described in the
present and previous chapters provide all that is required to be able to model a
choice. Each of the functions has been tested in isolation and found to exhibit
the expected results, but now it remains for both of the functions to be tested
together as a complete model. The testing uses known problem cases from the




Putting it all together - the
model and testing
10.1 Introduction
This chapter identifies the challenges (often called paradoxes) that research has
made to models of decision making, and expected utility theory in particular,
which credible models need to be able to meet (Busemeyer & Johnson, 2008).
The present model is an expected utility model, but, should produce the same
patterns of results that have been found in empirical research, yet do so on the
basis of simple maximisation of utility. The present model is tested against each
of the types of challenge identified and the results presented.
10.2 Classes of challenge
In order for the full model, consisting of both the value and the probability
weighting functions identified in Chapters 8 and 9 respectively, to be credible it
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must be able to predict the findings from empirical research that other models to
a greater or lesser extent find problematic. These findings are known as paradoxes
and broadly consist of three classes: preference reversals, dominance effects and
context effects (Busemeyer & Johnson, 2008). In this section these broad classes
of paradox are briefly described and the violations of Expected Utility theory
identified.
10.2.1 Common consequence and common ratio effects
More commonly known as Allais’ paradox (Allais, 1953), the common conse-
quence and common ratio effects are probably the best known of all the decision
making paradoxes. Allais’ original common consequence problem (Allais, 1953,
p527) is given below and was provided, by Allais (1953), as a direct counter
example to expected utility theory:
1. Pre´fe´rez-vous la situation A a` la situation B?
SITUATION A Certitude de recevoir 100 millions
SITUATION B
{ 10 chances sur 100 de gagner 500 millions.
89 chances sur 100 de gagner 100 millions.
1 chance sur 100 de ne rien gagner.
2. Pre´fe´rez-vous la situation C a` la situation D?
SITUATION C
{
11 chances sur 100 de gagner 100 millions.
89 chances sur 100 de ne rien gagner.
SITUATION D
{
10 chances sur 100 de gagner 500 millions.
90 chances sur 100 de ne rien gagner
Participants were asked to consider the first pair of prospects, indicating which
they would prefer, then to consider the second pair of prospects, also indicating
which they would prefer. In order to be consistent with expected utility Theory
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prospect A and then C or prospect B and then D ought to be chosen. However,
this is found not to be the case in empirical research where consistently the
preference is found to be A and then D. A quick calculation shows that the
preferences are in fact for the lower, less risky, amount for the first prospect and
the higher, more risky, amount for the second prospect.
However, this is called the common consequence effect because, according to
expected utility theory, altering an outcome by a fixed amount in each of the two
gambles should not change the preference for one gamble over the other. Con-
sider a simple example: Suppose you are thinking about buying a new house and
there two possible alternatives; does it matter whether both houses are equally
furnished or that neither house is furnished? The independence axiom says it
should not; whether both houses are furnished or unfurnished is irrelevant to the
choice being made, nonetheless, human behaviour appears to be contrary. In
Allais’ example above, it can be seen that subtracting 89% of 100 millions for op-
tions A and B above and subtracting 89% of nothing for options C and D, results
in the same gamble. 89% of 100 millions and 89% of nothing are the common
consequence in each of the gambles. This is true in Allais’ original experiment and
in other research, for example Kahneman and Tversky (1979) where the effect is
shown with monetary and non monetary outcomes; all in violation of expected
utility’s independence axiom (the Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) axioms for
expected utility theory are given in Appendix A).
A further effect that also violates the independence axiom is known as the
common ratio effect. An example of the common ratio effect is shown below:
1. Would you prefer option A or option B?
A £3000 for certain.
B £4000 with probability 80% otherwise nothing.
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2. Would you prefer option C or option D?
C £3000 with probability 25%.
D £4000 with probability 20%.
This effect is also attributable to Allais (1953); participants have a similar pref-
erence for A and D rather than B and D, which would be predicted by expected
utility theory. Again, a quick calculation shows that not only are B and D the
higher value options, but the amounts for the options in both of the prospects
are in the same ratio. Theories that can account for common consequence and
common ratio effects have been developed but these must also be able to cope
with violations of monotonicity or stochastic dominance effects.
10.2.2 Violations of monotonicity
In the context of decision making, stochastic dominance is often referred to in
terms of first and second orders, where second order dominance is a weaker form
than first order dominance. If a prospect, B, offers at least as good a chance as
another prospect, A, of obtaining each possible outcome or better, then prospect
B (first order) stochastically dominates prospect A (J. Hadar & Russell, 1969;
Bawa, 1975) (strictly speaking B must also offer a better chance for at least
one outcome otherwise the prospects are identical). In order to have second or-
der stochastic dominance, prospect B must be more predictable (less risky) and
have at least as high a mean or expected value than the alternative, prospect A
(J. Hadar & Russell, 1969; Bawa, 1975). In order to illustrate stochastic domi-
nance and its associated problems consider the example below from Tversky and
Kahneman (1986):
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The following pair of lotteries, described by the percentage of marbles of different
colors in each box and the amount of money you win or lose depending on the
color of a randomly drawn marble. Which lottery do you prefer?
Option A
{
90% white 6% red 1% green 1% blue 2% yellow
$0 win $45 win $30 lose $15 lose $15
Option B
{
90% white 6% red 1% green 1% blue 2% yellow
$0 win $45 win $45 lose $10 lose $15
With this first example it is quite easy to see that Option B dominates Option
A, indeed, Tversky and Kahneman (1986) found that all of the participants who
were presented with this choice chose Option B. However, things were not so
obvious in a similar choice:
Option C
{
90% white 6% red 1% green 3% yellow
$0 win $45 win $30 lose $15
Option D
{
90% white 7% red 1% green 2% yellow
$0 win $45 lose $10 lose $15
In this choice, the options are equivalent from a stochastic dominance perspective,
with Option D dominating Option C, but Tversky and Kahneman (1986) found
this time that 58% of participants presented with the choice went for the domi-
nated Option C. In order to better understand what is happening with stochastic









Presented with these prospects most participants preferred F, but F is stochas-
197
10.2 Classes of challenge




85% 5% 5% 5%
$98 $90 $12 $12
Option G’
{
85% 5% 5% 5%
$98 $98 $14 $12
Not only is it easy to see that G’ is the dominant option, but, when presented with
the prospect in this form, participants chose G’. Examples of experimental vio-
lations of stochastic dominance and independence are perhaps the most common
in the decision making literature, but, nevertheless maybe not the most difficult
to resolve: A further challenge that is also taken seriously in the literature is
preference reversals.
10.2.3 Preference reversals
Preference reversals are considered to be problematic for most utility theories
because they conflict with a fundamental prediction of those theories (Busemeyer
& Johnson, 2008). If one prospect is preferred to another, it follows that it
has higher utility; accordingly this implies that the price equivalent of the former
prospect is greater than the latter. However, consider the following example from
Grether and Plott (1979):
P: win $4 with 35/36 probability;
D: win $16 with 11/36 probability.
When offered this prospect and asked for a direct preference, significantly more
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participants chose option P than option D. However, when asked to provide a price
equivalent option D was preferred. Preferences also reverse when participants are
required to provide different types of prices: minimum selling prices or willingness
to accept (WTA) and maximum purchase prices or willingness to pay (WTP)
(Birnbaum & Zimmermann, 1998).
Nonetheless, potentially at the risk of being controversial, the following alter-
native interpretation is offered, which is consistent with the present thesis: If I
accept one of the two prospects offered above (P or D), then I will presumably
opt for the one with the greater chance of winning and since P gives me a 97.25%
chance of winning (against D of 30.56%), I will choose P, consistent with empirical
data. Alternatively, if I offer you (i.e. I stand to lose if you win) the same choice
then I will price them according to what I stand to gain, so for P I will stand a
2.75% chance to gain against D where I will stand a 69.44% chance and presum-
ably I will choose D, pricing it accordingly. If this is right then it appears that
participants are being consistent in their choices, choosing the prospect that of-
fers the greatest advantage in each case. In addition to preference reversals, there
is a further class of challenges that are concerned with the problem of context.
10.2.4 Context dependent preferences
Context dependent preference effects violate a principle called independence from
irrelevant alternatives (Tversky & Simonson, 1993) and have been found with
both humans and animals (e.g. Hurly & Oseen, 1999). Two context dependent
effects, similarity and attraction, are identified here. Both of these effects involve
adding a third prospect to an original two prospects offered to participants.
199
10.2 Classes of challenge
10.2.4.1 Similarity
The first context dependent effect is known as the similarity effect and occurs
when there is initially a choice from two alternatives, say A and B, and one of
them is chosen more frequently than the other, say B. Adding a third alternative,
C, similar, but not dominating B, causes the preference to change to A more
frequently. Consider the following example from Tversky and Sattath (1979):
Context similarity Problem 1
Candidate A: Intelligence = 60, Motivation = 90
Candidate B: Intelligence = 78, Motivation = 25
When participants were presented with context similarity Problem 1, preference
was for candidate B. However, when participants were offered context similar-
ity Problem 2, which is shown below with an additional option, C, preference
switched from candidate B to candidate A
Context similarity Problem 2
Candidate A Intelligence = 60, Enthusiasm = 90
Candidate B Intelligence = 78, Enthusiasm = 25
Candidate C Intelligence = 75, Enthusiasm = 35
10.2.4.2 Attraction
This effect occurs when there is initially a choice from two alternatives, say A
and B, as in the similarity effect and one of them is chosen more frequently than
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the other, say B. When a new option, C, is added that is similar to A but is
dominated by A, preference changes to alternative A.
In one experiment (Simonson, 1989), participants were required to choose
between cars that differed in miles per gallon and ride quality:
Attraction problem 1
Brand A: 73 rating on ride quality, 33 miles per gallon (mpg)
Brand B: 83 rating on ride quality, 24 mpg
In this initial attraction problem, participants preference was for car brand B. A
similar problem with a third brand added, which was similar to but dominated
by brand A, is shown below:
Attraction problem 2
Brand A: 73 rating on ride quality, 33 mpg
Brand B: 83 rating on ride quality, 24 mpg
Brand D: 70 rating on ride quality, 33 mpg
In a reversal of the preference found for attraction problem 1, participants pre-
sented with this choice, preferred brand A.
The five challenges (or paradoxes) identified above form the basis for testing
the present full model. Although the model is an expected utility model, it is
expected that, with utility construed as it is, the same pattern of preferences will




The full model consists of the value function identified in Chapter 8 and the
probability weighting function identified in Chapter 9. Because it is an expected
utility theory, the preferred alternative in a choice problem will be the one that
attracts the maximum utility, as calculated by the model, for each alternative.
The implications of choosing between alternatives, A, are explored below.
For an expected utility theory the utility of a particular option is the sum of
the utilities for all of the sub options, m, multiplied by the probability of those













For each of the paradoxes identified in the sections above, Equation 10.1 was
implemented in a separate Matlab function in the following way:
1. obtain average sigmoids over competitors for each part of the prospect. For
the Allais paradox prospects options 1 and 2, this meant obtaining values
for 100 and 500 based on a reference point that was arbitrarily set at 100
(note that the values tested were reduced from Allais’ original by dividing
each by 1 million);
2. obtain weighted probabilities for each of the stated probabilities. Again, for
Allais’ paradox options 1 and 2 these were 89%, 10% and 11%;
3. utility is then a simple matter of calculating the product of these quantities,
which can then be compared and the counts of the preferences recorded.
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Assuming the three dimensional reward structure discussed in Chapter 3 suggests
that three of the parameters that are required for the model consist of the dimen-
sions from that reward structure, where r is the reward dimension; d is the risk
dimension; and σ the uncertainty dimension. This leaves t which, it is proposed,
is governed by short term memory capacity, for example, the magic number 7
±2 (Miller, 1956). Each of the Matlab functions was tested using a fixed set of
parameter values, each for a hundred repetitions. The parameter values were as
follows and were chosen arbitrarily since there is no a priori principled reason
that the parameters should be different between paradoxes (though the param-
eters may be different if the paradoxes were tested across different (external)
conditions):
1. personal reference point r = 100 + reward determined by the paradox;
2. risk (or danger or difficulty) d = 10;
3. uncertainty σ = 4 a modest variation given r;
4. experience of a context t = 5 perhaps governed by short term memory
capacity;




Each of the paradoxes was tested in the same way, simply by setting the param-
eters shown above and recording the results for 100 repetitions of the model. For
each paradox these results are given in Table 10.1 and shown graphically in the
subsections below.
Table 10.1: Preferred options chosen by the model for each prospect of
the paradoxes that were tested. It can be seen that the inconsistent choices
seen in empirical research are also seen with a semi arbitrary parameteri-
sation of the model. It should be noted that, although the numbering of
prospects and options differs from the descriptions of the original research
given above, in the table below the first prospect is always referred to
as Situation 1 and the second as Situation 2 with the respective options
sequentially numbered 1, 2 and 3 if required, this has been done for ease
of presentation.
Paradox Situation 1 Situation 2
Option Option Option Option Option
σ t j 1 2 1 2 3
Allais 4 5 10 100 0 27 73 n/a
Stochastic dominance 4 5 10 84 16 30 70 n/a
Preference reversals 4 5 10 99 1 0 100 n/a
Similarity 4 5 10 44 56 39 29 32
Attraction 4 5 10 26 74 37 29 34
10.4.1 Allais paradox
Allais’ paradox offers two situations, each of which has two options, one more
certain than the other. When presented with the first situation, participants
typically prefer the more certain option (option 1 in the present example). Con-
versely, when presented with the second situation, the less certain option is typi-
cally chosen (option 2 for in the second situation in the present example). Figure
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10.1 shows the preferences found by the model for the example of the Allais para-
dox described in §10.2.1. The differences between the preferred and non preferred
options for each of the prospects were tested using the binomial test and found
to be significant; all p < .0001.
Figure 10.1: The preferences for each of options for each of the prospects
of Allais’ paradox are shown, illustrating the change in preference from
option 1 in the first prospect to option 2 in the second prospect. Error
bars are standard errors.
10.4.2 Stochastic dominance
Recall that if an option offers at least as good a chance as another of obtaining
each possible outcome and a better chance for at least one outcome, then it
stochastically dominates the other option. Using the example from Birnbaum
and Zimmermann (1998) described in §10.2.2, where preference changed, from
the dominated option in the first situation (option 1 for the present test), to the
non dominated option in the second situation (option 2), Figure 10.2 shows the
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preferences found by the model. The differences between the preferred and non
preferred options for each of the prospects were tested using the binomial test
and found to be significant; all p < .0001.
Figure 10.2: Preference results for the example of stochastic dominance.
The preferences for each of options for each of the prospects are shown
and illustrate the change in preference from option 1 in the first prospect
to option 2 in the second prospect. Error bars are standard errors.
10.4.3 Preference reversals
Although preference reversals, as described in the literature (e.g. Grether &
Plott, 1979), are not of the form described in Section 10.2.3 above, the reversal
in preference can be clearly seen in Figure 10.3. Using the example from Grether
and Plott (1979), preference reverses, from option 1, in a buying situation, to
option 2, in a selling situation. The differences between the preferred and non
preferred options for each of the prospects were tested using the binomial test
and found to be significant; all p < .0001.
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Figure 10.3: Preference reversal results. The reversal in preference is
due to the perceived difference between values when buying and selling.
The preferences for each of options for each of the prospects are shown
and illustrate the change in preference from option 1 in the first prospect
to option 2 in the second prospect. Error bars are standard errors.
10.4.4 Similarity
The similarity effect is tested using the example from Tversky and Sattath (1979)
and described in described in §10.2.4.1. Figure 10.4 shows the preferences found
by the model for a first situation where option 2 is preferred out of the two
options presented and a second situation where preference changed to the original
option 1 when a third option, similar to the originally preferred option, is added.
The differences between the preferred and non preferred options for each of the




Figure 10.4: Preference results for the example of the similarity effect.
The preferences for each of options 1 and 2 for each of the prospects are
shown and illustrate the change in preference from option 2 in the first
prospect to option 1 in the second prospect when a third option, similar to
the originally preferred option, is added. Error bars are standard errors.
10.4.5 Attraction
This test uses the example of the attraction effect described in §10.2.4.2 from
(Simonson, 1989). Figure 10.5 shows the preferences found by the model for an
initial situation where option 2 is preferred out of the two options presented and
a second situation where preference changed to the original option 1 when a third
option, similar to the originally non preferred option, is added. The differences
between the preferred and non preferred options for each of the prospects were
tested using the binomial test and found to be significant; all p < .0001.
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Figure 10.5: Preference results for the example of the attraction effect.
The preferences for each of options 1 and 2 for each of the prospects are
shown and illustrate the change in preference from option 2 in the first
prospect to option 1 in the second prospect when a third option, similar
to the originally non preferred option, is added. Error bars are standard
errors.
10.5 Discussion
The main classes of challenge to decision making models were identified as com-
mon consequence and common ratio effects, violations of stochastic dominance,
preference reversals and two forms of context dependent effect; similarity and at-
traction. The full model consisting of the value function and probability weighting
function, identified in Chapters 8 and 9 respectively, was tested against examples
from each of these classes. Testing preference reversals used a novel and poten-
tially controversial interpretation of what participants are doing when this effect
is seen. If this interpretation is right then not only are the results from the model
showing the same pattern as experiments, but the results are rather unsurprising
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because the comparison appears simply to be between a gain and a loss.
In all cases it was found that the pattern of results that were produced by the
model were similar to those found in the cited experiments but does so based on
the maximisation of an expected utility. Although implemented in separate Mat-
lab functions, all of the challenges were implemented the same way, as identified
in Section 10.3, and used the same set of parameter values.
Clearly, it is difficult to identify a particular parameterisation as correct, and
meaningful statistics, beyond the binomial tests that were carried out, are dif-
ficult, however, the results can be considered in terms of parsimony, suggesting
that the parameters do not need to be altered in an arbitrary manner per para-
dox. It may be, of course, that alternative parameters are required in order to
model a situation of particular framing or particular context, however, this was
not tested.
Further testing should be carried out, identifying scenarios that are capable
of being implemented with other sets of parameters and levels of competition.
However, despite these caveats, it has been shown that an expected utility theory
that takes account of a social element can deal qualitatively and in many cases






This thesis has fallen naturally into two parts, an experimental part, consisting
broadly of four experiments, and a modelling part, consisting of a mathematical
model of a decision process and its testing, also falling broadly into three parts,
which were motivated by some simple observations. This chapter draws the thesis
together, summarising the findings of each chapter, identifying its implications
and weaknesses, and suggesting areas of further research.
11.2 Motivation
The present thesis was initially motivated by the challenge of Antonio Damasio’s
Somatic Marker hypothesis (1994, 1996, 2000) to the traditional or classical view
that rationality is a cold calculation requiring a world without surprises and
knowledge of all the relevant alternatives and their consequences (e.g. Simon,
1979). Indeed, Descartes’ error was mind/body dualism and, for Damasio (1994),
the separation of rationality and emotion.
211
11.2 Motivation
Chapter 2 began by reviewing the Somatic Marker hypothesis and discusses
the evidence that supports it, venturing into other areas of research including
moral psychology and automaticity. As a result, it seems that our choice making
behaviour may be largely automatic and based on affective processes but that
these can be overridden by (or operate in conjunction with) a conscious delib-
erative process. A significant issue is also identified: Maximisation of a simple
reward is unsatisfactory because it ignores the risk and uncertainty that is, or
might be, associated with gaining the reward and consistent with Rushworth and
Behrens (2008) it is proposed that models of decision making can be improved
by considering a richer conception of reward consisting of reward, risk (or cost)
and uncertainty; this is one of the central parts of the present thesis which can
also be motivated by considering the environment in which choices are made.
In their classic treatment of expected utility Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)
consider rational behaviour and contrast a very simple economy, populated by a
single person referred to as Robinson Crusoe, with a more complex social econ-
omy. While Robinson Crusoe’s problem is one of simple maximisation, to the
extent that external conditions are given and all he has to do is make choices
that make his situation as good as it can be, people in a social economy must
enter into competition with others as well as having their own preferences. This
is also illustrated and supported with examples from cross cultural research on
the Ultimatum game and subtle cues. Due to the changing nature of the decision
making environment and the inherent uncertainties of competitive relationships
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) argues that, what for Robinson Crusoe is a
simple maximising problem, turns into a complex and disconcerting mixture of
conflicting maximising problems for people in a social economy. It seems that
the only way that this can be managed is through applying previous experiences
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to new situations and this can only be achieved through a process of induction.
Nevertheless, the following section concerning new knowledge identifies that
induction is a potentially thorny issue, particularly philosophically, and, despite
its very long history, cannot be justified from a reasoned logical point of view.
Frank Ramsey (Ramsey, 1926) summed up the position concerning induction in
the following quote “We are all convinced by inductive arguments and our con-
viction is reasonable because the world is so constituted that inductive arguments
lead on the whole to true opinions. We are not, therefore, able to help trusting in-
duction, nor, if we could help it, do we see any reason why we should”. Assuming
the choices that we make are inductive, learning from experience and applying
our prior experiences to new, but similar, situations, allows a different question
from induction itself being justified to be posed: Whether beliefs and opinions
can be modified in a logically justified way based on additional experience or
evidence. There is. Using Bayes’ rule.
Using Bayes rule accepts the descriptive explanation of induction, whether it
is reasonable or not, and identifies a model of reasonable change in belief that is
sufficient for being rational in a changing world. Taking induction, a multi di-
mensional reward structure and the somatic marker hypothesis together implies
that there is a marker that can be maintained for every concept that we know.
The semantic differential (Osgood et al., 1957) is a well researched psychological
instrument that is thought to measure the connotative meaning of a concept in
three dimensions, however, in spite of all of the research on and with the seman-
tic differential, the question ‘what is the semantic differential really measuring’
may still be posed, indeed, although its usefulness and reliability remains unques-
tioned, this has been a recurring question for most of the semantic differentials
history (e.g. Miron, 1969; Osgood, 1969). It is proposed in the present thesis
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that the semantic differential is a representation of our reward structure. Early
support for this approach came from David Heise, a long standing practitioner
with the semantic differential and pioneer of Affect Control Theory, who said,
with respect to the semantic differential, that had he been entering the field to-
day he would be interested in choices and decision making because to him it
is “obvious that those kinds of decisions involve emotion and affect” (personal
communication, December 25, 2010).
The remainder of Chapter 2 identifies problems for expected utility theory,
expecially in terms of axiom violations and the changes that were made to it by
prospect theory, which has become the most popular alternative to the expected
utility theory. Chapter 2 also includes a brief discussion of how learning and
reinforcement sufficient for making choices might exist at the level of neurophys-
iology, in particular surrounding the actions of the neurotransmitters dopamine,
serotonin, acetylcholine and norepinephrine.
So to sum up the background to and motivation for the present thesis, it
was identified that: a) making choices is to a great extent affective and that the
Somatic Marker hypothesis offers the basis of a Bayesian type prior; b) making
choices is competitive, whether the competitors are actual or perceived; c) there is
inherent uncertainty in the world and in the competitors; d) in order to maximise
advantage, cost and uncertainty should be considered alongside reward, rather
than just reward; and e) the semantic differential may offer a reliable representa-




Chapter 3 began the main experimental work by investigating whether the se-
mantic differential can be plausibly considered to measure a three dimensional
structure representing reward, risk/cost and uncertainty. In order to be able to
establish whether a relationship existed between peoples experiences and the se-
mantic differential, a set of rated concepts and an assessment of the experiences
that related to them was required. The rated concepts were easy to acquire from
a publicly available source (i.e. Francis & Heise, 2006) and required little further
work to make them usable, however, a novel approach was needed to gathering
data that could be considered to represent peoples’ good and bad experiences.
These ‘experiences’ data were collected by carrying out automated searches of
internet weblogs or blogs through the use of two blog search engines, technorati
and blogscope. Each search consisted of a concept word that had been pre-
rated using the semantic differential and a disjunctive list of modifier words.
From the data that were collected, six measures of reward were derived and
used with regression techniques to investigate the relationships with the semantic
differential.
The key findings in this experiment were similar for both search engines, one
of which was unexpected. There was essentially no correlation with the abso-
lute proportion of positively rewarded events: Evaluation is to first approxima-
tion simply relative reward representing the ratio of good events to bad, it does
not represent the probability of good events happening as might be intuitively
thought. The second dimension, Potency, essentially measures the risk (of bad
things happening), making it clear why Potency needs to be represented for every
object we can make decisions about; it is important to know not only the average
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reward associated with an option, but what the cost (risk/danger) might be in
obtaining it. Associating the semantic differential with a multi dimensional rep-
resentation of reward is also consistent with the action of the neurotransmitters
discussed in Chapter 2 §2.7 and all the more so if Evaluation represents relative
reward as found in this experiment.
It might be argued, however, that reducing prior experience to the apparent
experience of two outcomes is too limited, but it is argued that this is not the case,
what is potentially limiting though is the data sources that were used. Although
two blog search engines were used, it might be argued that they are in fact just
two access points to the same source and in any case might suffer the same biases.
It would be desirable to have other data sources, of the same scale, that could be
searched in a structured manner in order to provide an alternative to, and a cross
check for, the present findings. Facebook statuses have the potential to provide
the necessary information, however, Twitter, with the storage of ‘tweets’ by the
National Library of Congress has the greater potential, though neither potential
data source offered an accessible interface at the time of writing.
The blog search experiment was correlational only and it can not be inferred
that the good and bad experiences accessed through the blog search are causing
the reward structure, and thereby the semantic differential, to be a particular way
or otherwise altered. In the next experiment, labelled AlphaBet and reminiscent
of the Iowa gambling task that has been used extensively to test the prediction
of the somatic marker hypothesis, Chapter 4 successfully tried to influence a
semantic differential through differing distributions of rewards.
The AlphaBet experiment demonstrated that our reward structure and as a
result, the semantic differential, could be manipulated. Participants were asked
to make a series of bets on the outcome for arbitrarily coloured shapes. Each
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shape was associated with a different probability of gaining a reward, nothing
happening and loss, for which the participant was given explicit feedback. This
was thought to represent an economic type choice that was experienced as good,
bad or indifferent.
Ratings that were given for each shape after participants had completed a
series of bets formed the expected factors of the semantic differential, as with the
blog search experiment, these, together with the experience data (given by the
trial outcomes) were analysed using multiple regression techniques. The same
pattern of results was found in the AlphaBet experiment as was found in the
blog search experiment, particularly that the Evaluation dimension relates to
relative reward and that Potency relates to risk. The main claim of the AlphaBet
experiment therefore is that, on the basis of experiences from betting on arbitrary
shapes (representing an economic decision), that the semantic differential can be
manipulated and offers confirmation of the findings of the blog search experiment
that, to a first approximation, the semantic differential is a summary of the reward
history. It is interesting to note that, despite the massive difference in the size of
the data sets that were used, the pattern of the relationship between Evaluation
and Potency (or reward and cost), illustrated in Figure 4.5, is surprisingly similar.
While the winning shape distributions in the AlphaBet experiment are the
only ones to have a reduced level of activity, which is consistent with the idea
that this dimension represents uncertainty, it is not significant. Indeed, neither
the AlphaBet nor blog search experiments directly or explicitly address the Ac-
tivity dimension. Based on the idea that the Activity dimension of the semantic
differential is more accurately described as control or certainty, Chapter 5 at-




By keeping other variables, such as the stimulus colour and shape, static and
just manipulating the way that the size of the shape changed, the Triangles exper-
iment focussed on how good the predictions that participants made were. At one
of the extremes were random changes to the shape size, which were expected to
be the most unpredictable and consequently the most uncertain (or most active)
and at the other extreme an unchanging or uniform size, which was expected
to be most certain (or least active). In addition, because, unlike the AlphaBet
shapes experiment, no explicit rewards were provided, only the subjective feeling
that a good choice has been made is available, this experiment was considered to
be more like many everyday choices.
The uniform distribution, which by any standard must be the least active,
presumably be the easiest to see and hence be certain of, was, unsurprisingly,
found to be the least active and most certain. This was supported by the numbers
of correct predictions and squared prediction errors for the uniform distribution.
Although it was found to be significantly different from the uniform shape, the
randomly changing shape was not found to be significantly different from the
other two change distributions. It was, however, rated significantly higher for
the Potency/risk factor, that is, it was considered more risky, than the other
distributions and was again supported by the objective measure of the lower
number of correct predictions and the significantly higher squared prediction error
for the random distribution.
The Triangles experiment suggests that people are sensitive to more subtle
changes in experience, as predicted by the Somatic Marker hypothesis and that
explicit rewards are probably not required in order for our reward structure to be
maintained. While in some ways it seems obvious from the Somatic Marker hy-
pothesis (Damasio, 1994) and from other research on affect, such as Zajonc (1980),
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that subtle changes at a perceptual level must also affect our reward structure it
was unclear whether it could be captured based on the present approach.
Chapter 6 sought to test this based on the premise that the somatic marker hy-
pothesis, and hence our reward structure, is created through physiological states
and learned associations. Since it is known that the mere perception of colour trig-
gers evaluative processes (Elliot & Maier, 2007), Chapter 6 investigated whether
our reward structure will be evident from ‘lower level’ perceptual information in
the form of colour gleaned from limited exposure to scenes, often referred to as
gist.
One of the drawbacks with attempting to investigate perceptual information
on the basis of colour is that colour is complicated, whether considering colour
preferences or colour spaces, nonetheless the ratings of a test image set that were
provided by the small number of participants in this experiment produced the
expected semantic differential. More problematic, however, was considering what
the independent colour variables should be.
This consideration led to the basic colour terms and colours of Berlin and Kay
(1969) and also the World Color Survey. Though in some ways controversial, the
Berlin and Kay (1969) hypothesis has been tested across cultures and languages
through the WorlColor Survey. It should be stated clearly that what is of interest
is not whether we can perceive many hues at many levels of luminance, but a
range of colour categories or terms that are descriptive of the colours that they
represent; the Berlin and Kay (1969) basic colours serve this requirement and an
approach based on a finite mixture of Gaussians was selected in order to model
the colours.
An initial model was created using the Berlin and Kay (1969)/World Color
Survey colours and multiple regression used to investigate the relationship with
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the semantic differential that was found from the ratings of the images. The
analysis showed strong and significant relationships for Evaluation/reward and
Potency/cost, but not Activity/uncertainty, suggesting that our reward structure
is evident from low level perceptual information.
However, it was felt that, because the Berlin and Kay (1969) colours were ex-
ternally generated from a set of ‘ideal’ Munsell colour chips, the initial model did
not adequately represent learning from the environment and that a further model
should be created that learned its colours rather than them being given. A further
model was therefore created where the environment, the ‘world’ as it were, was
limited to a set of everyday scenes. Again, the relationship between the learned
colours and the Evaluation/reward and Potency/cost dimensions showed strong
and significant relationships. Visual inspection of the colour centres though,
showed that while they could be described in terms of the basic colours, they
were somewhat dull and did not appear to be what might intuitively be an ‘ideal’
colour.
Arguably though, because, for example, ‘ideal red’ would not be the same
as ‘average red’, these centres do not represent what we mean when we point
to an ideal representation of the colour. Something else is happening and it is
proposed that this is a phenomenon known as peak shift. Applying a peak shift
to the model colours produces a representation that is much more like the ideal
colours expected.
To summarise, the experimental chapters of the present thesis have addressed
three of the areas that were highlighted at the outset these are: a) making choices
is to a great extent affective and the extent of prior experience is evident for all
concepts we know; b) in order to maximise advantage, cost and uncertainty should
be considered alongside reward; and c) the semantic differential may be a reli-
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able representation of that reward structure. It was found from an investigation
of a very large data source and from two controlled experiments that three di-
mensions provided a good representation of experiences, more generally reward,
and that this representation is evident from the semantic differential. Further,
that this reward structure is also apparent when considering low level percep-
tual information such as the perception of colour. It is argued that the semantic
differential represents or describes the three dimensions of our reward structure
and that these dimensions might be better labelled as Reward, Risk/Cost and
Uncertainty.
Based on the premise that the Somatic Marker hypothesis provides a Bayesian
type prior and that the basis for choices must be inferred, the importance of
uncertainty is reiterated and the approach to Bayesian modelling provided in
Chapter 7 by way of a brief introduction to the second part of the thesis, which
is concerned with mathematical modelling.
11.4 Mathematical model
Expected utility theory as proposed by D. Bernoulli (1738) and axiomatised by
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) has been questioned, particularly as a descrip-
tive theory of choice. A number of alternatives to expected utility theory have
been proposed, many of which retain the central idea of D. Bernoulli (1738) in
multiplying the probability of an outcome by its value or utility. Probably the
most widely known and most influential of the modified theories is Kahneman and
Tverskys prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman,
1992). Prospect theory proposes two functions, where the value (or utility) of an
outcome is multiplied by a subjective decision weight; both of these functions,
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with broadly the same characteristics, are retained for the present thesis.
Chapter 8 proposes a value (or utility) function that introduces the novel ideas
of competition and fair judges, where utility is the probability (or how certain)
that we are to gain an advantage over real or hypothetical competitors.
Based around Bayesian techniques, the value function retains the idea of a per-
sonal reference point introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), but, harking
back to the very origins of expected utility, that the winning or gaining advantage
over the proposed competitors is based on the idea that the result would be as if
it were decided by a fair judge. The value function that is constructed takes four
parameters, each of which was systematically varied for the purposes of testing
the function.
The first parameter, d, has been tentatively labelled difficulty/deliberation.
Although the effect seems to be quite modest, larger values for difficulty/deliberation
produce a value function that is less risk averse, this may seem strange, but it
should be considered that the more step like the function becomes, the more stark,
or black and white, it becomes also. The second parameter, t, has been consid-
ered to represent ‘my’ experience in some domain, as with difficulty/deliberation
higher values for this parameter suggests an easier, more black and white choice.
The third parameter, σ2, represents the variance or uncertainty in competitors
and larger values for this parameter, unsurprisingly, leads to greater risk aver-
sion. The fourth parameter, n, represents the number of competitors with the
novel and interesting prediction that with a greater number of competitors a less
risk averse function is produced; this suggests that, as the number of competitors
grows, the more risk someone might be prepared to bear, nevertheless as with
the first two parameters this would have the effect of making the function more
step like and consequently a more straightforward choice.
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It can be clearly seen that whereas reward relates to utility, the other param-
eters relate to the risk and uncertainty dimensions of the reward structure that
is hypothesised. In addition, the value or utility function that is produced has all
of the key features of the empirically derived value function of prospect theory;
that is, a function that is risk averse above the reference point, risk seeking below
the reference point and loss averse overall. However, because people are observed
to behave as if they use a transformed version of a given probability, in prospect
theory a further function, the probability weighting function, is used to weight
the given probability subjectively. The idea of a probability weighting function
is retained by the present thesis, which is the subject of Chapter 9.
The probability weighting function proposed in the present thesis argues that,
because uncertainty is ubiquitous, the optimal strategy is to combine probabil-
ity statements with prior information using Bayes rule. Further, that the prior
distribution that is used is the adaptive combination of two classes of prior, an
informative empirical prior, that represents previous experience and an uninfor-
mative prior of ignorance.
Both classes of prior are commonly used in Bayesian analysis, but, unfor-
tunately, each has potential problems when used alone. Empirical priors rely
strongly on the fact that the situation is similar to those encountered before and
can be biased if this is not true, while ignorance priors that ignore this previous
experience are, potentially, inefficient. The present probability weighting func-
tion combines the efficiency of empirical priors with the robustness of ignorance
priors using Bayesian model comparison techniques.
The benefits of this approach are illustrated for generic contexts of “good” and
“bad” events, based on data gathered from the internet (as described in Chapter
3), and how they can be used to estimate the prior of inference. The result-
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ing model accounts for all the major characteristics of the probability weighting
function found in prospect theory.
The combination of priors used in the present probability weighting func-
tion also potentially addresses the differences highlighted in the experience based
decisions literature that were discussed in Chapter 7. When a situation does
not conform to previous experience the present probability weighting function
is sensitive to it and rather than slavishly sticking to an empirical prior that is
inappropriate, as might be the case if there were only a single prior, a new prior
for that situation can be built from the position of ignorance, based on the expe-
rience gained. As illustrated in Chapter 9, under weighting of small probabilities
that are due potentially to under sampling and information asymmetry, familiar
from the experience based decisions literature (e.g. L. Hadar & Fox, 2009), that
would be the result of building a new prior of inference in that situation.
The value function and probability weighting function, together forming a
complete model, are tested against known problem cases for decision making in
Chapter 10. The main classes of challenge to decision making models identified
in the decision making literature (e.g. Busemeyer & Johnson, 2008) are com-
mon consequence and common ratio effects, violations of stochastic dominance,
preference reversals and context dependent effects.
In testing the model, it is difficult to identify a particular parameterisation
as correct and meaningful statistics on this basis are also difficult, however, the
results can be considered in terms of parsimony i.e. the lowest parameter sets
generating the required preferences and in terms of typical values i.e. the mean
values of the parameters generating the required preferences. In all cases, how-
ever, it was found that the pattern of results that were produced by the model
were similar to those found in cited experiments but does so based on the max-
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imisation of an expected utility, perhaps better termed maximisation of potential
advantage in the present case.
11.5 Implications and further research
As a result of the research contained in the present thesis a number of plausible
predictions are made that can be followed up in further research, in addition,
some of the approaches used for data collection were interesting. For example,
using internet data sources, as discussed above, has been useful to the present
thesis and bears further use and investigation.
Use of these sources is an important approach if it can collect data that are
representative of behaviour “in the raw”, as it were, rather than as it might
occur in a psychology lab where, in certain types of experiments, people have
the opportunity to modify their behaviour according to what they think might
be required or have their behaviour artificially limited by dichotomous options
such as in the moral dilemmas. Fox, Rogers, and Tversky (1996), for example,
collected data from participants who were professional options traders in order to
investigate the probability weighting function and Stewart, Chater, and Brown
(2006) used real banking data for the Decisions By Sampling model. Furthermore,
while not directly concerned with choices, the mixture model approach, that was
used to investigate colour, warrants further attention as a route for exploring the
Berlin and Kay (1969) basic colour term hypothesis.
Intuitively, considering the potential risk and uncertainty associated with ob-
taining a reward is important when making choices, a point that is also made by
in Rushworth and Behrens (2008), however, these variables are rarely considered
in the reinforcement learning and decision making literature. The present the-
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sis considers them as central to making choices in terms of a multi dimensional
reward structure and investigates this structure in a series of experiments. As a
result it is argued that the three dimensions of reward, risk/cost and uncertainty
should be considered in research involving choices.
In addition, a long standing and well researched instrument, the semantic
differential, has been identified as a potential representation (or measure or de-
scription) of the richer reward structure. While this will need further investigation
as an instrument for use with choices, a potential answer has been provided for
a long standing theoretical question for the semantic differential, which is what
is it really representing.
The present thesis treats utility differently to the way that it has been treated
in other theories, that is, utility is considered as potential advantage, rather than
potential gain, which is perhaps more consistent with how people actually operate
in a social economy. When advantage is considered in terms of a social economy it
gives rise to an important and novel idea; the introduction of idea of competitors
into the value function.
However, because competitors are assumed to be randomly sampled and a
particular choice will be determined by the competitors that are sampled, peoples
choices will be changeable dependent on the samples that are actually taken.
The potential for priming (e.g. Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Duckworth et al.,
2002) and other memory type effects (e.g. Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982;
Furnham, 1989) to bias choices would therefore seem to be clear; indeed, a similar
view is expressed about the Decision By Sampling (DbS) model (Stewart et al.,
2006). The probability weighting function on the other hand, built as it is on a
combination of priors, offers a potential explanation for the differences that have
been seen in the experience based decisions literature. This combination of priors
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approach bears further research, especially in terms of other data sources and
specific choice situations.
In conclusion, the present thesis has two strong advantages. First, rather than
simply being an arbitrary function fitted to data, all the parameters have psy-
chological meaning. This means that the theory makes extensive and plausible
predictions: The number of competitors, how certain a person is of those competi-
tors; the level of certainty expressed in a probability (or the way it is signalled),
the level of trust in a probability (or the way it was signalled); the amount and
nature of previous experience a person has of similar situations; cues that this
situation is different to those in the past and others, are predicted to have affects
on peoples choices. These variables are also very likely to vary between people,
leading to between subject differences in choices.
Second, the present thesis also sheds light on another issue with descriptive
theories that maintain the expected utility hypothesis as the normative model. If
these models are correct, on the assumption that expected utility theory would
potentially be simple to implement and that evolution has had millennia to op-
timise our decision making machinery, it is unclear why we have not been out
competed by animals that do employ expected utility maximisation. It has been
shown that the observed biases are compatible with expected utility theory; it is
simply that the expectation is carried out over the uncertainty. Taking previous
knowledge into account (when appropriate) is not irrational, and not inconsistent
with expected utility theory, simply the uncertainty free version that is normally
explored.
This last section has attempted to pinpoint some of the findings that are
novel and have potentially advanced the investigation of how people go about
making choices in their everyday lives. However, it is a continuing challenge
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to attempt to account for all of the variations in behaviour and for the present
thesis, choice behaviour. To paraphrase Oaksford, Chater, and Stewart (2012),
human cognition is striking in its ability to handle, even to a modest extent,
making choices in novel, hypothetical, verbally stated and real scenarios for which
our past experience and evolutionary history may have provided only minimal
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A von Neumann and Morgenstern type expected utility function that ranks lot-
teries or probability distributions according to an individuals preference () is a
consequence of four axioms: completeness, transitivity, continuity, and indepen-
dence. These axioms are illustrated as follows (Machina, 2006):
Completeness
For all lotteries X and Y :
either X  Y or Y  X or both.
Transitivity
For all lotteries X, Y and Z
if X  Y and Y  Z then X  Z.
Continuity
For all lotteries X, Y and Z
if X  Y and Y  Z then for some α ∈ (0, 1)
Y is indifferent to αX + (1− α)Z .
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Independence
For all lotteries X, Y and Z and all α ∈ (0, 1)
if X  Y then αX + (1− α)Z  αY + (1− α)Z.
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Appendix B
The St Petersberg prospect
Bernoulli’s (1738) description of the St. Petersburg prospect:
“Peter tosses a coin and continues to do so until it should land ‘heads’
when it comes to the ground. He agrees to give Paul one ducat if he
gets ‘heads’ on the very first throw, two ducats if he gets it on the
second, four if on the third, eight if on the fourth, and so on, so that
with each additional throw the number of ducats he must pay is dou-
bled. Suppose we seek to determine the value of Paul’s expectation”.
In other words, what is of interest is how much (or the most) a rational person
would pay to enter the game. In this game, as defined above, the winnings are
xi = 2




















= 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + ...
= ∞ (B.1)
The paradox, clearly, is that (based on the expected value) no rational person





Table C.1: Technorati concept words
abandon bachelor calm compulsive demean entertain
abortionist back camp conceited demote enthusiastic
abuse badger campground concert denigrate entreat
accommodating baldy campus condemn denounce entrepreneur
accuse banquet capitalist confidant dependable envious
address baptize capture confident dependent escape
admonish bar car confine deprecate euphoric
adolescent bash careless confront deride evangelist
adult bathe caress congratulate despondent examine
adulterer battlefield carnival conscientious detective exasperated
adulteress beach casino conservative devil excited
adventurous beckonto catch considerate direct excuse
advise bed cathedral console disappointed execute
advisor beg Catholic consultant disapproving execution
affectionate belittle caution contemplate disciplinarian executioner
afraid berate cautious contemptuous discipline executive
aggravated beseech celebration contented disco exploit
aggressive bill celebrity contradict discontented extrovert
agitated bind cemetery contrite discourage extroverted
agnostic bite challenge convalescent discouraged eye
aide bitter chapel convict disgusted failure
airplane Black charmed cooperative disheartened father
alarmed blame chase correct dismayed fearful
alcoholic bless chastise counsel disobey felon
aloof blonde chatterbox courageous disparage female
alumnus blue cheer courtroom displeased female
ambitious bootlick cheerful cousin disrobe feminine
amuse bootlicker cheerless cowardly dissatisfied feminist
analyze boozer chide criminal dissuade festival
angry bore child critic distract fight
anguished boss childish criticize distressed fight
annoyed bossy choke crook divorce fine
antiSemite bouncer Christmas crowd doctor finicky
antisocial boy church crushed dogmatic firstborn
anxious brat citizen cue domineering flatter
apathetic brave classmate curse downhearted flee
applaud bribe classroom cuss dress flirt
applicant bride clergyman customer drinkto flophouse
apprehend bridesmaid client cynical dropout flunk
apprehensive brief clinic damn drunk flunky
apprentice bright club dance dummy flustered
approach brothel coach dare dyke foe
arrest brother coach daring eager follower
arrogant browbeat cocky date earnest foolish
ashamed brunette coddle daughter easygoing forget
assail brutalize coed debate ecstatic forgive
assist brute coerce debrief egotistical forgiving
assistant buddy cold defeat elated freeloader
athlete bully colleague defend elbow friend
attendto bully combat defendant elder frightened
attorney bum comfort defensive embarrassed frustrated
auction bureaucrat command defiant embrace funeral
aunt businessman compassionate deflated employee furious
authoritarian businesswoman compensate defy employer fussover
authority cafe competent degrade encourage gangster
awestruck cafeteria competitive dejected enemy gay
baby cajole competitor delinquent enraged genius
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gentle hero insecure lecture mouthpiece parent
gentleman heroine insensitive lecturer moved parody
ghetto heterosexual insider lesbian mug parolee
gigolo hideout insincere liar murder partner
girl hire inspect liberal murderer passerby
girlfriend hit instruct librarian murderess passionate
glad hold instructor library museum pastor
gleeful home insult loafer nag patient
gloomy homemaker intelligent lobbyist naive patient
glum homesick intern lonely nark patriot
God homosexual interrogate lonesome narrowminded patrolman
goofoff honeymoon interrogation loser needle pauper
gossip honeymooner interrupt lovesick neglect peaceful
grab hoodlum interview lunatic negotiator peacetime
grade hooker interview luncheon neighbor pediatrician
graduate horny interviewee luncheonette nephew peeved
graduation horrified interviewer lunchroom nervous penalize
grandchild hostess intimate lustful nestle penitentiary
granddaughter hostile intolerant mad newlywed perceptive
grandfather hothead introspective malcontent niece persistent
grandmother hotheaded introvert male nobody pessimist
grandparent hotshot introverted male nonsmoker pessimistic
grandson hound invalid malign nostalgic pest
grasp houseguest irked malingerer novice pester
greedy housewife irritable man nudge pet
greet hug irritated manager nurse petrified
grind humble jealous manageress nut petty
groom humiliated jerk masculine nuzzle photograph
grouchy hunk Jew masochist nymphomaniac physician
grownup hurry jock massage obedient pickpocket
guest husband joggle matriarch obey pickup
guide hush josh mature obstruct pimp
gullible hussy jostle mealtime office pizzeria
gunfight idealistic joyful medicate ogle placid
gunman idiot joyless meek old plainclothesman
guy ignoramus jubilant meeting opportunist playful
gym imaginative judge melancholy oppose playground
gynecologist imitate juror mentalcase optimistic playmate
gyp immature kick merchant order poke
hail immoral kid merry organizer policeman
Halloween impatient kid millionaire orgy politician
halt implore kind mimic orphan pompous
handcuff imprison kiss minister outgoing poor
handicapped incarcerate kitchen mischievous outlaw poorhouse
handyman inconsiderate klutz miser outraged popular
harangue incriminate knife miserly outspoken pornographer
harass indecisive laboratory mistress overcharge praise
hardworking independent laborer mob overjoyed preacher
harm indignant lackey mock overpower prejudiced
hassle industrious lady modest overwhelm priest
hatemonger infant lawyer molest overwhelmed priestess
heal infatuated lazy monitor overwork principal
healer inform lead moron pagan prison
Heaven informer leader mortified pal probationer
heckle inhibited leave mother pamper prod
hell injure lecher mourner panicked professor
helper innocent lecture mournful paranoid prompt
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prosecute rob sincere supervisor undergraduate youth
prostitute robber sinner supporter understanding zoo
Protestant roommate sister surgeon uneasy
protester rouse slap surprise unfair
proud ruthless slaughterhouse suspicious unfriendly
psychiatrist sad slug sweatshop unimaginative
psychopath sadist slut sweetheart unpopular
psychotic sadistic sly swinger unreliable
punch saint smoker sympathetic upset
punish saintly smug tactful uptight
punk salesclerk snuggle taxi vacationer
pupil saleslady sock taxpayer vain
purchaser salesman son teach vengeful
push sarcastic soothe teacher victim
quack satisfied sorrowful teammate victimize
quarrelsome sauna sorry tease vigilante
queer sawbones spank teenager village
question scared spendthrift temperamental villain
questioner schizophrenic spinster tenant violent
quiet scholar spiteful tent VIP
quiz schoolboy spokesman terrified virtuous
rabbi schoolgirl spokeswoman terrorist voter
racist schoolmate sponger test voyeur
racketeer schoolroom spouse test waitress
rape schoolteacher squeeze thank warm
rapist scientist stab thankful warn
raunchy scold steady theater wartime
ravish scornful stepbrother thoughtless wash
reassure scratch stepchild threaten washroom
rebellious scrooge stepdaughter thrilled watch
rebuff scrutinize stepfather thug wedding
rebuke search stepmother tickle welcome
receptionist secretary stepparent timid wheedle
reckless seduce stepsister toady whip
redhead selfish stepson toast White
reform sensitive stingy toddler whore
regretful sentence stop tolerant whorehouse
rehabilitate sentimental store tomboy widow
relieved serenade stranger torment widower
remind serene strangle tormented wife
remorseful server street torture wild
renounce sexist streetfair touch wilderness
repentant shaken strict touched windbag
reproach sheriff stubborn trainee winkat
rescue shocked stud traitor winner
resentful shoot student traveler wise
resort shopclerk student treat withdrawn
responsible shopkeeper study troublemaker witness
restrain shoplifter stupid truant woman
retiree shopper subdue trusting womanizer
reverent shove submissive tug worker
reward shrewd subordinate tyke workman
rib shrink subway unadventurous workmate
rich shy sue unambitious worried
ridicule sibling superior uncle yesman
riot sickened supermarket underachiever young





Table D.1: Blogscope concept words
abandon aunt brutalize club curse divorce
abortionist authoritarian brute coach cuss doctor
abuse authority buddy coach customer dogmatic
accommodate awe-struck bully cocky cynical domineering
accommodating baby bully coddle damn downhearted
accuse baby bum coed dance dress
address bachelor bureaucrat coerce dare dropout
admonish back bus cold daring drunk
adolescent badger businessman colleague date dummy
adult baldy businesswoman combat daughter dyke
adulterer banquet cafe comfort debate eager
adulteress baptize cafeteria command debrief earnest
adventurous bar cajole companion defeat Easter
advise bash calm compassionate defend easygoing
advisor bathe camp compensate defendant ecstatic
affectionate battlefield campground competent defensive educate
afraid beach campus competitive defiant egghead
aggravated bed capitalist competitor deflated egotistical
aggressive bed capture compliment defy elated
agitated bedroom car compulsive degrade elbow
agnostic beg careless conceited dejected elder
aid beginner caress concert delinquent elevator
aide belittle carnival condemn demagogue embarrassed
airplane berate casino confidant demean embrace
alarmed beseech catch confident demote employ
alcoholic bill cathedral confine denigrate employee
aloof bind Catholic confront denounce employer
alumnus bisexual caution congratulate dependable encourage
ambitious bite cautious conscientious dependent enemy
amuse bitter celebration conservative deprecate enraged
analyze Black celebrity considerate deride entertain
angry blame cemetery console despondent enthusiastic
anguished bless challenge consultant detective entreat
annoyed blonde champion contemplate devil entrepreneur
answer blue chapel contemptuous direct envious
antisocial bootlick charmed contented disappointed escape
anxious bootlicker chase contradict disapproving euphoric
apathetic boozer chastise contrite disciplinarian evangelist
applaud bore chatterbox convalescent discipline exalt
applicant boss cheat convict disco examination
apprehend bossy cheer cooperative discontented examine
apprehensive bouncer cheerful cop discourage exasperated
apprentice boy cheerless correct discouraged excited
approach boyfriend chide counsel disgusted excuse
arrest brat child courageous disheartened execute
arrogant brave childish courtroom dismayed execution
ashamed bribe choke cousin disobey executioner
assail bride Christmas cowardly disparage executive
assault bridegroom chum criminal displeased exonerate
assist bridesmaid church critic disrobe exploit
assistant brief citizen criticize dissatisfied extol
atheist bright classmate crook dissuade extrovert
athlete brothel classroom crowd distract extroverted
attack brother clergyman crushed distressed eye
attorney browbeat client cuddle divorce face
auction brunette clinic cue divorc factory
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failure God hit insecure lazy mobster
fairground gossip hold insensitive lead mock
fanatic grab hombre insider leader modest
father grade home insincere leave molest
fearful graduate homemaker inspect lecher monitor
felon graduation homesick instruct lecture moron
female grandchild homosexual instructor lecture mortified
female granddaughter honeymoon insult lecturer mother
feminine grandfather honeymooner intelligent lesbian mother
feminist grandmother hoodlum intern liar mourner
festival grandparent hooker interrogate liberal mournful
fianc grandson horny interrogation librarian mouthpiece
fiance grasp horrified interrupt library moved
fight graveyard host interview loafer mug
fight greedy hostess interview lobbyist mugger
fine greet hostile interviewee lonely murder
fingerprint grind hothead interviewer lonesome murderer
finicky groom hotheaded intimate loser murderess
firstborn grouch hotshot intolerant lovesick museum
flatter grouchy hound introspective lunatic nag
flee grownup houseguest introvert luncheon naive
flirt guest housewife introverted luncheonette nark
flophouse guide hug invalid lunchroom narrowminded
flunk gullible humble irate lustful needle
flunky gunfight humiliated irked mad neglect
flustered gunman hunk irritable malcontent negotiator
foe guy hurry irritated male neighbor
follow gym husband jail male nephew
follower gymnasium hush jail malign nervous
fondle gynecologist hussy jealous malingerer nestle
foolish gyp idealistic jerk man neurotic
foreman hail idiot Jew manager newlywed
forget Halloween ignoramus jock manageress niece
forgive halt ignore joggle maniac nightclub
forgiving handcuff imaginative josh marry nobody
freeloader handicapped imitate jostle masculine nonsmoker
friend handyman immature joyful masochist nostalgic
frightened happy immoral joyless massage novice
frisk harangue impatient jubilant matriarch nudge
frustrated harass implore judge mature nurse
funeral hardworking imprison juror mealtime nut
furious harm incarcerate kick medicate nuzzle
gangster hassle inconsiderate kid meek nymphomaniac
gay hatemonger incriminate kid meeting obedient
genius heal indecisive kill melancholy obey
gentle healer independent kind merchant observe
gentleman Heaven indignant kiss merry obstruct
ghetto heckle indoctrinate kitchen millionaire office
gigolo hell industrious klutz mimic ogle
girl help infant knife mind old
girlfriend helper infatuated laboratory minister opponent
glad hero inform laborer mischievous opportunist
gleeful heroine informer lackey miser oppose
gloomy heterosexual inhibited lady miserly optimistic
glorify hideout injure laud mistress order
glum hire innocent lawyer mob organizer
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orgy playful rebellious schoolgirl sorry tackle
orphan playground rebuff schoolmate spank tavern
outgoing playmate rebuke schoolroom spendthrift taxi
outlaw poke reception schoolteacher spinster taxpayer
outraged policeman receptionist scientist spiteful teach
outspoken politician reckless scold spokesman teacher
overcharge pompous redhead scornful spokeswoman teammate
overjoyed poor reform scratch sponger tease
overpower poorhouse regretful scrooge spouse tease
overwhelm popular rehabilitate scrutinize squeeze teenager
overwhelmed pornographer relative search stab temperamental
overwork praise relieved secretary steady temple
pagan preacher remind seduce stepbrother tenant
pal prejudiced remorseful seize stepchild tent
pamper priest renounce selfish stepdaughter terrified
panicked priestess repentant seminar stepfather terrorist
parade principal reprimand sensitive stepmother test
paranoid prison reproach sentence stepparent test
parent probationer rescue sentimental stepsister thank
parody prod resentful serenade stepson thankful
parolee professor resort serene stingy theater
partner prompt responsible sermon stoolpigeon thoughtless
party prosecute restaurant serve stop threaten
passerby prostitute restrain server store thrilled
passionate protect retiree sexist stranger thug
pastor protg reverent shaken strangle tickle
patient Protestant reward sheriff street timid
patient protester rib shocked strict toady
patriot proud rich shoot strip toast
patrolman psychiatrist ridicule shopkeeper stroke toddler
pauper psychopath riot shoplifter stubborn tolerant
peaceful psychotic rival shopper stud tomboy
peacetime punch rob shove student torment
pedestrian punish robber shrewd student tormented
pediatrician punk roommate shrink study torture
peeved pupil rouse shush stupid tot
penalize purchaser ruthless shy subdue touch
penitentiary pursue sad sibling submissive touched
perceptive push sadist sickened subordinate train
persistent quack sadistic silence subway trainee
pessimist quarrelsome saint sincere sue traitor
pessimistic queer saintly sinner superior traveler
pest query salesclerk sister supermarket treat
pester question saleslady slap superordinate troublemaker
pet questioner salesman slaughterhouse supervise truant
petrified quiet saloon slug supervisor trusting
petty quiz salute slum supporter tug
photograph quiz sarcastic slut surgeon tutor
physician rabbi satisfied sly surprise tyke
pickpocket racist sauna smoker survivor unadventurous
pickup racketeer save smug suspect unambitious
pimp rape sawbones snuggle suspicious uncle
pinch rapist scared sock sweatshop underachiever
pizzeria raunchy schizophrenic son sweetheart underdog
placid ravish scholar soothe swinger undergraduate
plainclothesman reassure schoolboy sorrowful sympathetic underpay
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understanding vacation virtuous watch wife worker
undress vacationer visitor wedding wild workman
uneasy vain voter weekend wilderness workmate
unfair vengeful voyeur welcome windbag worried
unfriendly victim waiter wheedle winner young
unimaginative victimize waitress whip wise youngster
unpopular vigilante warm White withdrawn youth
unreliable village warn whore witness zoo
upbraid villain wartime whorehouse woman
upset violent wash widow womanizer






Figure E.1: The instructions/information page presented to participants.
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Figure E.2: The first bet page presented to participants with a randomly
generated shape and a banked total initialised at 100.
Figure E.3: The feedback page presented to participants showing a ‘smi-
ley’ face at the bottom and in the centre. In this case the feedback being
given is that an indifferent event occurred.
265
Figure E.4: A subsequent bet page presented to participants with a ran-
domly generated shape, updated banked total and a count of the number
of bets made (at the top of the page).
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Figure E.5: The shape rating page consisting of two questions collect-
ing demographic information, then the six experimental shapes each with
9 sliders for participants to indicate their ratings between the extremes







Table F.1: An example of the Semantic Differential ratings sheet used by
participants for each triangle. The example below shows the rating sheet
for the triangle presented in the upper left corner as depicted at the top
of the sheet.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
cruel        kind
curved        straight
masculine        feminine
untimely        timely
active        passive
savory        tasteless
unsuccessful        successful
hard        soft
wise        foolish
new        old
good        bad
weak        strong
important        unimportant
angular        rounded
calm        excitable
false        true
colorless        colorful
usual        unusual
beautiful        ugly
slow        fast
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Appendix G
The Problem of Points
The problem of points, a gambling problem which is also known as division of the
stakes, is a problem said to have been posed to mathematician Blaise Pascal by
French writer, Chevalier de Me´re´ (Antoine Gombaud); the problem was discussed
by Pascal and Fermat in a series of letters. The problem that was posed is as
follows:
Suppose two gamblers play a coin tossing game where the first person
to get two heads or tails wins, and the game ends after at most three
tosses. Suppose also that the gamblers, after placing their stakes, for
some reason must stop after one winning head. What would be a
rational division of the money?
Intuitively, it seems that the money should not be divided equally because the
gambler with the first winning head from the first toss has a greater chance of
winning overall. But how much more should this player receive?
If the game continued, it seems that it could end in three different ways: a) by
tossing a head, in which case the heads player will win; b) by tossing tails then
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tails, in which case the tails player will win; c) by tossing tails then heads, in which





conceptual insight, however, is recognising that there are really four possibilities.
The extra (imaginary) toss after the second toss comes up heads must also be
considered, this makes the complete list of possibilities: a) heads, heads and the
heads player wins; b) heads, tails and the heads player wins; c) tails, tails and
the tails player wins; d) tails, heads and the heads player wins: Therefore, the





Pascal (1665) showed that in a game where one gambler needs r points to win



















Figure H.1: Image representing the action genre.
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Figure H.2: Image representing the classical art genre.
Figure H.3: Image representing the surreal art genre.
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Figure H.4: Image representing the nature genre.
Figure H.5: Image representing the romance genre.
275
Figure H.6: Presentation of an image on a web page and method of
rating using slider bars.
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Figure H.7: Example of images used to build the Gaussian mixture
model.
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